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LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY    Of 
CALfFORNIA 


RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 


COLUMBU  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
SALES  AGENTS 


NEW  tork: 
LEMCKE  &  BUECHNER 

30-33   EAST   aOTH   STBEBT 

LONDON : 
HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

AU£N    CORNER,    K.    C. 

BHANGHAI : 
EDWARD  EVANS  A  SONS.  Ltd. 

30   NORTH   8ZECHUEN   ROAD 


RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

A  CRITICAL  SURVEY  OF  METHODS  OF 
APPROACH  TO  RELIGIOUS  PHENOMENA 


BY 


FREDERICK  SCHLEITER,  Ph.D. 


N«ti  fork 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1919 

All  rights  resei'ved 


Copyright  1919 
Bt  Columbia  University  Press 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  April,    1919 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


i'4 


TO 
MY  MOTHER 

AND 

MRS.  FANNIE  LAKE 


6^0 


PREFACE 

I  am  indebted  to  Prof.  Franz  Boas  for  the 
suggestion  that  my  use  of  the  term  '  emanation  ' 
in  the  original  MS.  was  too  narrow  to  compre- 
hend the  phenomena  involved.  In  the  revision  I 
have  therefore  attempted  to  embody  this  point. 
I  have  profited  by  discussing  several  of  the 
problems  involved  in  this  work  with  Prof.  John 
Dewey  and  Dr.  A.  A.  Golden weiser.  Dr.  Gol- 
denweiser  has  been  particularly  generous  in  the 
giving  of  his  time  in  detailed  conversations. 
In  the  sections  dealing  with  causality,  particu- 
larly in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  the  physical 
sciences,  I  have  followed  some  constructive  sug- 
gestions made  by  Prof.  W.  P.  Montague.  I 
am  also  indebted  to  Prof.  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge 
for  assistance  in  a  thorough  revision  of  the  text. 
Due  to  his  criticisms  I  have  in  some  degree 
softened  or  modified  the  rather  iconoclastic  atti- 
tude which  I  took  toward  the  comparative 
method  in  ethnology.  I  am  lastly  immeasur- 
ably obligated  to  my  mother  and  Mrs.  Fannie 
Lake  for  their  painstaking  labor  which  has 
involved     a    host    of    necessary    details.     All 


viii  PREFACE 

problems  involved  in  organization,  methods  of 
research  and  bibhography,  which  necessarily 
become  very  considerable  in  this  type  of  work, 
have  been  handled  by  Mrs.  Lake  in  a  most  able 
and  effective  manner,  and  her  measure  of  con- 
tribution I  am  therefore  unable  to  overestimate. 


Frederick  Schleiter. 

Columbia  University, 
Febniarj',  1919. 


f 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  1 

Difficulties  involved  in  the  attempt  to  de- 
scribe religion  at  large  or  apart  from  its 
cultural  setting 1 

CHAPTER  2 

Universal  laws  based  upon  the  intensive 
study  of  a  limited  geographical  area  or 
historical  period 5 

CHAPTER  3 

The  comparative  method  and  the  classical, 
unilinear,  evolutionary  series 21 

CHAPTER  4 

The  problem  of  the  correct  interpretation 
of  ethnographical  analoga 43 

CHAPTER  5 
The  relations  between  magic  and  religion .  .     68 

CHAPTER  6 

Spirit  as  the  primordium 74 

ix 


z  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   7 
Magical  power  as  the  primordium 101 

CHAPTER   8 

The  anomalous  position  of  emanation  and 
the  specific  powers  and  properties  of 
physical  bodies 126 

CHAPTER  9 

The  relations  of  causality  to  magic,  religion 
and  other  phases  of  culture 136 

CHAPTER  10 

The  application  of  the  concept  of  converg- 
ence in  the  interpretation  of  causaHty. 
Unconscious  mental  processes 153 

CHAPTER  11 

The  application  of  the  concept  of  converg- 
ence in  the  interpretation  of  causality. 
(Continued).  Various  additional  mental 
processes 164 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 


\ 


CHAPTER   1 

DIFFICULTIES  INVOLVED  IN  THE  ATTEMPT  TO 

DESCRIBE  RELIGION  AT  LARGE  OR  APART 

FROM  ITS  CULTURAL  SETTING 

The  observations  of  daily  life,  literature, 
travelers'  accounts  and  ethnographic  mono- 
graphs, furnish  a  bewildering  profusion  of  data 
which,  it  would  seem,  might  be  properly  utilized 
as  the  basis  of  a  generalized  interpretation  of  the 
magico-religious  thoughts,  feelings  and  overt 
behavior  of  man.  Various  degrees  of  excellence 
characterize  the  raw  data  but,  on  the  whole, 
there  is  a  very  considerable  amount  of  a  purely 
descriptive  character  which  is  both  of  a  high 
order  and  readily  available.  There  is  a  wide 
gap,  however,  between  this  abundant  and  di- 
verse material  and  the  theoretical  treatise  which 
purports  to  be  based  upon  it.  Sundry  diffi- 
culties and  pitfalls  beset  the  attempt  to  arrive 
at  valid  universal  conclusions  by  means  of  deal- 
ing in  a  general  way  with  phenomena  which 
exhibit  enormous  complexity  and  hence  resist 
the  demands  of  exact  treatment  and  classification. 


2  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

Notwithstanding  these  considerations,  how- 
ever, nearly  all  theoretical  works  attempt  to 
build  up  and  describe  a  type  or  pattern  in  which 
individual  and  particular  phenomena  are  forth- 
with conceived  to  participate  more  or  less  fully. 
The  statement  of  religion,  as  such  and  at  large, 
free  from  the  exigencies  of  time  and  place,  is 
the  end  toward  which  they  direct  their  efforts. 
It  is  sometimes  necessary  to  employ  consider- 
able violence  in  order  to  correlate  specific  events, 
beliefs,  rites  and  historical  processes  with  the 
abstract  type  but  nevertheless  the  purity  and 
absolute  character  of  the  latter  remain  rela- 
tively undisturbed.  Real  phenomena  appear 
only  in  its  reflected  light. 

The  philosophical  treatment  of  religious  data 
has  sinned  grievously  in  this  respect;  indeed, 
it  is  frequently  difficult  to  state  the  precise  facts 
on  which  its  theories  are  founded.  On  the 
whole,  however,  it  appears  to  refer  largely  to 
reflective  mental  processes  appearing  in  both 
the  lower  and  higher  civilizations,  but  more 
frequently  the  latter.  In  so  great  degree  is  this 
true  that  there  is  oftentimes  considerable  danger 
of  identifying  religion  with  the  philosophy  of 
religion,  i.  c,  of  disregarding  completely  the 
historic  individuality  of  complicated  rites,  cere- 
monies and  beliefs,  and  conceiving  of  it  purely 
as  a  view  of  the  world.     An  article  by  Ladd 


RELIGION  AT  LARGE  3 

illustrates  strikingly  this  tendency  to  disregard 
ethnographic  data  and  deal  with  an  abstract 
formulation.  ''For  religion  is",  he  says,  ''as  a 
matter  of  historical  and  psychological  fact,  al- 
ways metaphysical.  It  is  alwaj^s  a  naive  or  a 
reasoned  theory  of  reality.  It  is  an  attempt  to 
explain  human  experience  by  relating  it  to  in- 
visible existences  that  belong,  nevertheless,  to 
the  real  world.  Indeed,  monotheism  finds  in  its 
One  and  Alone  God  the  Ultimate  Reality,  the 
Being  from  whom  all  finite  beings  proceed,  on 
whom  they  all  depend,  and  to  whom  they  all 
owe  the  devotion  of  their  lives  in  a  faithful 
allegiance.  This,  however,  is  ontological  doc- 
trine— somehow  postulated  rationally,  or  rea- 
soned out,  or  superstitiously  and  vainly  imag- 
ined ".^ 

The  situation  created  by  the  abstraction  of 
magico-religious  phenomena  from  their  cultural 
settings  and  their  description  and  characteriza- 
tion uherhaupt,  is  analogous  to  that  which  has 
frequently  been  referred  to  by  Dewey  and  his 
students  as  obtaining  within  the  field  of  logic, 
when  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  abstract 
logical  elements  from  concrete  psychical  pro- 
cesses and  deal  with  them  in  their  relationship 

*  Ladd,  The  religious  consciousness  as  ontological, 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods, 
1904,  V.  1,  p.  9. 


4  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

to  reality  as  such  and  at  large.^  A  peculiar 
problem  has  thus  been  created  by  the  dichotomy 
of  psychology  and  logic,  the  former  dealing  with 
mental  existence, — the  stream  of  experience  inci- 
dent to  the  life  history  of  the  individual, — the 
latter  with  meaning  which  goes  beyond  the  par- 
ticular mental  state,  is  not  embodied  in  the 
fragmentary  image  but  refers  to  a  reality  beyond 
the  act  of  judgment. 

It  is  desirable,  however,  to  investigate  the 
processes  of  generalization,  abstraction  and  re- 
construction, as  they  are  actually  carried  out 
in  the  science  of  religion,  and  attempt  to  bring 
clearly  to  light  the  types  of  presupposition  in- 
volved. We  may  therefore  proceed  to  consider 
a  number  of  methods  of  treatment  which  have 
important  ramifications  and  which  continually 
recur  in  the  vast  literature  of  the  subject. 

'See  for  example,  Dewey,  Studies  in  logical  theory, 
Ch.  I.  See  also  Dewey  and  others,  Creative  intelligence, 
"The  need  for  a  recovery  of  philosophy",  pp.  29,  32-33, 
38,55. 


CHAPTER  2 

UNIVERSAL  LAWS  BASED   UPON  THE   INTEN- 
SIVE STUDY  OF  A  LIMITED  GEOGRAPHICAL 
AREA  OR  HISTORICAL  PERIOD 

The  conception  that  the  most  fruitful  method 
to  be  pursued  in  the  interpretation  of  cultural 
phenomena  consists  in  the  intensive  study  of  a 
limited  geographical  area  which  provides  the 
habitat  of  an  independent  development,  and  by 
this  means  arrive  at  certain  laws  of  evolution 
which  are  of  universal  or  world-wide  distribution, 
was  perhaps  first  propounded  by  Buckle.  He 
states  that  in  his  youth  he  cherished  an  ambitious 
dream  of  writing  an  universal  history,  but,  upon 
undertaking  the  task,  found  the  materials  in  a 
condition  entirely  too  unsatisfactory  for  his 
purpose,  which  he  thereupon  abandoned,  and 
proceeded  to  devote  himself  to  a  more  modest 
and  feasible  work.  He  then  cast  about  for  a 
proper  object  of  study, — a  cultural  development 
of  great  importance  in  the  history  of  the  world, 
which,  at  the  same  time,  involved  an  individual 
and  independent  growth  within  a  limited  area, 
5 


6  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

free  from  foreign  influences.  As  an  Englishman, 
it  was  not  ill-befitting  that  he  made  his  native 
land  the  object  of  his  investigations.  In  a  very- 
quaint  and  curious  manner,  he  proceeds  to 
justify  his  thesis  that  the  cultural  and  institu- 
tional development  of  England  has  not  been 
materially  determined  by  foreign  influences. 
Englishmen  are  wont  to  travel  abroad,  he  tells 
us,  but  are  not  receptive  of  exotic  elements. 
Europeans  also,  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  occa- 
sionally sojourn  in  England  but,  in  any  event, 
leave  no  marked  impress  upon  the  culture  of 
the  country;  indeed,  the  ordinary  proletariat 
in  the  customary  course  of  his  life  never  sees  a 
foreigner  save  when,  by  chance,  he  happens  to 
stumble  upon  "some  dull  and  pompous  am- 
bassador taking  his  airing  on  the  bank  of  the 
Thames!"  1 

Buckle  conceives  that  it  is  possible  by  means 
of  studies  of  this  type  to  formulate  certain  laws 
of  history  and  of  the  correlation  and  succession 
of  social  phenomena  which  are  as  rigid  and  as 
valid  as  those  of  the  natural  sciences.  '*I  select 
for  especial  study,"  he  ^ays,  ''the  progress  of 
English  civilization,  simply  because,  being  less 
affected  by  agencies  not  arising  from  itself,  we 
can   the   more  clearly  discern  in  it   the  normal 

*  Buckle,  The  history  of  civilization  in  England,  pp. 
1G8-1C9. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  7 

march  of  society,  and  the  undisturbed  operation 
of  those  great  laws  by  which  the  fortunes  of  mankind 
are  ultimately  regulated' \^ 

Buckle's  method  of  intensive  study  of  a 
limited  geographical  area  or  period  of  history 
and  the  concomitant  determination  of  laws  of 
universal  validity  based  thereon,  has  been  re- 
peatedly applied  in  the  interpretation  of  religious 
phenomena.  According  to  Max  Miiller,  India 
provides  the  most  excellent  material  for  the 
study  of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  religion,  and 
he  tells  us  that  he  has  framed  his  own  theories  of 
these  subjects  from  a  life  long  study  of  the 
sacred  books  of  India.  In  a  rather  guarded 
way  he  proceeds  to  generalize  the  Hindu  phe- 
nomena. "When  we  have  learnt  how  the  an- 
cient inhabitants  of  India  gained  their  religious 
ideas,  how  they  elaborated  them,  changed  them, 
corrupted  them,  we  may  be  allowed  to  say  that 
possibly  other  people  also  may  have  started  from 
the  same  beginnings,  and  may  have  passed 
through  the  same  vicissitudes."  ^ 

Nieuwenhuis  considers  the  Bahau  and  Kenja 
of  the  Island  of  Borneo,  and  the  Toradja  of  the 
Island  of  Celebes,  as  the  basis  of  his  investiga- 
tions into  the  necessary  rise  and  development  of 
religious  concepts  and  practices.    He  believes 

*Ibid.,  p.  171.    Italics  mine. 

•  Miiller,  Origin  and  growth  of  religion,  p.  132. 


8  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

that  these  tribes  are  the  most  primitive  in 
existence,  that  they  are  isolated  from  foreign 
influences,  particularly  Malay  and  Islam,  and 
manifest,  therefore,  an  ideal  independent  de- 
velopment.'' 

Frazer,  who  finds  it  possible  to  embody  in  his 
immensely  voluminous  works,  several  mutually 
irreconcilable  types  of  research,  has  utilized  this 
method  in  his  interpretation  of  totemism.  Aus- 
tralia, as  a  whole,  he  considers  to  be  cut  off  from 
the  rest  of  the  world  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
it  is  surrounded  by  water,  and  its  central  por- 
tion, in  turn,  to  be  isolated  from  the  remainder 
of  the  continent  by  natural  boundaries.  ''Here, 
then,  in  the  secluded  heart  of  the  most  secluded 
continent,  the  scientific  inquirer  might  reason- 
ably expect  to  find  the  savage  in  his  very  lowest 
depths,  to  detect  humanity  in  the  chrysalis  stage, 
to  mark  the  first  blind  gropings  of  our  race  after 
freedom  and  light.  The  reader  who  turns  to  the 
Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia  with  such 
hopes  and  expectations,  will  not,  I  venture  to 
hope,  be  disappointed  ".^  With  this  thought 
firmly  fixed  in  his  mind,  he  regards  the  Intich- 

*  Nieuwenhuis,  Die  Wurzeln  des  Animismus,  Inter- 
nalionales  Archiv  fiir  Ethnographic,  1917,  Sup.  to  band  24, 
pp.  8-9. 

» Frazer,  The  origin  of  totemism,  Fortnightly  Review, 
1899,  n.8.,  V.  65. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  9 

luma  ceremonies  as  *Hhe  key  to  the  original 
meaning  and  purpose  of  Totemism  among  the 
Central  Australian  tribes,  perhaps  even  of 
Totemism  in  general".^ 

In  a  recent  work,  aiming  at  systematic  com- 
prehensiveness, Durkheim  again  makes  the  Aus- 
tralian phenomena  the  basis  of  a  generalized 
interpretation  of  the  nature,  function,  and  de- 
velopment of  religion.  He  alleges  that  the  life 
of  these  peoples  is  the  most  primitive  known  to 
the  ethnographer^  and  that  their  religious  prac- 
tices and  ideas  have  developed  through  an  inner 
immanent  potentiality  free  from  foreign  sources.^ 

6Ibid.,  p.  664. 

'  Durkheim  finds  the  criteria  of  primitiveness  in  certain 
features  of  material  culture  and  social  organization 
"Not  only  is  their  civihzation  most  rudimentary — ^the 
house  and  even  the  hut  are  still  imknown — but  also  their 
organization  is  the  most  primitive  and  simple  which  is 
actually  known; — ^it  is  that  which  we  have  elsewhere 
called  organization  on  a  basis  of  clans."  The  elementary 
forms  of  the  reHgious  life,  p.  96.  Golden weiser  has  fre- 
quently pointed  out  that  this  latter  point  does  not  rest 
upon  a  single  shred  of  definite  evidence  and  is,  indeed, 
violently  at  variance  with  the  most  acceptable  ethno- 
graphic opinion  of  the  present  day.  ReHgion  and  society: 
A  critique  of  Emile  Durkheim's  theory  of  the  origin  and 
nature  of  rehgion,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and 
Scientific  Methods,  1917,  v.  14,  pp.  113-124. 

8  Durkheim,  The  elementary  forms  of  the  rehgious 
life,  p.  1. 


10  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  intensive  study  of  the  Australian  data, 
therefore,  is  "better  adapted  than  any  other  to 
lead  to  an  understanding  of  the  religious  nature 
of  man,  that  is  to  say,  to  show  us  an  essential 
and  permanent  aspect  of  humanity".^  While 
he  admits  that  it  is  of  some  interest  to  examine 
into  the  nature  of  any  particular  religion  in  and 
for  itself,  this  procedure  is  to  be  understood  as 
only  incidental  in  serving  to  bring  out  the  ulti- 
mate nature  of  the  type.  "If  it  is  useful'^  he 
Bays,  "to  know  what  a  certain  particular  religion 
consists  in,  it  is  still  more  important  to  know  what 
religion  in  general  is.  This  is  the  problem  which 
has  aroused  the  interest  of  philosophers  in  all 
times;  and  not  without  reason,  for  it  is  of 
interest  to  all  humanity."  ^^ 

The  entire  attempt  to  formulate  universal 
laws  upon  the  basis  of  the  intensive  study  of  a 
very  limited  group  of  cultural  facts  literally 
bristles  with  fallacies  and  insupportable  pre- 
suppositions, the  most  obvious  and  far  reaching 
of  which  embodies  the  idea  that  the  ethno- 
graphic phenomena  found  in  some  specially 
selected  area,  are  the  result  of  an  independent 
development,  and  constitute,  as  it  were,  an 
indigenous  entity  possessing  complete  historic 
individuality.     In    the    last    analysis    there    is 

"  Ibid.,  p.  2,  see  also  p.  95. 
*°  Ibid.,  p.  4,     Italics  mine. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  11 

always  involved  an  artificial  and  wholly  im- 
aginary separation  of  a  mere  fragment,  with 
widely  ramified  irradiations,  from  the  vast  period 
of  history.  A  large  number  of  very  recent 
studies  have  shown  the  enormous  importance  of 
the  transmission  and  intermixture  of  cultural 
elements  from  one  area  to  another.  While  this 
consideration  has  become  something  of  a  com- 
monplace among  many  ethnologists,  its  impor- 
tance, however,  is  still  far  from  being  universally 
recognized,  and  it  is  therefore  desirable,  for 
purposes  of  illustration,  to  refer  briefly  to  a 
few  instances. 

It  is  possible  that  a  number  of  widespread 
and  fundamental  ideas  and  inventions  find  their 
ultimate  source  in  a  prehistoric  culture  which 
existed  prior  to  the  dispersion  of  the  human 
race.^^  Whatever  attitude  be  taken  with  refer- 
ence to  these  exceedingly  ancient  cultural 
achievements,  diffusion  is  now  known  to  have 
occurred  over  vast  areas  and  in  a  multiplicity 
of  ways  even  within  the  sharp  limitations  of  that 
relatively  short  chronological  period  to  which  our 
knowledge  refers.  Speaking  in  the  most  general 
terms,  detailed  and  careful  studies  have  in- 
variably revealed  the  fact  that  the  empirical 
possibilities  of  transmission  are  much  greater 
than  would  seem  a  priori  plausible.    Cultural 

"  Boas,  Anthropology,  p.  22. 


12  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

features  may  be  disseminated  over  enormous 
distances  with  incredible  rapidity.  Tobacco 
was  introduced  into  Africa  after  the  discovery 
of  America  and  quickly  spread  over  the  entire 
continent,  indeed,  soon  became  so  completely 
integrated  in  the  indigenous  cultures,  that  to-day 
no  one  would  suspect  its  foreign  origin.  In  a 
similar  way  the  banana  has  spread  over  almost 
the  whole  of  South  America,  and  Indian  corn 
over  the  entire  world.  The  horse,  cattle,  Euro- 
pean grains,  and  the  use  of  milk,  were  widely 
disseminated  in  prehistoric  times.^  Boas  gives 
abundant  testimony  to  the  very  widespread 
transmission  of  tales  among  the  natives  of  the 
northern  portion  of  North  America. ^^  Kalish 
calls  attention  to  the  immense  significance  of 
the  serpent  in  the  religious  systems  of  the 
world,  particularly  those  of  the  East.^^  El- 
worthy  cites  the  widespread  use  of  the  serpent 
as  an  amulet  together  with  its  so-called  worship 
and  prevalence  in  the  mythologies  of  Babylonia, 
Persia,  India,  Ceylon,  China,  Japan,  Burmah, 
Java,  Arabia,  Syria,  Asia  Minor,  Egypt,  Ethio- 

"  Boas,  Anthropology,  p.  2L 

"  Boas,  Dissemination  of  tales  among  the  natives  of 
North  America,  Journal  of  American  Folk-Lore,  1891,  v.  4, 
pp.  16-17. 

"  Kalish,  A  historical  and  critical  commentary  on 
the  Old  Testament,  Genesis  III. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  13 

pia,  Greece,  Italy,  and  North  America. ^^  The 
distribution  of  magico-religious  ideas  regarding 
serpents  obviously  suggests  processes  of  diffusion, 
although  in  specific  cases  it  would  not  be  possible 
to  prove  them.^® 

Having  become  convinced,  through  the  study 
of  the  historical  growth  of  various  culture  com- 
plexes, that  they  are  really  the  result  of  diffusion 
and  intermixture,  Rivers  considers  that  the 
necessary  preparation  for  the  interpretation  or 
formulation  of  evolutionary  laws,  consists  in 
cultural  analysis,  by  means  of  which  the  elements 
composing  the  assemblage  of  features  may  be 
disentangled  and  traced,  so  far  as  possible,  to 
their  respective  points  of  origin. ^^  In  an  indefin- 
ite number  of  citations  throughout  his  work^,  Boas 
has  recommended  the  employment  of  the  same 
principle  as  the  one  best  calculated  to  yield  vaUd 
scientific  results,  and  the  entire  American  school 
which  has  been  directly  under  his  influence,  has 
attempted  to  carry  it  out  in  greater  or  lesser 
degree  in  the  course  of  different  investigational  ^^ 

15  Elworthy,  The  evil  eye,  p.  311. 

1^  In  view  of  the  fact  that  these  ideas  are  relatively 
simple,  they  may,  in  many  cases,  have  had  an  independent 
origin. 

^"^  Rivers,  The  ethnological  analysis  of  culture,  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  1911,  p.  494. 

18  For  the  application  of  this  method  of  research  in  the 
interpretation  of  a  group  of  religious  phenomena,  see 


14  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  widespread  tendency  to  regard  Australia 
as  the  cradle  of  religion  and  the  basis  of  more 
generalized  evolutionary  speculations,  has  been 
vigorously  attacked  by  Rivers.  By  a  compara- 
tive study  of  Australia  and  Melanesia,  he  has 
become  convinced  that  the  former  contains  a 
mixture  of  cultures  having  the  same  or  similar 
components  as  those  of  the  latter.  More  speci- 
fically, he  believes  that  the  form  of  social 
organization  clearly  indicates  the  historical  con- 
tact *'of  a  people  possessing  the  dual  organization 
and  matrilineal  descent  with  one  organized  in 
totemic  clans,  possessing  either  patrilineal  de- 
scent, or  at  any  rate  clear  recognition  of  the 
relation  between  father  and  child."  \*  Paren- 
thetically we  may  call  attention  to  a  somewhat 

Goldenweiser,  Totemism,  an  analytical  study,  Journal  of 
American  Folk-Lore,  1910,  v.  23.  Wissler  has  referred  to 
the  views  of  the  American  School  "as  the  psychic  accident 
theory  of  culture  origin  as  opposed  to  the  developmental 
or  evolutionary  theory."  This  would  imply,  according 
to  Wissler,  that  the  aggregation  of  elements  found  in  a 
cultural  complex,  has  not  been  assembled  according  to 
fixed  laws  of  development,  but  is  to  be  explained  only 
as  the  result  of  an  adventitious  association, — a  "psychic 
accident."  The  psychological  aspects  of  the  culture 
environment  relation,  American  Anthropologist,  1912,  p. 
222. 

"  Rivers,  The  ethnological  analj'sis  of  culture,  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  Report,  1911, 
p.  495. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  13 

specialized  magical  procedure  which  suggests  an 
ancient  transmission  between  the  Malay  pen- 
insula and  Australia.  In  the  former  area  the 
attempt  is  made  to  bring  infliction  upon  an  en- 
emy by  holding  in  the  hand  a  sharpened  splinter 
of  bamboo,  performing  an  incantation  over  it, 
whereupon  it  is  presumed  to  enter  the  body  of 
the  designated  person:  in  the  latter,  a  similar 
custom  exists  which  is  called  '*  pointing  the 
bone,"  a  piece,  generally  of  the  tibia,  being 
"sung  over'',  and  then  despatched  on  its  malevo- 
lent mission.20 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  utilize  the  Mela- 
nesian  data,  on  the  basis  of  its  alleged  primitive- 
ness,  in  support  of  the  doctrine  as  to  the  ultimate 
origin  and  development  of  religious  concepts, 
particularly  that  of  mana.^^  According  to  Rivers, 
however,  this  procedure  is  entirely  unjustifiable, 
in  so  far  as  Melanesian  society  exhibits  great 
complexity  and  heterogeneity,  by  reason  of  the 

2°Skeat  and  Blagden,  Pagan  races  of  the  Malay 
peninsula,  v.  2,  p.  199.  Spencer  and  Gillen,  The  native 
tribes  of  Centra!  Australia,  p.  534.  The  Northern  tribes 
of  Central  Austraha,  pp.  25,  455,  458,  459,  463,  480. 
Howitt,  The  native  tribes  of  South-East  Australia,  p.  326. 

2^  See,  for  example,  Codrington,  The  Melanesians. 
Compare  also  the  entire  group  of  mana  theorists,  who 
commonly  fall  back  upon  the  Melanesian  data,  in  con- 
nection with  that  taken  from  many  other  ethnographic 
areas. 


16  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

fact  that  it  is  the  resultant  of  the  mixture  of 
three  or  four  main  cultures  through  historical 
contact.22 

A  number  of  remarks  of  Wundt  involve  an 
implied  attack  upon  the  entire  attempt  to  formu-. 
late  laws  upon  the  basis  of  the  study  of  a  limited 
area,  indeed,  he  points  out,  in  particular,  that 
a  culture  could  only  be  conceived  of  as  abso- 
lutely primitive  if  no  antecedent  mental  de- 
velopment whatsoever  could  be  pre-supposed, — 
a  situation  which  is  obviously  not  realized  in 
experience.2^  Smith,  in  dealing'  with  the  rites 
and  beliefs  of  the  ancient  Semites,  points  out 
that  no  religion  begins  de  novo  with  a  tabula  rasa, 
but  is  to  be  understood  only  with  reference  to 
older  ideas  and  practices  which  have  become 
integrated  with  it.^^  Ratzel  has  suggested  that 
the  idea  of  independent  development  in  the 
social  sciences  is  comparable  to  the  theory  of 
spontaneous  generation  of  biology,  and  is,  there- 
fore, to  be  regarded  as  essentially  anachronistic, 

^  Rivers,  The  ethnological  analysis  of  culture,  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  Report,  1911, 
p.  494:  The  history  of  Melanesian  Society. 

28  Wundt,  Elements  of  folk  psychology,  1916,  p.  20. 
It  is  curious,  however,  that  this  consideration  does  not 
prevent  Wundt  from  framing  a  generalized  evolutionary 
schematism  of  the  cultural  development  of  mankind  some- 
what according  to  traditional  prescriptions. 

"  Smith,  The  religion  of  the  Semites,  p.  2. 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  17 

— a  suggestion  which  has  been  abundantly 
elaborated  by  Graebner,  Foy,  Ankermann, 
Schmidt,  Elliot  Smith  and  others. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the 
development  of  this  point  of  view  on  the  part 
of  the  German  school  has  led  to  the  most 
extreme  results,  the  preferential  use  of  the  con- 
(  cept  of  diffusion  having  become  a  methodological 
Metish.  Graebner,  indeed,  goes  so  far  as  to  con- 
tend that  the  independent  development  of  similar 
ethnic  features  in  two  or  more  areas  cannot  be 
demonstrated  by  objective  criteria,  but  are  to 
be  explained  by  transmission,  regardless  of  how 
far  apart  be  the  areas,  or  improbable  the  histor- 
ical contact.2^  The  German  school,  however, 
has  subserved  the  very  useful  function  of  calling 

25  Graebner,  Methode  der  Ethnologie,  p.  107.  The 
morphological  similarity  of  widespread  simple  inventions 
Buch  as  the  bow  and  arrow,  the  throwing  stick,  the  dart, 
the  cross,  and  the  swastika,  cannot  be  regarded  as  proof 
of  historical  relationships  of  the  cultures  in  which  they 
occur,  but  may  have  (at  least  in  many  instances)  an 
independent  origin.  McGee,  Anthropology  and  its  larger 
problems,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904,  v.  5. 
Dixon  also  points  out  that  a  simple  invention  like  the 
dugout  canoe  may  have  had  an  independent  origin  in  two 
or  more  areas.  Dixon,  The  independence  of  the  culture 
of  the  American  Indian,  Science,  1912,  n.s.,  v.  35,  p.  48,  55. 
Compare  also  Boas,  Review  of  Graebner's  Methode  der 
Ethnologie,  Science,  1911,  n.s.,  v.  34,  p.  48. 

3 


IS  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

attention  to  the  enormous  empirical  possibilities 
of  transmission  and,  in  this  manner,  has  con- 
trived to  stimulate  the  most  vital  and  important 
historical  investigations. 

One  of  the  characteristic  features  of  intensive 
studies,  based  upon  a  delimited  area  and  the 
concomitant  determination  of  laws  of  universal 
validity,  is  an  appalling  lack  of  historical 
perspective.  Robinson's  illuminating  illustra- 
tion of  the  relative  length  of  chronological  periods 
may  be  introduced  as  a  healthy  criticism  of  un- 
controlled speculations  of  this  type.  He  im- 
agines the  whole  history  of  mankind  as  divided 
up  into  twelve  hours,  of  which  the  present  may 
be  considered  as  noon.  A  very  conservative 
estimate  would  consider  man  to  have  been  an 
upright  creature  for  two  hundred  and  forty 
thousand  years.  Each  hour  on  the  clock  repre- 
sents twenty  thousand,  each  minute,  three 
hundred  and  thirty  three  and  one  third  years. 
For  more  than  eleven  and  a  half  hours  there  is 
no  record.  At  twenty  minutes  before  twelve 
vestiges  of  Egyptian  and  Babylonian  civiUzation 
begin  to  appear.  Looking  upon  these  vast 
stretches  of  time  from  this  point  of  view,  accord- 
ing to  Robinson,  the  whole  perspective  of  history 
is  completely  changed,  and  those  whom  we  have 
been  wont  to  call  the  ancients — Thales,  Pytha- 


LAWS  BASED  ON  LIMITED  DATA  19 

goras,  Socrates  and  Plato — are  really  our  con- 
temporaries.^^ 

Kohlbruges  points  out  the  essentially  senti- 
mental attitude  which  various  ethnographers 
have  taken  with  reference  to  the  particular 
people  with  whom  they  have  dealt, — each  feeling 
it  incumbent  upon  himself  to  prove  that  his 
particular  group  is  the  most  primitive  known 
and  hence  of  the  greatest  importance  for  genetic 
study.  In  this  connection  he  cites  the  work  of 
the  Sarasin  brothers  on  the  Veddhas  of  Ceylon, 
Klastch  on  the  Australians,  Schmidt  on  the 
Pygmies,  etc.^' 

A  suppressed  element  of  irrefragable  absurdity 
lies  behind  the  attempt  to  frame  evolutionary 
hypotheses  on  the  basis  of  tribes  alleged  to  be 
most  primitive  and,  therefore,  to  constitute  the 
elementary  stage  in  the  process  of  development. 
In  any  particular  case,  it  is  perfectly  possible 
that  the  specific  people  involved  has  not  wilfully 
contrived  to  remain  in  statu  quo,  in  a  chrysalis 
stage,  for  untold  ages,  and  so  provide  the  con- 

26  Robinson,  The  new  history,  pp.  239-240,  251. 

"Kohlbruges,  Review  of  Schmidt's  Die  Stellung  der 
Pygmaenvolker  in  der  Entwickelungsgeschichte  des  Men- 
schen,  Anthropos,  v.  5,  p.  1186.  For  other  discussions  of 
the  criteria  of  primitiveness  see  Wundt,  Elements  of 
folk-psychology,  pp.  77-78,  and  Schmidt,  Die  Stellung 
der  Pygmaenvolker  in  der  Entwickelungsgeschichte  des 
Menschen,  pp.  268-269,  270. 


20  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

venient  basis  for  speculative  reconstructions  of 
the  order  of  development,  but  on  the  other  hand, 
may  represent  a  process  of  degeneration  from  a 
higher  level  of  culture.  History  furnishes  abun- 
dant cases  of  the  degradation  of  high  civiliza- 
tions to  a  much  lower  level,  indeed,  we  may 
regard  this  change,  in  the  reverse  order,  as  one 
of  the  inevitable  vicissitudes  attendant  upon 
man's  sojourn  upon  the  surface  of  the  earth. 
As  cases  in  point,  Lankester  mentions  the  Indians 
of  Central  America,  the  modern  Egyptians, 
Fuegians,  Bushmen,  and  Australians.^^ 

2^  Lankester,  Advancement  of  science,  p.  47. 


CHAPTER  3 

THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  AND  THE  CLASS- 
ICAL, UNILINEAR,  EVOLUTIONARY  SERIES 

In  contradistinction  to  the  attempt  to  formu- 
late generalizations  upon  the  basis  of  a  cultural 
fragment  torn  out  of  the  total  universe  of  human 
aJGfairs,  the  comparative  method  undertakes  to 
deal  with  an  agglomeration  of  data  gathered 
from  the  four  corners  of  the  earth  and  the  ends 
of  time.  It  proceeds  to  classify  these  facts  under 
the  very  ill-defined  and  loose  principle  of  morpho- 
logical similarity, — taboo,  totemism,  contagious 
and  imitative  magic,  etc.,  being  illustrations  of 
the  type  of  rubrics  employed. 

Dewey  characterizes  the  procedure  of  the  com- 
parative method  as  consisting  in  the  bunching  of 
static  facts  to  indicate  the  common  properties 
of  the  primitive  mind.  That  which  determines 
the  grouping  of  a  number  of  elements  under  a 
common  heading,  is  the  fact  that  "they  have 
impressed  the  observer  as  alike  in  some  respect".^ 

^  Dewey,    Interpretation    of   savage   mind.     Thomas, 
Source  book  for  social  origins,  p.  174. 
21 


22  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

On  a  single  page  of  Spencer  are  cited  Kam- 
schadales,  Kirghiz,  Bedouins,  East  Africans, 
Bechuanas,  Damaras,  Hottentots,  Malays,  Papu- 
ans, Fijians,  Andamanese.  The  data  thus 
brought  together  are  not  organically  inter- 
related, and  do  not  embody  that  dynamism 
which  is  so  necessary  to  genetic  considerations. 
As  a  result,  no  coherent  scheme  of  mind  is  pre- 
sented, but  the  various  divisions  of  cultural  facts 
grouped  together  loosely  on  the  basis  of  alleged 
similarity  are,  indeed,  somewhat  comparable  to 
the  disparate  entities  of  the  faculty  psychology, 
each  of  which  stands  upon  its  own  legs.^ 

In  a  work  of  vast  proportions^  Frazer  classifies 
all  magical  rites,  beliefs  and  practices  into  two 
grand  divisions,  homoeopathic  or  imitative  and 
contagious.  He  regards  all  magic  as  a  pseudo- 
science  whose  ultimate  explanation  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  misapplication  of  the  association 
of  ideas, — the  principle  lying  at  the  basis  of  the 
first  type  being  that  'like  produces  like',  and 
that  at  the  basis  of  the  second  that  things  which 
have  once   been   in   contact  may   continue  to 

'Ibid.,  p.  173  and  fol.  Instead  of  raking  together 
facts  under  the  principle  of  similarity,  Dewey  proposes 
to  study  tjTDes  of  mind  in  so  far  as  they  are  embodied  in 
occupations  which  determine  the  formation  and  use  of 
habits.     Ibid.,  p.  176. 

'  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  vols.  1  and  2. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  23 

exert  an  influence  over  one  another  at  a  distance 
after  the  actual  connection  has  been  severed. 
Drawing  his  material  from  the  entire  world, 
and  describing  facts  totally  without  reference  to 
their  cultural  settings  and  the  penumbrae  of 
thoughts  and  feelings  which  cluster  round  them, 
he  brings  together,  under  the  common  heading 
of  *  imitative  magic  ^  rites  and  practices  which 
are  of  an  exceedingly  heterogeneous  character, 
to  wit,  the  abuse  of  an  image  under  the  theory 
that  an  enemy  will  suffer  corresponding  injury, 
the  Intichiuma  ceremonies  of  the  Australian 
aborigines  for  the  multiplication  of  the  totemic 
animal,  the  ghastly  initiation  ceremonies,  in- 
cluding those  concerned  with  certain  bodily 
mutilations,  the  knocking  out  of  teeth,  etc.* 
Under  the  title  of  'contagious  magic'  he  as- 
sembles a  vast  amount  of  other  material  exhibit- 
ing no  less  diversity.^ 

A  similar  state  of  affairs  obtains  in  the  uncon- 
trolled use  of  the  term  'fetishism'  as  employed 
by  De  Brosses,  Comte,  Schultze  and  many 
others, — the  single  term  being  used  to  designate 
phenomena  of  the  most  heterogeneous  char- 
acter and,  at  the  same  time,  an  alleged  stage  in 
the  development  of  the  mental  life  of  man, 
viewed  both  from  the  standpoint  of  individual 

*  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  v.  1,  chapter  3,  sec.  2 
.     »Ibid.,  V.  1,  ch.  4. 


24  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

and  racial  or  cultural  development.  De  Brosses, 
who  characterizes  fetishism  as  *le  culte  de  cer- 
tains objets  terrestres  et  mat^riels',  appears  to 
have  used  the  term  in  a  very  wide  sense  to 
include  practices  and  beliefs  regarding  the  vir- 
tues of  amulets,  talismans,  prophylactics  against 
the  evil  eye,  etc.,  indicating  that  the  objects  to 
which  the  term  is  applied  are  neither  necessarily 
gods  nor  the  habitats  of  divine  beings  or  spirits. 
Comte,  on  the  other  hand,  used  the  term  as 
loosely  coextensive  with  the  w^orship  of  natural 
objects  or  phenomena,  implying  in  all  cases  that 
the  thing  itself  is  a  spirit,  or  that  a  spirit  abides 
in  it,  controls  it,  or  works  through  it.  In  the 
so-called  'fetishistic  stage'  of  development 
Comte  alleges  that  primitive  man  believes  all 
phenomena  to  be  controlled  by  the  agency  of 
spiritual  beings.  Tylor,  with  his  strong  bias 
in  favor  of  animism,  considers  fetishism  to  imply 
the  presence  of  spiritual  beings  and  he  char- 
acterizes it  as  "the  doctrine  of  spirits  embodied 
in,  or  attached  to,  or  conveying  influence 
through,  certain  material  objects,  vessels  or 
vehicles  or  instruments  of  spiritual  beings."** 

^  Primitive  culture,  1903,  v.  2,  p.  144.  Borchert  also 
states:  "Der  Fetischdiener  verehrt  nicht  diesen  von 
einem  Geiste  bewohnten  Gegenstand  als  solchen,  sondem 
er  verehrt  den  Geist,  der  in  ihm  wohnt  und  wirkt." 
Borchert,  Der  Animismus,  Studien  aus  dern  Collegium 
Sapientiae  zu  Freiburg  i??i  Breisgau,  Band  5,  p.  171. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  25 

Speaking  with  due  fairness,  therefore,  it  is 
perhaps  patent  that  the  term  'fetishism,'  in  the 
profuse  literature  of  the  subject,  has  been  used 
with  great  poetic  license  and  bewildering  am- 
biguity and  has  been  applied  in  a  loose  way  to  a 
body  of  phenomena  whose  character  and  extent 
are  not  limited  or  well  defined.  The  central  or 
nuclear  symptom  of  fetishism  commonly  con- 
noted is  a  magico-religious  attitude  toward  an 
inanimate  object.  The  psychological  processes, 
however,  in  a  number  of  different  cases  may  be 
so  diverse  and  non-comparable  as  to  render  the 
use  of  a  single  term  to  comprehend  them  exceed- 
ingly unjustifiable  and  positively  misleading. 
An  object  may  be  worshipped  because  it  provides 
the  habitat  of  a  spirit  or  a  god ;  it  may  attain  to 
profound  magical  significance  because  it  pro- 
vides the  source  of  supposedly  therapeutic  ema- 
nations or  because  it  is  believed  to  possess 
specific,  mysterious  virtues  or  properties;*'  it 
may  be  used  as  a  prophylactic  for  the  purpose  of 
warding  off  the  malevolent  and  destructive  radia- 
tions from  the  evil  eye^  or  it  may  be  used  in 
connection    with    the    doctrine    of    signatures, 

^  See  especially  Karutz,  Der  Emanismus,  Zeitschrift  fur 
Ethnologie,  1913. 

^  EI  worthy,  The  evil  eye,  and  Westermarck,  The  magic 
origin  of  Moorish  designs,  Journal  of  the  Royal  Anthro' 
pological  Institute,  1904,  v.  34. 


26  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

according  to  which  nature  is  believed  to  have 
set  upon  various  things,  a  sign,  symbol,  color  or 
whatnot,  which  indicates  that  they  are  efl&cacious 
for  the  securing  of  certain  definite  magical 
results,  generally,  the  cure  of  diseases. 

In  his  great  classic  dealing  with  religion,  Tylor 
uses  the  term  *  animism'  or  the  'animistic  view 
of  nature',  to  designate  a  large  number  of  psychic 
processes  in  primitive  culture,  in  the  mind  of  the 
child  and  in  the  higher  civilizations,  which  are  in 
many  respects  profoundly  non-homogeneous  and 
should  not  be  grouped  under  one  category.  In 
another  place  we  have  given  a  detailed  analysis 
of  Tylor's  position  which  should  be  considered  in 
this  connection,  but  it  may  suffice  here  to  indi- 
cate merely  a  number  of  the  diverse  mental 
operations  referred  to  by  him  as  illustrations  of 
the  general  theory  of  world  animation.  He  re- 
duces to  a  common  denominator  and  considers 
upon  the  same  level,  mythological  stories  in 
which  the  heavenly  bodies  are  personified,  the 
play  of  children  in  which  objects  take  on  a 
dramatic  role,  a  man's  anger  as  expressed  in  his 
retaliation  upon  an  object  which  has  injured  him, 
Xerxes  flogging  the  Hellespont,  legal  proceedings 
instituted  for  the  purpose  of  trying  an  object 
which  has  killed  a  man,  etc. 

A  word  of  caution  should  be  appended  to  the 
foregoing  somewhat  drastic  critique  of  the  com- 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  27 

parative  method  and  the  fact  made  clear  that 
we  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  it  is  intrinsically 
vicious  wherever  it  appears  and  in  whatever 
sense  employed.  It  has,  indeed,  yielded  vaHd 
results  in  such  disciplines  as  anatomy,  linguistics, 
etc.,  and  the  process  of  comparison  is  frequently 
utilized  very  advantageously  by  way  of  illu- 
minating a  theme  or  making  clear  a  point  by 
parallel  cases  and  analogous  conditions.  There 
is,  perhaps,  also  considerable  to  be  said  in  favor 
of  the  comparative  method  even  in  ethnology. 
It  has  served  to  bring  together  similar  customs, 
rites  and  ideas  the  world  over,  to  stimulate 
investigation  of  them  and  has,  perhaps,  in  many 
cases,  laid  the  basis  for  their  elucidation.  In 
the  hands  of  a  great  master  like  Tylor  immense 
masses  of  material  are  classified  and  our  knowl- 
edge of  a  specific  case  seems  to  be  enriched  by 
citation  of  other  instances  of  a  like  character. 
If  we  wish  to  do  full  justice  to  the  comparative 
method,  therefore,  we  should  compare  it  to  the 
great  classificatory  period  of  the  natural  sciences, 
represented  by  such  writers  as  Cuvier,  Buffon 
and  Linnaeus,  in  which  great  quantities  of  data 
were  brought  together  under  certain  specific 
rubrics.  This  scientific  procedure,  however, 
represented  only  a  stage, — a  precondition  of  evo- 
lutionary generalizations  which  were  implicitly 
involved.     These  classifications  finally  became 


28  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

so  top-heavy  and  unwieldly  that  they  demanded 
working  over  from  a  new  and  critical  point  of 
view  not  based  purely  upon  classificatory  and 
morphological  principles.  This  new  point  of 
view  was  reflected  in  evolutionary  speculations 
which,  whatever  their  shortcomings,  involved  a 
complete  reorganization  of  the  material  collected 
in  the  classificatory  period.  In  a  similar  manner 
the  data  assembled  by  the  comparative  method 
in  ethnology  which  is  based  largely  upon  mor- 
phological considerations  cannot  be  regarded  as 
final,  but  requires  to  be  supplemented  and 
worked  over  from  entirely  different  points  of 
view.  More  adequate  sifting,  testing  and  re- 
analysing  in  accordance  with  more  critical  prin- 
ciples; the  abandonment  of  the  exclusive  use 
of  the  form  criterion  as  the  basis  of  the  classi- 
fication of  similarities;  the  abnegation  of  the 
rash  desire  to  frame  vast  generalizations  of  world 
wide  significance  and  validity,  and  fixed  evolu- 
tionary series  upon  the  basis  of  heterogeneous 
and  non-comparable  material;  are  indicated. 
Our  criticisms,  therefore,  are  directed,  not  against 
the  desirability  and  the  usefulness  of  instituting 
world-wide  comparisons,  but  rather  against  the 
loose  implications  and  presuppositions  involved. 
It  is  well  to  recognize,  therefore,  that  the  com- 
parative method  furnishes  a  valuable  preparation 
to  more  detailed   and    critical    studies    leading 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  29 

inevitably  to  certain  important  supplementary 
principles.  At  the  present  time,  however,  it 
is  only  fair  to  add  that  there  is  no  agreement  as 
to  the  tools  to  be  employed, — ethnologists  being 
divided  into  various  schools  each  of  which  dis- 
trusts the  work  of  the  others. 

The  previous  discussion  will  serve  to  bring 
clearly  to  our  attention  the  fact  that  the  litera- 
ture dealing  with  religion  is  loaded  down  with 
catchwords  which  are  used  to  designate  groups 
of  phenomena  which  are  ill-defined  and  each  of 
which  may  indeed  be  of  almost  indefinite  extent. 
With  a  certain  degree  of  poetic  license  we  may 
use  such  terms  as  'imitative  magic',  '  fetishism', 
*  animism',  Hotemism',  Haboo',  'nature  wor- 
ship', 'monotheism',  'henotheism',  'polythe- 
ism', etc.,  but  the  moment  that  we  attempt  to 
attach  a  clear  and  reasonably  delimited  connota- 
tion to  any  of  them  we  immediately  plunge  into 
the  most  serious  difficulties. 

Classificatory  rubrics  of  the  types  referred  to 
seem  to  arise  as  the  inevitable  product  of  the 
peculiar  logic  of  the  Geistesmssenschaften,  par- 
ticularly in  so  far  as  the  comparative  method  is 
followed:  they  are,  moreover,  almost  inextri- 
cably bound  up  with  various  a  priori  theories 
of  social  or  cultural  evolution, — the  novelistic 
influence  of  these  developmental  theories  pre- 
scribing their  dramatic  roles  and  setting  them 


30  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

in  motion:  indeed,  although  the  elements  of 
which  they  are  composed  lose  their  dynamism  by 
being  violently  torn  from  the  context  of  reality 
in  which  they  have  been  embedded,  they  receive 
a  vicarious  infusion  of  vitality  when  placed  upon 
a  new  stage.  Thus  the  comparative  and  the 
evolutionary  methods  in  the  social  sciences  are 
intrinsically  bound  up  together  and  mutually 
supplement  one  another,  indeed,  but  for  the 
benevolent  ministrations  of  the  latter,  the  cre- 
ations of  the  former  would  remain  truly  Platonic 
ideas,  set  in  the  empty  heavens  of  intellectual 
abstractions  and  uncontaminated  by  participa- 
tion in  the  moving  reality  of  the  empirical  world. 
It  is  perhaps  not  possible  to  emphasize  too 
strongly  the  fact  that  schemes  of  development 
do  not  arise  as  the  result  of  inductive  studies 
based  upon  the  raw  material  to  which  they  refer, 
but  are  essentially  the  products  of  the  cloister 
which  are  dragged  out  upon  appropriate  oc- 
casion and  correlated  with  the  facts  in  accord- 
ance with  certain  artistic  demands, — in  other 
words,  an  order  of  development  having  been 
postulated,  material  is  assembled  according  to 
its  prescriptions  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
case  seems  to  be  adequately  demonstrated  and 
'proved.' 

In  1760  De  Brosses  set  the  fashion  for  a  long 
line  of  evolutionary  theorists  by  his  celebrated 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  31 

book^  in  which  he  set  forth  the  theory  that 
fetishism  is  the  fundamental  form  of  religion, 
followed  later  by  polytheism,  and,  lastly,  by 
monotheism.  As  the  basis  of  his  study,  De 
Brosses  considered  the  Negroes  of  the  West 
coast  of  Africa  as  described  by  Portuguese  sailors 
and  regarded  them  as  the  most  primitive  people 
known.  De  Brosses,  however,  was  not  thor- 
oughly consistent  in  his  evolutionary  schema- 
tism, indeed,  his  general  doctrine  was  somewhat 
pervaded  and  corrupted  by  the  theological  ideas 
prevalent  at  the  time.  Accordingly  he  believed 
that  there  was  one  race,  the  Jewish,  which  had 
never  passed  through  the  fetishistic  stage.  All 
other  peoples,  however,  were  originally  the  recip- 
ients of  a  primordial  Divine  Revelation  which 
they,  in  some  manner,  contrived  to  lose,  where- 
upon they  promptly  began  at  the  beginning  of 
the  evolutionary  series,  namely,  with  fetishism, 
then  progressed  to  polj^heism,  and  lastly  to 
monotheism. 

The  theories  of  De  Brosses  obtained  wide 
currency  in  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  and 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  centuries.  The 
doctrine  of  fetishism  as  the  elementary  religion 
was  widely  disseminated  and  popularized  and, 

8  De  Brosses,  Du  culte  des  deux  fetishes,  ou  parallele 
de  Tancienne  religion  de  I'Egypte  avec  la  religion  actuelle 
de  Nigritie. 


32  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

indeed,  attained  new  influence  through  the  writ- 
ings of  Comte  who  makes  it  the  initial  stage  in 
the  process  of  evolution. 

Comte  assumed  that  the  mental  development 
of  man, — both  from  an  ontogenetic  and  a  phylo- 
genetic  point  of  view, — passes  through  three 
necessary  phases  of  development.  In  the  pri- 
mary, or  "theological,"  state,  man  seeks  the 
essential  nature  of  things,  the  first  and  final 
causes,  or  absolute  knowledge,  and  believes  that 
all  phenomena  arise  through  the  action  of  super- 
natural beings;  in  the  "metaphysical"  state, — 
which  Comte  regards  as  one  of  a  purely  transi- 
tional character, — he  projects  abstract  entities 
such  as  forces,  etc.,  instead  of  supernatural 
beings,  and  considers  them  as  the  explanation 
of  all  phenomena;  in  the  final  or  positivistic 
state,  he  abandons  "the  vain  search  after  abso- 
lute notions,  the  origin  and  destination  of  the 
universe,  and  the  causes  of  phenomena,  and 
applies  himself  to  the  study  of  their  laws, — 
that  is,  their  invariable  relations  of  succession 
and  resemblance".^ 

The  process  of  individual  development  repre- 
sents a  parallel  series,  and,  if  one  looks  back 
upon  his  own  history,  says  Comte,  he  will  dis- 
cover "that  he  was  a  theologian  in  his  childhood, 

9  Comte,  The  positive  philosophy,  v.  1,  p.  2. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  33 

ia  metaphysician  in  his  youth,  and  a  natural 
philosopher  in  his  manhood  ".^^ 

In  the  presentation  of  facts  supporting  the 
validity  of  his  thesis  Comte  selects  only  those 
which  contribute  to  its  plausibility:  specifically, 
he  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  astronomy 
and  chemistry  have  arisen  historically  out  of 
the  chimerical  notions  of  astrology  and  alchemy.^^ 

A  certain  pleasing  plausibility  attaches  to  these 
evolutionary  generalizations  of  Comte.  His 
position  has  been  frequently  attacked  and  de- 
fended, and  perhaps  rarely  justly  evaluated.  By 
reason  of  the  fact  that  the  stages  are  exceedingly 
general,  wide-sweeping  and  comprehensive,  they 
do  not  yield  themselves  readily  to  specific  tests 
and  criticisms,  moreover,  one  cannot  altogether 
rid  himself  of  the  haunting  thought  that  there  is 
much  more  to  Comte's  position  than  seems  a 
priori  obvious,  and  that  it  perhaps  furnishes  a 
convenient,  and  rough  and  ready,  characteriza- 
tion of  a  genuine  historical  sequence.  If  the 
attempt  be  made,  however,  to  test  or  apply  this 
evolutionary  hypothesis  in  the  interpretation  of 
specific  cases,  it  frequently  breaks  down  entirely. 
(1)  There  is  abundant  testimony  to  show  that 
primitive  man,  in  the  'theological  state',  fre- 
quently makes  use  of  positivistic  knowledge. 

"Ibid.,  p.  3. 

"  Comte,  The  positive  philosophy,  v.  1,  p.  5. 
4 


34  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

Concrete  investigations  have  invariably  shown 
that  the  definite  scientific  information  possessed 
and  utiKzed  by  primitive  man,  is  enormously 
greater  than  is  immediately  evident,  or  than 
that  which  is  ordinarily  ascribed  to  him  by 
that  variegated  horde  of  evolutionary  hypotheses 
which  are  wont  to  attribute  to  him  a  more  or 
less  benign  innocence. ^^  (2)  In  the  positivistic 
state,  at  the  present  day,  theological'  and 
'metaphysical'  interpretations  frequently  main- 
tain themselves,  side  by  side,  with  those  of 
rationalistic  science.  Moreover  the  individual, 
considered  as  a  disparate  entity,  may  partake  of 
both  of  these  cycles  of  participation:  he  may 
hold  esoteric  communion  with  gods  and  spirits, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  carry  out  concrete 
physical  experiments  which  make  use  of  the 
mathematical  method,  and  which  do  not  provide 
a  loop-hole  for  the  machinations  of  anthropo- 
morphic entities  possessing  independent  will 
power  and  the  potentiality  of  capricious  depre- 
dations. The  statement  that  every  science  arises 
as  a  direct  lineal  descendant  of  pre-existent  meta- 
physical or  theological  views  of  the  world,  cannot 
be  regarded  as  a  generalization  based  upon  his- 

"  See  for  example  Roth,  Superstition,  magic,  and  medi- 
cine, North  Queensland  Ethnography  Bulletin,  no.  5. 
Goldenweiser,  The  knowledge  of  primitive  man,  American 
Anthropologist,  1915,  n.s.,  v.  17. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  35 

torical  facts.  Frequently  a  science  has  an  inde- 
pendent development  from  a  positivistic  or 
rationalistic  origin,  and  never  passes  through 
these  previous  states.  Undoubtedly  a  consider- 
able part  of  our  pharmacopoeia  has  developed 
from  administrations  utilized  by  primitive  man, 
without  antecedent  adventitious  genuflections  or 
ideas  regarding  spiritual  beings.  An  indefinite 
amount  of  technological  procedure,  such  as  is 
involved  in  the  constructions  of  houses,  boats, 
canoes,  etc.,  has  arisen,  in  a  similar  manner, 
from  purely  matter  of  fact  motives. 

One  of  the  dogmas  which  has  been  very  popu- 
lar with  evolutionary  writers  from  time  im- 
memorial, is  that  the  idea  of  God  is  a  relatively 
late  development  in  history  and  represents  a 
mature  flowering,  as  it  were,  of  the  religious 
spirit  which  is  immanent  in  man.  Investiga- 
tion, however,  entirely  fails  to  support  this  view, 
— there  being  considerable  evidence  that  the 
concept  of  an  omnipotent  being  may  arise  spon- 
taneously among  the  most  primitive  tribes. 
Schmidt,  for  example,  considers  the  pygmies  as 
constituting  the  lowest  race  of  men  but  finds,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  they  possess  a  lofty  con- 
ception of  a  single  God.^^    Lang  in  numerous 

^'  Schmidt,  Die  Stellung  der  Pygm&envdlker  in  der 
Entwickelungsgeschichte  des  MenscheUy  p.  244. 


36  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

places"  calls  attention  to  the  distribution  of  the 
All-father  belief  among  the  Australian  aborig- 
ines, who  are  considered  by  a  whole  group  of 
theorists  as  the  most  primitive  races  and  the 
fitting  subject  of  far-reaching  evolutionary  specu- 
lations. Borchert,  writing  from  a  theological 
point  of  view,  assumes  that  the  idea  of  God  is,  as 
it  were,  immanent  in  the  religious  or  mental  life 
of  man  and  that  such  phenomena  as  are  repre- 
sented by  the  worship  of  spirits  and  the  cult  of 
ancestors,  are  of  secondary  derivation.  He 
alleges  that  the  idea  of  an  All-father  is  prevalent 
among  the  most  backward  races  and  is  also 
revealed  in  the  oldest  historical  records,  par- 
ticularly the  earliest  collections  of  the  Rig- 
Veda.15 

Numberless  attempts  have  been  made  to  show 
that  the  notion  of  mana,  or  magical  power,  con- 
stitutes the  magico-religious  primordium  and 
that,  only  later  in  history,  ideas  of  spiritual 
beings  and  gods  have  been  elaborated.  If  we 
look  at  the  evidence,  however,  on  a  plain  surface, 
and  without  preconception,  it  is  perfectly  evident 

"See,  for  example,  Lang,  The  making  of  religion, 
pp.  91-92:  Australian  gods,  Folklore,  March,  1899. 
Compare  also  Spencer  and  Gillen,  The  native  tribes  of 
Central  Australia,  pp.  222-246. 

"  Borchert,  Der  Animismus,  Studien  aus  dem  Collegium 
Sapieniiae  zu  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  Band  5,  pp.  vii,  31, 
34,  45,  52,  55,  161,  163,  172. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  37 

that  the  idea  of  force  is  of  universal  distribution, 
and  develops  with  iron  necessity,  as  Bastian 
might  say,  wherever  man  lives,  in  civilized,  as 
well  as  in  primitive,  society.  In  making  this 
statement,  which  may,  perhaps,  to  many,  seem 
somewhat  extreme,  we  do  not  mean  to  suggest 
that  the  scientific  concept  of  force  is  identical  in 
all  respects  with  the  idea  of  mana,  but  rather 
that  they  may  be  regarded  as  similar  or  com- 
parable with  respect  to  one  or  more  morpho- 
logical features,  even  though  the  concomitant 
psychological  penumbrae  of  the  two  ideas,  when 
set  in  different  stages,  may  exhibit  considerable 
variation. 

In  the  last  analysis,  all  evolutionary  theories 
go  back  to  an  hypothetical  primordium  which 
furnishes  the  starting  point  of  their  serial  ar- 
rangement of  data.  If,  however,  in  the  selection 
of  the  primary  stage,  the  writer  contrives  to 
seize  the  wrong  pig  by  the  ear,  his  further  periods 
of  development  will  not  exhibit  progressive  im- 
provement,— the  words  of  von  Moltke,  applied 
to  things  military  being  equally  relevant  here: 
''An  initial  strategical  blunder  never  can  be 
retrieved". 

It  is  very  instructive  to  note  that  the  great 
difficulty  involved  in  the  satisfactory  determina- 
tion of  the  primordium,  is  not  confined  to  inter- 
pretations of  religion  and  other  phases  of  the 


38  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

psychic  life  of  man,  but  has  also  been  keenly 
felt  in  the  biological  sciences.  Referring  to 
botany,  Goebel  says: 

"It  seeks,  then,  with^  diUgence  after  'primitive'  forms. 
But  in  this  search  we  meet  with  great  difficulties.  In  the 
first  place,  we  are  inclined  to  regard  those  forms  as  primi- 
tive which  have  simple  form-relations,  and  unmarked 
division  of  labor.  But  such  forms  may  also  have  arisen 
by  reversion,  and  if  one  looks  over  botanical  literature,  he 
sees,  at  least  so  far  as  the  relationships  between  the  larger 
groups  are  concerned,  there  exists  no  agreement  as  to 
which  forms  are  to  be  regarded  as  primitive  and  which 
derived;  opinion  on  this  point  often  changes  with  the 
fashion.  Thus  the  thallose  liverworts  have  up  till  now 
been  regarded  as  more  primitive  than  the  foliose,  because 
the  vegetative  body  of  the  former  is  much  more  simple  in 
construction  than  that  of  the  latter,  and  between  them 
there  are  found  gentle  gradations.  Recently,  however, 
the  attempt  has  been  made  to  derive  the  thallose  from  the 
foliose  forms.  This  is  not  the  place  to  examine  the  evi- 
dence for  or  against  such  derivations.  How  vacillating  is 
the  point  of  view  from  which  it  is  judged  what  form  is 
primitive  is  shown  by  the  various  positions  which  have 
from  time  to  time  been  given  to  the  apetalons  dicotyledons 
(p.  87).  ...  I  do  not  wish  to  deny  the  value  of  phyloge- 
netic  investigation,  but  the  results  which  it  has  brought 
forth  often  resemble  more  the  product  of  creative  poetic 
imagination  than  that  of  exact  study,  i.  e.,  study  capable 
of  proof."     (p.  97).i« 

^^  Goebel,  The  fundamental  problems  of  present-day 
plant  morphology,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  St.  Louis, 
1904.  V.  5. 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  39 

All  evolutionary  schemes  of  religion,  without 
exception,  in  the  determination  of  the  primor- 
dium  and  the  serial  stages  of  alleged  develop- 
ment, proceed  upon  a  purely  arbitrary  and  un- 
controlled basis.  The  empirical  possibilities  of 
arrangement  of  the  data,  starting,  in  this  manner, 
from  a  primary  point  of  orientation,  are  in- 
definitely numerous,  and,  if  we  spread  before 
ourselves  dispassionately  a  number  of  classical 
evolutionary  schemes,  there  is  little  reason  to 
accord  preferential  respectability  to  any  one  of 
them  on  the  ground  of  a  relatively  greater  degree 
of  plausibility.^^ 

Among  all  the  attempts  which  have  been  made 
to  set  forth  the  genealogical  relations  alleged  to 
exist  among  religious  practices  and  ideas,  few, 
indeed,  have  involved  a  serious  test  of  the 
hypothetical  scheme  by  means  of  concrete  his- 
torical studies,  in  this  respect  differing  materially 
from  the  biological  sciences  which  have  been 
able  to  check  up  their  developmental  theories 
by  consulting  the  archaeological  and  palaeonto- 

*'  For  a  statement  of  objections  to  world  wide  unilinear 
evolution,  see  for  example,  Crooke,  Method  of  investiga- 
tion and  folklore  origins,  Folklore,  1913,  v.  24,  p.  19. 
Wissler  suggests  that  the  various  so-called  epochs  are 
merely  types  of  culture,  of  uneven  distribution,  some  of 
which  have  been  contemporaneous.  The  doctrine  of 
evolution  and  anthropology,  Journal  of  Religious  Psy- 
chology, 1913,  V.  6,  p.  231. 


40  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

logical  records.  Taking  Robinson's  view  of  his- 
torical perspective,  according  to  which  the  life 
of  man  as  an  upright  creature  must  be  regarded 
as  having  consumed  at  least  two  hundred  and 
forty  thousand  years,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
whole  discussion  is  somewhat  vitiated  by  being 
confined  to  a  relatively  insignificant  period  of 
history.  Speaking  in  the  most  general  terms, 
therefore,  we  may  safely  say  that  all  these 
genealogical  hypotheses  lack  objective  confirma- 
,tion  and  that  their  relative  merit  is  to  be  judged 
.largely  on  the  ground  of  obvious  plausibility  and 
ingenuity,  and  the  inner  logical  consistency  and 
symmetry  involved  in  the  process  of  their  own 
unfolding. 

The  principles  determining  these  evolutionary 
arrangements  being  thus  capricious  and  uncon- 
trolled, may  therefore  justly  be  said  to  involve  a 
strong  admixture  of  artistic  and  novelistic  ele- 
ments, together  with  that  all-pervading  logical 
principle  characteristic  of  the  Geistesmssenschaf- 
ten,  namely,  the  extrusion  of  negative  evidence. 
The  writer,  indeed,  fares  best  and  swims  most 
easily  in  a  sea  of  generalities  when,  and  in  so  far 
as,  he  can  get  rid  of  some  of  his  facts.  This 
procedure  serves  to  give  the  freest  rein  to  his 
imagination  and  to  provide  the  indispensable 
basis  of  a  quasi-dramatic  narrative.  The  facts 
to  which  reference  is  made  are  so  enormously 


THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD  41 

complex  and  diversified,  that,  by  means  of  a 
rigid  selection  carried  out  in  the  service  of  a 
special  point  of  view,  almost  any  specific  the- 
oretical point  can  be  '^  proved '\ 

If,  however,  we  spread  the  material  out  on  a 
plain  surface  and  take  for  a  moment  the  view  of 
Bastian  that  there  are  a  limited  number  of 
fundamental  ideas^*  which  characterize  the  life 

1*  Bastian  and  Dilthey  have  claimed  that  there  are  a 
limited  number  of  metaphysical  ideas  which  occur  with 
appalling  monotony  both  in  the  writings  of  philosophers 
and  the  mind  of  primitive  man.  For  example,  the  presence 
of  Platonic  ideas  among  the  American  Indians,  cited  by 
Tylor  and  Alexander,  is  a  case  in  point.  Referring  to 
the  tendency  of  a  name  toward  hypostatization,  Alexander 
says:  "This  is  curiously  illustrated  by  the  Indian  notion 
of  an  archetjTJal  chief  (a  veritable  Platonic  Idea)  of  every 
animal  species,  from  which  each  individual  of  the  species 
draws  its  life.  The  myth  of  such  universals — universalia 
ante  res,  in  the  true  Scholastic  sense — is  a  plain  consequence 
of  the  primitive  inabihty  to  think  an  abstraction  other 
than  concretely;  every  idea  corresponds  to  a  reality 
because  every  idea  is  a  present  vision  of  its  object." 
Alexander,  Communion  with  Deity,  Hastings  Encyclopedia 
of  Religion  and  Ethics,  p.  744.  Boas  calls  attention  to  the 
limited  number  of  categories  which  can  be  discovered 
through  an  analytical  study  of  primitive  languages  and 
the  fact  that  these  coincide  with  the  categories  of  thought 
dealt  with  by  philosophers.  Anthropology,  p.  20.  See 
also,  The  Umitations  of  the  comparative  method  of  anthro- 
pology, Science,  n.s.,  v.  4,  pp.  901-902.  Psychological 
problems  in  anthropology,  Clark  University,  Lectures  and 


42  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

of  man,  both  primitive  and  civilized,  we  are  at 
once  freed  from  the  constricting  and  artificial 
domination  of  evolutionary  schemes,  and  are  at 
liberty  to  investigate  their  occurrence  and  dis- 
tribution, without  reference  to  any  alleged  point 
for  point  correspondence  with  certain  hypothet- 
ical levels  of  cultural  achievement  or  with  any 
fixed  principles.  With  strict  regard  to  the  actual 
data,  we  are  justified  in  considering  the  funda- 
mental religious  ideas  of  man  as  lying  on  the 
same  chronological  and  logical  level,  and  in- 
volving, as  it  were,  so  many  empirical  possi- 
bilities which  are  liable  to  occur  and  recur, 
sporadically.  Ideas  of  magical  power,  spirits, 
emanations,  deities,  an  All-Father,  etc.,  are  ir- 
regularly and  willy-nilly  distributed  among 
various  cultural  stages  and  historical  periods 
and  cannot  be  stated  in  terms  of  a  necessary 
genealogical  series. 

Addresses,  1909,  pp.  127-128.  Compare  Goldenweiser, 
The  principle  of  limited  possibilities  in  the  development  of 
culture,  Journal  of  American  Folk-Lore,  1913,  v.  26,  p.  259. 


CHAPTER  4 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  CORRECT  INTERPRE- 
TATION OF  ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA 

The  comparative  method  involves  the  assump- 
tion that  ethnological  features  in  various  areas 
are  identical  or  similar,  and  hence  constitute 
homogeneous  data.  Taboo,  totemism,  the  forms 
of  art,  of  religion,  of  social  organization,  and  so 
on,  are  illustrations  of  the  cultural  products  in 
question.  The  classification  and  organization 
of  material  under  such  specific  rubrics  are  based 
upon  characteristics  of  outer  form.  Some  type 
of  arrangement  in  a  series  is  then  usually  pre- 
dicated and  the  early  methods  of  biological  evolu- 
tionism carried  over  directly  into  ethnology, — 
it  being  supposed  that  various  aspects  of  the 
spiritual  life  of  man  exhibit  genealogical  relations 
involving  a  change  from  the  simple  to  the  com- 
plex in  a  manner  similar  to  those  obtaining 
among  plants  and  animals.  It  is  furthermore 
assumed  that  a  classical  and  uniform  method  of 
development  has  taken  place  between  the  various 
forms  or  stages  of  the  process,  considered  as  a 
43 


44  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

whole,  and  also  that  each  separate  ethnological 
feature  has  arisen  in  a  certain  typical  manner, — 
Frazer,  for  example,  regarding  taboo  as  having 
developed  everywhere  by  reason  of  magical  pro- 
hibition.^ Similarity  in  the  outer  form  of  ethnic 
units  in  two  or  more  areas  or  periods  of  time  is 
held  to  involve  a  concomitant  resemblance  in 
their  historical  genesis.  The  cultural  objects  or 
constructs  set  up  in  this  manner  are  not  com- 
pletely embodied  in  actual  situations,  but  only 
participate  in  them  more  or  less  fully.  An  entire 
system  of  artefacts  is  thus  presupposed  whose 
relationship  to  the  individual  instance  is  very 
far  from  being  clearly  set  forth. 

The  ramifications  of  the  comparative  method 
are  enormously  more  widespread  than  those 
which  are  revealed  in  the  systematic  attempts 
to  build  up  evolutionary  series  or  to  generahze 
diverse  processes  of  development,  in  various 
parts  of  the  world,  in  the  form  of  an  archetypal 
narrative.  Frequently  it  is  utilized  for  purposes 
of  illustration  or  as  a  powerful  literary  device, 
ancillary  to  the  more  lucid  and  appealing  exposi- 
tion of  a  point  which  the  writer  desires  to  convey 
with  irrefragable  logic.  Some  striking  features 
possessing  morphological  resemblance  are  se- 
lected out  of  two  or  more  wider  complexes  and 

^See  Marett's  criticism  of  Frazer,  The  threshold  of 
religioD,  chapter  entitled,  "Is  taboo  a  negative  magic?" 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  45 

made  the  bases  of  comparison.  It  is  always 
assumed,  however,  that  the  concomitant  ele- 
ments associated  with  tiiese  central  features  are 
also  similar, — that  is  to  say,  if  a  complex,  A, 
possess  a  feature,  a,  similar  to  a  feature,  6,  in 
the  complex,  B,  A  and  B  are  therefore  similar 
and  may  be  spoken  of  in  the  same  breath.  The 
empirical  possibilities  of  instituting  comparisons 
according  to  this  prescription  are  almost  limit- 
less,— magic  may  be  compared  with  science, 
religion  with  paranoia,  the  vault  of  the  heavens 
with  a  man's  skull,  and  what  not.  Excerpts 
from  the  writings  of  Tanzi  furnish  an  excellent 
illustration  of  the  literary  (and  perhaps  quasi- 
scientific)  employment  of  this  device  for  the 
purpose  of  embellishing  a  theme. 

One  of  the  morphological  features  of  resem- 
blance between  religion  and  paranoia  is  the  fact 
that  both  make  use  of  spirits, — the  zealot  be- 
seeching them  to  bestow  upon  him  all  the  benefits 
of  life  and  adopting  various  prophylactic  meas- 
ures against  their  malevolent  depredations,  the 
insane  man  waging  deadly  battle  upon  those  in 
league  against  him.  This  consideration  Tanzi 
proceeds  to  amplify  in  a  very  picturesque 
manner. 

In  mellifluous  cadence,  balanced  metaphor,  and 
with  brilliant  rhetorical  artifice,  he  sets  forth  the 
parallelism, — deep,  fundamental  and  abiding, — 


40  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

between  primitive  religion  and  paranoia.  The 
artistry  of  the  writer  is  so  manifest,  his  command 
of  the  resources  of  language  so  striking,  his 
illustrations  so  well  chosen,  that  one  is  quite 
carried  away  upon  the  virile  wings  of  his  thought 
and  fancies  that,  forsooth,  he  may  see  within  the 
sombre  walls  of  the  asylum,  the  concepts,  rites 
and  practices  of  primitive  religion  vicariously 
unfolded  in  the  mental  life  and  overt  behavior  of 
the  patient.  *'Thus'^  says  Tanzi,  "the  aban- 
doned mythology  of  primitive  man  is  mobilized 
like  an  army  ready  to  assail  the  paranoiac,  who, 
without  having  ever  read  one  word  of  Spencer, 
Lubbock,  Tylor,  or  Bastian,  ends  by  creating 
for  himself  a  sort  of  personal  religion  which  is 
not  very  different  from  the  religions  of  primitive 
man,  and  which  also  passes  through  its  own 
phases  of  indistinct  animism  to  monotheism — 
that  is  to  say,  to  belief  in  a  single,  invisible,  and 
omnipotent  being,  either  persecutor  or  protec- 
tor ".^  "Since  paranoia  is  a  developmental 
anomaly  that  embraces  the  entire  life  of  a  man, 
these  clinical  histories  are  complete  biographies, 
from  which  it  would  almost  seem  as  if  paranoiacs 
possessed  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  psy- 
chology of  primitive  peoples,  and  deliberately 
set  themselves  to  imitate  them.  To  them,  also, 
the  world  seems  to  be  swarming  with  invisible 

2  Tanzi,  A  text-book  of  mental  diseases,  p.  720. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  47 

powers  and  persons,  malignant  and  proteiform, 
leagued  in  that  villainy  sometimes  horrible, 
sometimes  even  comic,  which  afflicts  or  excites, 
but  at  least  disturbs  the  simple  mind  of  the 
savage.  With  them,  also,  the  something  becomes 
the  someone,  and  good  and  evil,  but  especially 
evil,  are  the  constant  objects  of  symbolical 
personifications  ".' 

However,  those  who,  either  through  tempera- 
mental predisposition,  or  more  rationalistic  argu- 
mentation, are  disposed  to  find  some  measure  of 
justification  and  dignity  in  the  religion  of  primi- 
tive man,  will  perhaps  derive  some  measure  of 
consolation  in  the  fact  that  Tanzi  rejects  the 
parallelism  between  the  mental  processes  of 
primitive  man  and  those  of  dementia  praecox.'* 

« Ibid.,  p.  719. 

*  "Other  authorities  compare  the  degeneration  that 
takes  place  in  dementia  praecox  to  those  processes  of 
atavistic  reversion  by  which  certain  cultivated  plants 
return  to  their  wild  form,  but  it  is  unjust  to  savages  to 
liken  them  to  cases  of  dementia  praecox".  Ibid.,  p.  665. 
Freud  has  also  compared  paranoia  and  primitive  religion 
and  considers  that  in  the  latter  spirits  are  ejected  aa 
an  aspect  of  a  compensatory  process  which  serves  to 
ameliorate  the  conflicts  which  arise  within  experience. 
"  Der  Krankheitsprozess  der  Paranoia  bedient  sich  tatsach- 
lich  des  Mechanismus  der  Projektion,  um  solche  im  Seelen- 
leben  entstandene  Konflikte  zu  erledigen."  Freud,  S. 
Tiber  einige  tjbereinstimmungen  in  Seelenleben  der 
Wilden  und  der  Neurotiker,  Imago,  1913,  v.  2,  p.  15. 


48  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  form  criterion  in  the  interpretation  of 
similarities  has  held  undisputed  sway  in  eth- 
nology until  very  recent  years.  In  this  respect 
the  science  remained  anachronistic  and  fallow, — 
having  quite  failed  to  take  up  into  itself,  or 
to  draw  appropriate  morals  from,  the  significant 
and  fruitful  discussion  of  this  subject  in  the 
field  of  biology.  It  is  entirely  impossible  to 
convey  any  adequate  idea  of  the  immense  sig- 
nificance of  the  form  criterion  in  the  general 
literature  of  the  subject. 

Attempts  aimed  at  a  satisfactory  interpreta- 
tion of  similarities  constitute  an  irradiating 
centre  round  which  a  group  of  ethnological 
problems  gravitate.  The  difl&culties  attendant 
upon  the  statement  of  the  respect  in  which 
things  resemble  and  in  which  they  differ  from 
one  another,  was  early  appreciated  in  speculative 
thought.  Plato  sets  forth  the  pitfalls  to  be 
encountered  in  a  quaint  fashion. 

"Well,"  he  said,  "I  admit  that  justice  bears  a  resem- 
blance to  holiness,  for  there  is  alwaj^s  some  point  of  view 
in  which  everj^thing  is  like  every  other  thing:  white  is  in  a 
certain  way  like  black,  and  hard  is  like  soft,  and  the  most 
extreme  opposites  have  some  qualities  in  common;  even 
the  parts  ot  the  face  which,  as  we  were  sajing  before,  are 
distinct  and  have  dijfferent  functions,  are  still  in  a  certain 
point  of  view  similar,  and  one  of  them  is  like  another  of 
them.  And  you  may  prove  that  they  are  like  one  another 
on  the  same  principle  that  all  things  are  like  one  another; 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  49 

and  5^et  things  which  are  alike  in  some  particular  ought 
not  to  be  called  alike,  nor  things  which  are  unlike  in  some 
particular,  however  slight,  unlike."  ^ 

We  may  refer  firstly  to  the  biological  phases 
of  this  question  in  a  very  guarded  way,  with  an 
explicit  recognition  of  the  fact  that  biological 
considerations  cannot  be  applied  haphazardly  in 
the  interpretation  of  ethnological  phenomena, 
and  that  we  must  not,  in  any  sense,  look  for  a 
point  for  point  correlation  between  the  heuristic 
principles  utilized  by  the  two  disciplines.  Bear- 
ing these  highly  important  reservations  in  mind, 
it  is,  nevertheless,  instructive  to  consider  the 
manner  in  which  attempts  have  been  made  to 
interpret  similarities  in  this  field  of  research. 
Speaking  with  a  •  considerable  degree  of  laxity, 
we  may  say  that,  in  place  of  morphological 
similarity,  utilized  so  widely  in  ethnology  and 
general  literature,  a  comparable  fetish  has  been 
made  of  the  attempt  to  interpret  similarity 
upon  the  basis  of  descent.^ 

In  1870  Ray  Lankester  published  an  important 
article  involving  an  able  critique  of  the  treat- 
ment of  homologa  and  analoga  prevalent  in 
biology  at  that  time.     Homology,  according  to 

•>  Plato,  Protagoras,  Jowett,  1892,  p.  153. 

^We  shall  see,  however,  that  this  characterization  is 
rough  and  subserves  at  best  only  the  function  of  a  pre- 
liminary statement. 
5 


50  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

Lankester,  is  ordinarily  interpreted  by  evolu- 
tionary writers  upon  the  basis  of  descent.  If 
an  organ,  a,  in  an  animal,  A,  is  asserted  to  be 
homologous  with  an  organ,  6,  in  an  animal,  By 
it  is  meant  that  in  some  common  ancestor,  K, 
the  organs,  a  and  6,  were  represented  by  an 
organ,  c,  and  that  A  and  B  have  inherited  their 
organs,  a  and  6,  from  KJ^ 

However,  it  is  quite  obvious  that  similarity 
of  structure  cannot  be  interpreted  entirely  in 
terms  of  descent.  Parts  which  are  both  struc- 
turally dissimilar  and  cannot  be  traced  back  to  a 
common  ancestral  type,  may,  nevertheless,  take 
on  similarity  of  structure  and  function  due  to 
the  influence  of  a  similar  environment.  To 
express  the  former  type  of  resemblance  due  to 
descent  he  invented  the  term  "homogeny",  for 
the  latter  type  "  homoplasy  ".  He  proposed  that 
this  latter  term  be  applied  to  ''all  cases  of  close 
resemblance  of  form  which  are  not  traceable  to 
homogeny,  all  details  of  agreement  not  homo- 
genous, in  structures  which  are  broadly  homo- 
geneous, as  well  as  in  structures  having  no  gen- 
etic affinity  ".8  He  suggests,  however,  that  the 
term  homoplasy  may  be  susceptible  of  further 

'  Lankester,  On  the  use  of  the  term  homology  in  modem 
zoology,  Anmils  and  Magazine  of  Natural  History,  1870, 
eer.  4,  v.  6,  p.  34. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  41. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  51 

analysis,  and  that  other  contributary  causes 
may  be  involved  in  the  production  of  similar 
structures.® 

In  a  critique  of  the  position  of  Lankester, 
Mivart  states  that  if  the  word  homology  be 
abandoned,  the  two  terms  'homogeny'  and 
^homoplasy'  will  not  be  sufficient  to  replace  it, 
in  other  words,  similarities  in  structure  may  be 
looked  upon  from  more  than  two  points  of 
view.^'^  He  proceeds  to  the  enumeration  of  no 
less  than  twenty-five  different  principles  of  classi- 
fication each  of  which  is  valid  for  the  subject 
matter  to  which  it  applies,  from  whence  it 
follows  that  we  may  get  an  indefinitely  large 
number  of  different  types  of  similarity  in  accord- 
ance with  purely  subjective  principles.  ''We 
can",  he  says,  "detect  a  certain  number  of  rela- 
tions of  function,  of  origin,  and  of  conformity  of 
relative  position  of  different  kinds  according  to 
the  different  ways  in  which  we  regard  the  subject 
matter,  i.  e.,  as  we  follow  up  different  lines  of 
thought.  It  is  well  to  have  distinct  names  for 
at  least  the  more  obviously  different  conceptions 
of  this  kind,  about  a  quarter  of  a  hundred  of 
which  may  be  readily  distinguished".^^ 

8  Ibid.,  p.  42. 

"  Mivart,  On  the  use  of  the  term  "homology",  Annals 
and  Magazine  of  Natural  History,  1870,  ser.  4,  v.  6,  p.  115. 
"Ibid.,  p.  118. 


52  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

In  a  general  way,  it  has  long  been  recognized 
that  similarity  of  structure  does  not  always 
indicate  a  corresponding  genetic  resemblance. 
Specifically,  Goebel  has  shown  that  the  leaves 
of  bryophytes  in  a  number  of  series  have  arisen 
in  quite  different  ways.^^ 

The  ideal  biological  classification,  according 
to  Bower,  should  be  made  on  the  basis  of  descent, 
but  great  difficulties  are  involved  in  the  attempt 
to  carry  out  this  desideratum  in  the  general 
practice  of  plant  morphology.  The  practical 
upshot  of  the  matter,  indeed,  is  that  traditional 
categories  of  parts,  such  as  leaves,  break  down 
when  genetic  and  comparative  considerations  are 
introduced.  He  does  not  offer  a  practical  for- 
mula by  means  of  which  purely  morphological 
or  structural  similarities  may  be  harmonized 
with  similarities  conceived  from  the  point  of 
view  of  descent.^^ 

Bower  points  out  the  difficulties  attendant 
upon  the  attempt  to  introduce  too  great  pre- 
cision into  biological  nomenclature.  He  states 
that  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  regard  the 
"leaf"  as  an  abstract  entity,  distinct  from  the 
stem.  From  a  purely  morphological  point  of 
view,  such  precision  indeed  seems  to  constitute  a 

"Goebel,  Organography,  v.  1,  p.  261. 
"  Bower,    Plant   morphology.    Congress   of  Arts   and 
Sciences,  St.  Louis,  1904,  v.  5,  p.  65. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  53 

consummation  to  be  devoutly  wished.  From 
the  standpoint  of  both  ontogenetic  and  phylo- 
genetic  development,  however,  this  structural 
homogeneity  cannot  be  maintained,  and  con- 
sideration of  the  actual  form  does  not  suggest 
its  sharp  delimitation  from  the  axis  as  a  general 
feature  in  the  shoots  of  ordinary  vascular  plants.^^ 
He  appears  to  speak  of  the  term  ''leaf"  as  a 
catchword  having  reference  to  essentially  heter- 
ogeneous phenomena.  He  points  out  further 
that  the  term  has  been  borrowed  from  colloquial 
language  and  is  used  in  a  roughly  descriptive, 
rather  than  a  strictly,  scientific  sense^  In  this 
connection  he  says:  "It  designates  collectively 
objects  which  have,  it  is  true,  formal  and  func- 
tional, and  even  topographical  features  in  com- 
mon, but  have  not  had  the  same  phyletic  history. 
There  is  every  probability  that  the  word  'leaf 
will  continue  to  be  used  in  this  merely  popular 
sense  ".^^ 

Delage  points  out  with  irrefragable  logic  that 
similarity  in  the  functions  of  organs  is  of  equal 
importance  with  genetic  considerations,  or  sim- 
ilarity interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of 
descent.  Thus  both  the  gill  of  the  fish  and  the 
lung  of  the  mammal  subserve  the  purpose  of 

"  Ibid.,  p.  76. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  71. 


64  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

respiration,  although,  structurally  and  genet- 
ically, they  are  quite  distinct.^^ 

The  wing  of  an  insect  and  that  of  a  bird  sub- 
serve the  purpose  of  flight  and  are  hence  com- 
parable organs  or  parts.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  structure,  however,  the  wing  of  the  bird 
resembles  the  arm  of  man,  in  so  far  as  there  is 
involved  in  each,  a  similar  arrangement  of  bones 
and  muscles.^^ 

If  we  look  at  biological  phenomena  from  an 
embryological  and  palaeontological  point  of  view, 
a  still  different  classification  of  resemblances  is 
suggested.  The  foot  of  the  horse  and  the  foot 
of  the  ox  are  functionally  and  structurally  similar 
with  respect  to  their  general  outlines.  Despite 
this  consideration,  however,  these  parts  exhibit 
a  noteworthy  difference,  namely,  the  foot  of  the 
horse  has  one  digit  whereas  that  of  the  ox  has 
two.  From  an  embryological  point  of  view,  the 
five  digits  of  the  unguiculates  appear  in  the 
horse  and  the  ox.  This  consideration  leads  to 
the  supposition  of  a  five-toed  ancestor  whose 
digits  have  undergone  this  progressive  reduction. 
The  palaeontological  record  confirms  this  sup- 
position, and  the  foot  of  the  horse  and  the  foot 

"  Delage,  Comparative  anatomy  and  the  foundations 
of  morphology,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  St.  Louis, 
1904,  V.  5,  p.  51. 

^"  Ibid.,  p.  342. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  55 

of  the  ox  are  therefore  regarded  as  descendants 
of  the  parts  of  a  common  five-toed  ancestor.^^ 

Delage  recognizes  quite  clearly  that  there  are 
no  absolute  ear  marks  or  stigmata  by  means  of 
which  similarities  may  be  classified.  He  states 
that  the  biologist  ordinarily  boldly  announces 
that  his  criteria  are  taken  from  genetic  con- 
siderations or  phylogeny:  as  a  matter  of  actual 
practice,  however,  they  are  borrowed  from  a 
number  of  diverse  points  of  view.  "  The  founda- 
tions of  homology  are  a  mixture  in  varying 
proportions  of  comparative  anatomy  studied  pro- 
foundly, of  palaeontological  data  too  often  in- 
complete, and  a  hypothetical  phylogeny,  together 
with  a  dose,  not  to  be  overlooked,  of  that 
mysticism  with  which  natural  philosophers  con- 
structed their  archetype.  This  formula  may 
appear  a  little  irreverent  to  the  devotees  of 
morphology;   it  is  just,  nevertheless."  ^^ 

In  ethnology,  however,  the  form  criterion 
maintained  itself  with  almost  undisturbed  placid- 
ity until  1896,  when  Boas  made  an  assault  upon 
the  whole  group  of  principles  presupposed  by 
the  comparative  method.  In  a  critical  article 
he  showed  that  ethnic  units  which  exhibit 
morphological  similarity  or  identity  may  have 
developed  from  diverse  psychic  processes.     He 

18  Ibid.,  p.  343. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  350. 


66  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

called  attention  to  a  number  of  cases  in  point, — 
totemism,  geometrical  designs,  the  use  of  masks, 
the  paternal  family,  and  concepts  of  a  future 
Iife.2o 

In  1903,  Ehrenreich,  probably  as  the  result  of 
entirely  independent  investigations,  arrived  at 
an  interpretation  strikingly  similar  to  that  of 
Boas,  and  applied  the  term  "convergence"  to 
the  phenomena  involved. 

He  finds  of  special  interest,  certain  similarities 
among  religious  phenomena  in  regions  far  apart, 
of  which  he  enumerates  the  following:  (a) 
shamanistic  secret  societies  with  similar  rites; 
(6)  the  semblant  death  of  the  novitiate  imme- 
diately preceding  his  entrance  into  a  religious 
society, — a  phenomenon  encountered  in  the  Greek 
mysteries  and  in  the  indigenous  cultures  of 
North  America,  Africa  and  Australia;  (c)  the 
supposition  that  a  masked  dancer  must  not  fall 
in  his  performance  lest  he  thereby  engender  the 
anger  of  spirits  ;2^  (d)  the  prescription  that  wo- 
men and  children  must  not,  upon  penalty  of 

20  Boas,  The  limitations  of  the  comparative  method  of 
anthropology,  Science,  1896,  n.s.,  v.  4,  p.  903-905.  Com- 
pare also  Boas,  The  mind  of  primitive  man.  Journal  of 
American  Folk-Lore,  v.  14.  Boas,  Review  of  Graebner, 
Methode  der  Ethnologic,  Science,  n.s.,  v.  34. 

2^  Boas,  The  social  organization  and  the  secret  societies 
of  the  Kwakiutl  Indians,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  American 
Ethnology,  Annual  Report,  1895. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  57 

death,  look  upon  masks  and  other  magico- 
religious  paraphernalia;  {e)  when  the  higher 
reUgions  have  become  differentiated  from  a  more 
primitive  animism  and  a  priestly  caste  has  ap- 
peared, certain  striking  similarities  are  to  be 
found  in  the  shape  of  offerings,  prayers,  exor- 
cisms, etc.;  (/)  purification,  self-castigation, 
confession,  etc., — resemblances  so  striking  as  to 
lead  the  old  missionaries  to  assume  that  primitive 
races  must  have  come  under  Jewish  or  Christian 
influences  at  some  remote  period;  {g)  the  pres- 
ence of  a  custom  similar  to  the  Lord's  Supper 
among  the  Aztecs.^^ 

In  1910  Golden weiser  subjected  the  phe- 
nomena of  totemism  to  a  searching  critical 
analysis  from  this  point  of  view.  Previous  the- 
oretical writers  had  commonly  defined  and 
described  it  in  terms  of  one  or  more  fundamental, 

^  Ehrenreich,  Zur  Frage  der  Beurtheilung  und  Bewer- 
thung  ethnographischer  Analogien,  CorrespondenzUatt  der 
deutschen  Gesellschaft  fiir  Anthropologie,  Ethnologie  und 
Urgeschichte,  1903,  p.  178.  Ehrenreich  utilizes  the  concept 
of  convergence,  not  only  in  the  interpretation  of  specific 
features  of  culture  which  have  arisen  from  different  his- 
torical antecedents,  but  also  to  cultures  as  such.  From 
this  point  of  view  he  considers,  (1)  the  Brazilians  and 
Papuans,  (2)  the  Veddahs,  Bushmen  and  Pj-gmies  and, 
lastly,  (3)  the  Babylonians,  Egyptians  and  Chinese  (Ibid., 
p.  178).  This  extension  of  the  concept  of  convergence  to 
cultural  complexes  iiberhaupt  is,  however,  rather  unhappy. 


58  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

essential  features.  Goldenweiser  finds,  however, 
that  these  alleged  typical  symptoms  exhibit 
considerable  diversity  from  area  to  area  and 
that,  for  this  reason,  totemism  cannot  be  dealt 
with  as  such  and  at  large,  nor  can  its  various 
features  be  regarded  as  organically  interrelated. ^^ 
The  phenomena  of  taboo  have  been  widely 
quoted  as  a  simple  and  obvious  case  in  which  a 
multitude  of  diverse  processes  may  lead  to  the 
same  result.  Goldenweiser  has  cited  a  large 
number  of  the  sources  from  which  this  ethnic 
feature  may  arise. 

"  The  animal,  as  such  is  sacred,  as  for  instance,  snakes 
in  India,  and  cats  in  Egypt;  the  animals  are  believed  to  be 
incarnations  of  ancestors,  as  in  Egypt,  or  among  the  South 
African  Bantu;  the  animal  is  a  totem,  as  in  innumerable 
instances;  the  animal  is  a  guardian  spirit,  as  commonly 
among  North  American  Indians,  in  the  Banks  Islands, 
etc.;  the  animal  is  associated  with  evil  spirits,  as  among 
the  Aranda  in  the  case  of  some  few  animals  that  are  not 
totems;  certain  animals  must  not  be  killed  or  eaten  during 
a  particular  season,  as  among  the  Eskimo,  where  caribou 
must  not  be  killed,  eaten,  handled,  during  the  season  when 
eea-animals  are  hunted,  and  vice  versa.  The  animal  is  re- 
garded as  an  ancestor,  as  in  many  totemic  communities 
where  the  taboo  applies  to  a  clan  or  a  family,  as  well  as  in 
some  non-totemic  groups  where  the  idea  of  descent  refers 
to  the  entire  tribe;  the  animal  is  unclean,  as  the  pig  among 
the  Jews;  the  animal  is  too  closely   akin  to  man,  as  in 

^  Goldenweiser,  Totemism,  Journal  of  American  Folh- 
Lore,  1910,  pp.  182-183. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  59 

modern  ethical  vegetarianism;  the  animal  is  too  closely 
associated  with  man,  as  the  dog  or  other  pets;  pregnant 
women,  boys  before  initiation,  women  after  first  child- 
birth, etc. ;  must  not  eat  certain  animals  for  various  rea- 
sons; the  animal  is  a  sacred  symbol,  as  the  dove  in 
Christianity;  and  so  on."  " 

Boas  has  emphasized  the  frequent  non-com- 
parability of  genetic  processes  which  lead  to  the 
same  result.  Murder,  wherever  it  occurs,  re- 
garded from  the  standpoint  of  outer  form, 
might  be  thought  to  involve  a  violation  of  the 
fundamental  ethical  and  social  sentiments  of 
man.  From  this  point  of  view  it  would  seem 
quite  appropriate  to  group  together,  under  one 
rubric,  all  cases  of  deliberate  homicide.  The 
simplest  investigation,  however,  brings  to  light 
the  fact  that  the  mental  processes  leading  to  the 
killing  of  a  man  are  frequently  very  diverse  and 
strictly  non-comparable.  Infanticide,  frequently 
practiced  by  reason  of  the  shortage  of  food 
supply  or  because  a  child  is  deformed ;  the  killing 
of  a  parent  about  to  become  decrepit  so  that  he 
may  enjoy  the  full  use  of  his  faculties  in  the 
spirit- world;  the  slaying  of  an  enemy  for  revenge; 
involve  mental  processes  so  diverse  that  they 
ought  not  to  be  considered  in  the  same  category. 
Again  a  machine-made  art  product  cannot  be 

2^  Goldenweiser,  The  principle  of  limited  possibiUties 
m  the  development  of  culture,  Journal  of  American  Folk- 
Lore,  1913,  v.  26,  p.  274. 


60  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

compared  with  one  which  is  the  creation  of 
the  individual  artist  involving  his  innermost 
thoughts  and  feelings,  though  they  be  identical 
in  outer  form.^^  If,  however,  despite  the  state 
of  affairs  here  so  clearly  indicated,  we  persist  in 
conjoining  heterogeneous  elements  under  a  single 
principle  of  classification,  the  situation  resembles 
that  of  the  small  boy  who,  after  having  added 
together  cows,  horses  and  sheep,  wonders  what 
sort  of  an  animal  has  arisen  as  the  result  of  his 
arithmetical  calculations. 

One  of  the  fundamental  difficulties  which 
confront  us  is  that  which  arises  when  we  take 
cognizance  of  the  Wundtian  concept  of  psychic 
actuality,  which  involves  an  appreciation  of  the 
dynamic  and  functional  aspect  of  a  culture  over 
and  above  its  constituent  parts.^^  Accordingly, 
if  two  elements  which  resemble  one  another  are 
present  in  two  separate  cultures,  one  of  the 
criteria  of  similarity  can  be  stated  only  in  terms 
of  their  relationship  to  their  respective  cultures, 
or  to  some  more  narrow  cycle  of  participation 

^  Boas,  Psychological  problems  in  anthropology,  Clark 
University,  Lectures  and  Addresses  delivered  1909,  p.  128. 

2«See,  for  example,  Wimdt,  Logik,  v.  3,  p.  260. 
Haeberlin,  The  theoretical  foundations  of  Wundt's  folk- 
psychology.  Psychological  Rcneiv,  1916,  v.  23,  pp.  281-285. 
Haeberlin,  The  idea  of  fertihzation  in  the  culture  of  the 
Pueblo  Indians,  p.  5. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  61 

within  them  (a  socio-ceremonial  unit,  a  religious 
society,  etc.^^). 

It  is  obvious  that  we  cannot  consider  as  sim- 
ilar, in  a  significant  sense,  elements  which  have 
been  introduced  from  without  in  a  fortuitous 
manner,  and  have  not  become  integral  or  func- 
tioning parts  within  the  respective  cultures  in- 
volved. If,  for  example,  in  an  autochthonous 
culture  complex  (if  we  can  for  purposes  of 
exposition  speak  of  such  a  non-existent  entity) 
a  mask  is  used  for  a  profound  religious  purpose, 
such  as  to  personify  a  spirit,  to  scare  away,  or  to 
deceive,  a  hostile  spirit  as  to  the  identity  of  the 
wearer,  etc.,  and  the  same  mask  is  borrowed  by 
another  people  and  used  merely  for  the  purposes 
of  theatrical  or  ceremonial  pantomine,  we  would 
not  be  justified  in  classifying  the  two  groups  of 
phenomena  as  similar.  Oftentimes  a  cultural 
feature  may  be  borrowed  and  yet  remain,  as 
Goldenweiser  expresses  it,  *'a  foreign  body  in 
its  new  cultural  environment."  2  8  ^g  instances 
of  this  non-assimilation  he  cites  the  art  nouveau 
of  western  Europe  which  toward  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  introduced  into  the 
United   States   but,    "after  languishing   for   a 

2' Compare  Boas,  Review  of  Graebner's  Methode  der 
Ethnologie,  Science,  1911,  v.  34,  p.  808. 

28  Goldenweiser,  The  principle  of  limited  possibilities 
in  the  development  of  culture,  p.  283. 


62  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

number  of  years  in  the  show-windows  of  fashion- 
able stationary  and  art  stores,  it  vanished  with- 
out leaving  any  apparent  trace  on  any  form  of 
American  art".^^  Classical  education  recently 
foisted  upon  the  Russian  school  curriculum  quite 
failed  to  be  psychologically  assimilated  to  the 
system  as  a  whole.  The  institution  of  maternal 
descent  was  only  imperfectly  assimilated  by  the 
Kwakiutl,  the  resulting  social  organization  em- 
bodying both  features  of  maternal  and  paternal 
descent.^"  Elements  of  Christianity  frequently 
appear  in  the  ghost  dance  religions  of  the 
American  Indians,  and  Biblical  incidents  in  their 
cosmologies.^^ 

With  due  respect  to  the  concept  of  psychic 
actualit}^  however,  and  the  integral  assimilation 
of  elements  within  a  functioning  totality,  it  is 
exceedingly  difficult  to  apply  these  considera- 
tions seriously  in  the  shape  of  an  heuristic 
principle,  or  one  of  the  criteria,  for  the  correct 
interpretation  of  similarities.  It  is  almost  im- 
possible to  determine,  with  any  degree  of  assur- 
ance, whether  or  not  a  particular  element  has 

29  Ibid.,  p.  2S3. 

"oibid.,  p.  284:  See  also  Boas,  The  social  organization 
and  the  secret  societies  of  the  Kwakiutl  Indians,  U.  S. 
Bureau  of  Ethnology,  Annual  Report,  1895,  p.  334. 

"  Goldenweiser,  The  principle  of  limited  possibilities  in 
the  development  of  culture,  pp.  284-285. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  63 

been  thoroughly  digested  by  the  new  culture, 
indeed,  it  may  frequently  be  introduced,  juxta- 
posed, or  intermingled,  in  the  mechanical  sense 
assumed  by  Graebner,  or  it  may  not  have  refer- 
ence to  the  culture  as  a  whole,  but  only  to  a 
certain  sharply  deliminated  portion  of  it,  as  for 
example,  a  religious,  socio-ceremonial  or  scien- 
tific, body,  within  which  it  lives  and  moves  and 
has  its  being.  This  latter  consideration  applies 
with  particular  force  in  the  case  of  modern 
cultures,  all  of  which  embody  separable  and 
disparate  parts  within  the  body  politic  or  a 
limited  geographical  area. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  a  number  of  funda- 
mental similarities  in  cultural  features,  ideas  and 
inventions,  are  due  to  their  common  origin  in  a 
prehistoric  period  prior  to  the  dispersion  of  the 
human  race, — a  consideration  which  Boas  con- 
siders to  have  ''some  points  in  its  favor,  though 
it  cannot  be  proved  ".^^  This  state  of  affairs, 
however,  can  hardly  be  seriously  considered  in 
the  actual  development  of  ethnological  studies, 
but  it  serves  to  introduce  an  element  of  un- 
certainty into  the  situation  in  so  far  as  we  are 
bound  to  take  cognizance  of  an  indeterminable 
variable. 

When  we  speak  of  morphological  resemblance 
we  are  using  an  inevitably  loose  term  which 

32  Boas,  Anthropology,  p.  22. 


64  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

cannot  with  equal  validity  be  indifferently  re- 
ferred to  all  cultural  features.  At  best  it  seems 
to  apply  most  cogently  and  legitimately  to  those 
objects  of  material,  industrial,  and  scientific 
culture,  which  have  a  definite  external  shape. 
In  the  case  of  the  products  of  spiritual  culture 
however, — the  gods,  spirits,  magic  powers,  ema- 
nations, taboos,  concepts  of  a  future  life,  rites, 
ceremonies,  etc., — which  are  not  precipitated 
in  the  form  of  definite  geometrical  objects,  we 
cannot  speak  of  morphological  resemblance  with 
the  same  degree  of  assurance.  In  the  last 
analysis,  probably  all  that  is  implied  here  is  that 
some  one  constant  feature  is  set  within  a  shifting 
complex  of  variable  elements.  The  significant 
consideration,  however,  may  frequently  be  the 
fact  that  this  central  nucleus  is  of  no  great  im- 
portance when  compared  with  the  profound  dif- 
ferences which  characterize  the  concomitant 
elements  which  cluster  round  it.  In  the  case  of 
taboo,  the  constant  feature  is  that  a  thing  is 
forbidden,  but  the  reasons  for  the  inhibitory 
prescription,  together  with  its  genetic  history 
and  psychological  setting,  are  frequently  so 
exceedingly  dissimilar,  that  we  are  bound  to 
admit  that  taboo  in  two  or  more  areas  may  be 
non-comparable. 

In  various  parts  of  this  work  sufl&cient  refer- 
ences have  been  made  to  constitute  a  drastic 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  65 

criticism  against  the  uncontrolled  use  of  the  form 
criterion.  It  is,  therefore,  unnecessary  to  refer 
to  these  ..arguments  again.  Suffice  it  to  say- 
that  classifications  based  on  morphological  con- 
siderations will  clash  hopelessly  with  those  based 
upon  genetic  processes  which  lead  to  the  same 
result. 

In  the  absence  of  satisfactory  objective  criteria 
for  the  determination  and  interpretation  of 
analoga,  the  methodological  bias  of  the  investi- 
gator occupies  the  leading  role  in  the  resulting 
classification.  Oftentimes,  therefore,  a  very  con- 
siderable degree  of  artistic  and  novelistic  effects 
is  produced  by  the  application  of  the  several  re- 
spective points  of  view.  Thus  Graebner  ascribes 
similarities  in  regions  far  apart,  divided  by 
geographical  barriers,  and  in  which  historical 
contact  is  not  known  definitely  to  have  occurred, 
to  a  process  of  dissemination.  The  great  and 
influential  school  represented  by  such  writers  as 
Tylor,  Spencer,  Frazer,  Andr^e,  Bastian,  Waitz 
and  many  others,  have  sought  to  explain  the 
same  phenomena  on  the  basis  of  parallel  develop- 
ment and,  in  this  manner,  have  ignored  almost 
completely  actual  processes  of  historical  trans- 
mission. In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  tend- 
ency on  the  part  of  a  few  ethnologists  to  utilize 
convergence  as  a  subsidiary  or  equally  important 
method  of  interpretation.  Comprehensive  the- 
6 


66  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

oretical  works,  however,  have  not  as  yet  been 
written  from  this  point  of  view.^^ 

The  question  at  last  arises  as  to  what  we  can 
mean  by  real,  as  opposed  to  false,  similarity, 
and  as  to  the  ultimate  justifiability  of  the  em- 
ployment of  the  concept  of  comparability.  In 
the  last  analysis,  the  difficulties  attendant  upon 
the  attempt  to  harmonize,  organize,  and  sys- 
tematize, into  an  organic,  mutually  consistent 
whole,  the  multiplicity  of  views  which  are  cap- 
able of  providing  a  basis  for  a  classification  of 
similarities,  are  insuperable.  It  is  perhaps  fair 
to  say  that  no  serious  attempt  has  been  made  to 
unify  these  various  standpoints.  Ethnograph- 
ical literature,  on  the  whole,  presents  to  us  little 
more  than  groups  of  classifications  carried  out 
from  mutually  irreconcilable  points  of  view, — 
the  advocates  of  the  separate  principles  being 
gathered  into  schools  which  profoundly  distrust 
each  others  results.  What  is  implied,  then,  is 
really  a  group  of  subjective  principles,  each  of 
which  has  a  limited  validity  within  a  special 
point  of  view,  but  which  cannot  be  organized 
into  a  single,   coherent,  logical  system,  whose 

^  For  an  ethnographic  study  based  largely  on  this 
point  of  view,  however,  see  for  example,  Goldenweiser, 
Totemism,  Journal  of  American  Folk-Lore,  1910,  v.  23: 
Compare  also  Goldenweiser,  The  principle  of  limited 
possibilities  in  the  development  of  culture. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL  ANALOGA  67 

various  parts  are  satisfactorily  adjusted.  In  the 
last  analysis,  therefore,  the  interpretation  of 
similarities  and  the  concomitant  determination 
of  objects  (taboo,  totemism,  etc.)  is  a  function 
of  an  indefinite  number  of  more  or  less  indeter- 
minate and  indeterminable  variables,  which  are 
not  mutually  consistent  with  one  another,  and 
which  cannot  be  organized  into  a  comprehensive 
system.  Different  products  arise  accordingly  as 
one  or  another,  or  various  groups  of  these  prin- 
ciples are  followed  out, — the  resulting  classifica- 
tion refiecting  only  the  particular  heuristic 
principles  which  determine  it,  and  having  no 
objective  validity.  The  framing  of  ethnograph- 
ical analoga,  therefore,  is  a  somewhat  romantic 
procedure  which  is  comparable  in  many  respects 
to  the  building  up  of  animal  and  plant  archetypes 
characteristic  of  the  pre-Darwinian  natural 
sciences.  Both  procedures  supplement  their 
positivistic  knowledge  with  a  strong  dose  of 
mysticism  and  are  wont  to  ascribe  ontological 
existence  to  their  subjective  creations. 


CHAPTER  5 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN   MAGIC  AND 
RELIGION 

There  is  no  unanimity  of  opinion  at  the  present 
time  regarding  a  precise  characterization  of 
magic, — the  attitude  toward  the  subject  being 
largely  dominated  by  that  assumed  toward 
religion.  There  is,  however,  no  dearth  of  defini- 
tions of  the  latter.  Applying  to  his  day,  Max 
Miiller  commented  upon  the  bewildering  varie- 
ties then  in  existence.^  Since  that  time  the 
number  has  unhappily  not  decreased.  Durk- 
heim  enumerates  and  criticizes  several  current 
definitions  after  which  he  proceeds  to  formulate 
one  of  his  own.^  Leuba  cites  forty-eight  which 
he  attempts  to  classify  under  four  rubrics,  three 
following  the  conventional  tripartite  division  of 
psychology, — volitional,  intellectualistic,  affec- 
tivistic, — and  the  fourth,  valuational,  which 
stands  upon  its  own  legs.^ 

^  Miiller,  Lectures  on  the  origin  and  growth  of  religion, 
p.  2L 

2  Durkheim,  Les  formes  ^l^mentaires  de  la  vie  religieuse, 
ch.  I. 

'Leuba,  A  psychological  study  of  religion,  Appendix. 
68 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION  69 

Scholastic  implications  maintain  a  troubled 
existence  under  the  guise  of  brief  verbal  formulae 
of  this  type.  An  utterly  fictitious  simplification 
is  introduced  into  phenomena  which  involve 
enormous  complexity,  and  the  attempt  is  made 
to  state  the  nature  of  the  inner  essence  of  that 
which  gives  rise  to  a  complex  of  diversified 
irradiations.  It  is  desirable,  however,  from  a 
certain  point  of  view,  to  avoid  stereotyped  for- 
mulations and  to  use  the  terms  ''magic"  and 
"religion"  in  a  common  or  garden  sense,  being 
guided  either  by  the  context  or  the  exigencies  of 
discourse. 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  distinguish  be- 
tween magic  and  religion  on  the  basis  of  the 
presumption  that  each  possesses  mutually  exclu- 
sive traits.  Two  considerations  have  especially 
contributed  to  this  dichotomy. 

Religion,  it  has  been  said,  is  inextricably  inter- 
woven with  ethical  concepts,  certain  practices 
after  having  obtained  social  approval,  being 
forthwith  organized  into  an  established  cult: 
magic,  in  contradistinction,  is  associated  with 
disapproval,  its  rites  being  unjustified,  its  aims 
and  pm-poses  anti-social;  indeed  it  leads  a  pre- 
carious career  in  the  shape  of  disorganized  rags 
and  tags  of  practices  within  the  body  politic. 

One  of  the  most  widely  held  views,  for  which 
King,  Durkheim,  and  many  others  stand  sponsor, 


70  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

involves  the  supposition  that  magic  is  ''relatively 
individualistic  and  secret  in  its  methods  and 
interests,  and  is  thus  opposed  fundamentally 
to  the  methods  and  interests  of  religion,  which 
are  social  and  public.  This  individualistic  and 
secret  character  of  magic  makes  it  easy  for  it 
to  become  the  instrument  of  secret  vengeance. 
.  .  .  There  is  no  primitive  society,  so  far  as  our 
accounts  have  gone,  which  does  not  dread  the 
sorcerer.  Everywhere  there  is  a  clear-cut  dis- 
tinction between  the  sorcerer,  who  deals  secretly 
with  unfamiliar  agencies,  and  the  priest  or 
medicine  man,  who  works  for  the  public  good."  ^ 
Durkheim  compares  the  relationship  existing 
between  the  magician  and  his  client  with  that  of 
the  physician  and  his  patient  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  both  are  more  or  less  accidental  and 
evanescent.  While  it  is  true,  he  admits,  that 
shamans  sometimes  assemble  for  the  performance 
of  ceremonies,  this  is  to  be  regarded  as  merely 
an  incidental  occurrence  and  does  not  express 
the  essential  or  significant  characteristic  of  the 
art.  Religion,  on  the  other  hand,  is  indigenous 
only  to  a  more  or  less  closely  knit  group  wherein 
is  involved  a  certain  degree  of  spiritual  and  moral 

*King,  The  development  of  religion,  p.  195.  Smith 
regards  the  practice  of  magic  as  having  been  illicit  in  the 
ancient  Semitic  cultures.  The  religion  of  the  Semites, 
p.  263. 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION  71 

homogeneity, — the  beliefs  being  held,  the  emo-    X^ 
tions  experienced,  and  the  rites  practiced,  in 
common.^ 

A  certain  insidious  plausibility  attaches  to  the 
many  opinions  of  this  character  which  renders 
the  fallacy  involved  not  readily  susceptible  of 
discovery.  Throughout  the  world  magic  is  asso- 
ciated with  evil  practices,  particularly  in  the 
form  of  killing  or  doing  injury  to  an  enemy  by 
means  of  a  secret  technique  and  the  securing  of 
all  sorts  of  benefits  for  a  purely  selfish  motive. 
Religion,  on  the  other  hand,  appears  to  be  more 
frequently  concerned  with  communistic  welfare, 
with  rites  and  practices  which  are  ideally  asso- 
ciated with  socio-economic  values, — good  crops, 
benign  states  of  the  weather,  plentitude  of  game 
animals,  and  so  on. 

In  order  to  make  good  the  point  to  which  these 
writers  refer,  however,  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
point  to  the  adventitious  association  (however 
frequent  it  be)  of  magic  with  individual,  evil 
purposes,  and  religion  with  those  which  possess 
social  and  ethical  approval,  but  it  is  requisite 
that  these  adhesions  be  inevitable,  necessary, 
and  of  universal  distribution.  The  incorrectness 
of  the  distinction  set  up  in  this  manner  is  made 
manifest  not  by  means  of  an  a  priori  examina- 

5  Durkheim,  Les  formes  616mentaires  de  la  vie  religieuse, 
p.  63. 


72  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

tion  of  the  theory  but  by  a  simple  reference  to 
the  ethnographic  facts.  There  is  an  abundance 
of  material  which  indicates  that  magic  may  be  a 
social,  communistic  affair  possessing  the  approval 
or  ethical  sanction  of  the  group  as  a  whole. 
The  Australian  Intichiuma  ceremonies  performed 
ostensibly  by  the  totemic  clans  for  the  regula- 
tion of  the  various  departments  of  nature,  the 
magical  rites  of  the  wild  tribes  of  the  Malay 
peninsula  carried  on  particularly  in  connection 
with  agricultural  processes,  and  the  activities  of 
the  Eskimo  angakok,  furnish  striking  cases  in 
point.  Fossey  also  calls  attention  to  the  public 
and  official  character  of  the  performances  of  the 
magicians  attached  to  the  ancient  Babylonian 
kings.^ 

^Spencer  and  Gillen,  The  native  tribes  of  Central 
Australia:  The  northern  tribes  of  Central  Australia. 
Howitt,  The  native  tribes  of  South-East  Australia.  Roth, 
Superstition,  magic,  and  medicine.  Frazer,  The  origin  of 
totemism,  Fortnightly  Review,  1899,  n.s.,  v.  65.  Skeat, 
Malay  magic.  Skeat  and  Blagden,  Pagan  races  of  the  Malay 
Peninsula.  Boas,  The  Central  Eskimo,  U.  S.  Bureau  of 
Ethnology,  Annual  Report,  1884-85,  v.  6.  Boas,  The 
Eskimo  of  Baffin  Land  and  Hudson  Bay,  American 
Museum  of  Natural  History,  Bulletin,  1907,  v.  15.  Golden- 
weiser.  Spirit,  7nana,  and  the  religious  thrill.  Journal  of 
Philoso-phy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods,  1915,  v.  12, 
pp.  636-637.  Fossey,  La  magie  Assyrienne,  Bihliothdque 
de  V^cole  des  Hautes  Etudes,  Sciences  Religieuses,  v.  15, 
pp.  4,  10,  136. 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION  73 

The  presence  of  a  belief  in  spirits  has  been 
widely  held  to  be  the  most  important  of  the 
specific  differentiae  of  religion,  whereas  the  vicar- 
ious idea  of  an  impersonal  power  is  characteristic 
of  magic.  This  consideration  is  of  great  crucial 
significance,  indeed,  our  mode  of  approach 
toward,  and  manner  of  treating,  magico-religiouS 
phenomena  will  be  largely  determined  by  the 
attitude  which  we  adopt  regarding  ideas  of 
spirits  and  their  performances,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  those  of  mana  and  its  manifestations,  on  the 
other.  Several  equally  important  methodolog- 
ical problems  are  concomitantly  involved,  but, 
in  so  far  as  the  spirit-7?2ana  problem  is  immanent 
in  any  method  of  treatment  which  may  be 
adopted,  it  is  justifiable  to  select  it  for  special 
and  individual  investigation. 


CHAPTER  6 

SPIRIT  AS  THE  PRIMORDIUM 

Tylor's  classic  treatise,  embodying  the  cele- 
brated "minimum  definition  of  religion'*  as  '*a 
belief  in  spiritual  beings",  provided  the  basis  for 
modern  speculation  on  the  subject.  Previous 
to  this  time  many  persons  had  thought  that 
they  had  discovered  "savage''  races  who  pos- 
sessed no  religion  whatsoever,  but  this  lack  was 
found  to  exist  only  by  reason  of  those  formal 
definitions  set  up  by  them  which  served  arbi- 
trarily to  extrude  certain  customs  and  behefs 
from  this  domain.  With  the  appearance  of 
Tylor's  definition,  however,  it  became  evident 
that  no  tribe  was  completely  devoid  of  religion, 
since  all  peoples,  who  had  ever  been  investigated, 
were  found  to  possess  more  or  less  well  defined 
ideas  about  spirits. 

According  to  Tylor  and  his  followers,  these 
behefs,  on  the  one  hand,  furnish  the  motivation 
for  all  religious  practices, — ceremonies,  the  cures 
of  disease,  sacrifices,  praj^ers,  incantations,  witch- 
craft, etc., — and,  on  the  other,  constitute  the 
74 


SPIRIT  75 

basis  of  a  primitive  philosophy  of  nature  or 
Weltanschauung  which  he  calls  "animism". 
Primitive  man  is  ''deeply  impressed"  by  two 
groups  of  biological  phenomena:  (l)  those  con- 
cerning life  and  death,  together  with  that 
peculiar  thing  which  ''causes  waking,  sleep, 
trance,  disease  and  death;"  (2)  the  nature  of 
those  "human  shapes  which  appear  in  dreams 
and  visions".^  Observing  such  types  of  facts 
he  draws  the  "obvious  inference  that  every  man 
has  two  things  belonging  to  him,  namely,  a  life 
and  a  phantom  ".^  He  then  reasons  further  that 
they  are  related  to  one  another  or  are  combined 
in  a  tertium  quid,  viz.,  the  soul,  i.  e.,  the  appari- 
tional-  or  ghost-soul.  Having  arrived  at  this 
all  important  concept,  he  applies  it,  in  the  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning,  to  other  phenomena,  animals, 
plants,  and  lastly,  to  inanimate  objects, — stocks, 
stones,  canoes,  rivers,  etc., — so  that,  in  the  end, 
he  considers  the  entire  world  to  be  alive. 

It  is  requisite,  at  the  outset,  that  we  should 
attempt  to  make  as  clear  to  ourselves  as  possible 
precisely  what  is  connoted  by  this  animistic 
world  view.  This  desideratum  will  perhaps  be 
best  subserved  by  means  of  a  few  literal  citations. 

"First  and  foremost  among  the  causes  which  trans- 
figure into  myths  the  facts  of  daily  experience  is  the  behef 

1  Tylor,  Primitive  culture,  p.  428. 
2Ibid.,  p.  428. 


76  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

in  the  animation  of  all  nature,  rifdng  at  its  highest  pitch 
to  personification.  ...  To  the  lower  tribes  of  man,  sun 
and  stars,  trees  and  rivers,  winds  and  clouds,  become 
personal  animate  creatures,  leading  hves  conformed  to 
human  or  animal  analogies,  and  performing  their  special 
functions  in  the  universe  with  the  aid  of  Hmbs  Hke  beasts, 
or  of  artificial  instruments  like  men,  or  what  men's  eyes 
behold  is  but  the  instrument  to  be  used  or  the  material 
to  be  shaped,  while  behind  it  there  stands  some  prodigious 
but  yet  half-human  creature,  who  grasps  it  with  his  hands 
or  blows  it  with  his  breath.  The  basis  on  which  such 
ideas  as  these  are  built  is  not  to  be  narrowed  dovm  to  poetic 
fancy  and  transformed  metaphor.  They  rest  upon  a  broad 
philosophy  of  nature,  early  and  crude,  indeed,  but  thoughtful, 
consistent,  and  quite  really  and  seriously  meant."  ' 

In  another  passage  he  says: 

"When  the  Aleutians  thought  that  if  any  one  gave 
offence  to  the  moon,  he  would  fling  down  stones  on  the 
offender  and  kill  him,  or  when  the  moon  came  down  to  an 
Indian  squaw,  appearing  in  the  form  of  a  beautiful  woman 
with  a  child  in  her  arms,  and  demanding  an  offering  of 
tobacco  and  fur  robes,  what  conceptions  of  personal  life 
could  be  more  distinct  than  these?  "VVTien  the  Apache 
Indian  pointed  to  the  sky  and  asked  the  white  -man,  'Do 
you  not  beheve  that  God,  this  sun  (que  Dios,  este  Sol) 
sees  what  we  do  and  punishes  us  when  it  is  evil?'  it  is 
impossible  to  say  that  this  savage  was  talking  in  rhetorical 
simile".* 

In  support  of  the  reasonableness  of  his  conten- 
tion that  primitive  man   holds  a  doctrine  of 

» Ibid.,  p.  285.    Itahcs  mine. 

« Ibid.,  pp.  289-290.    Itahcs  mine. 


SPIRIT  77 

animism  in  a  literal  sense,  Tylor  adduces  evidence 
from  more  highly  developed  cultures  in  which 
such  a  belief  is  alleged  to  be  held,  the  implication 
being  that,  if  we  can  observe  the  mechanisms  of 
the  process  of  animation  working  here,  we  are 
thus  enabled  to  understand  more  clearly  their 
mode  of  operation  in  the  lower  cultures.  In  so 
far  as  these  illustrations  are  drawn  from  modes 
of  thought  more  closely  allied  to,  and  more 
congenial  to  our  own  than  are  those  of  primitive 
man,  they  serve  to  afford  an  interesting  light  on 
the  Tylorian  method  of  interpretation  and  serve 
at  once  to  raise  the  question  of  its  legitimacy. 

His  first  example  is  drawn  from  the  life  of 
childhood. 

"Animism  here  makes  its  appearance  as  the  child's 
early  theory  of  the  outer  world.  The  first  beings  that 
children  learn  to  understand  something  of  are  human 
beings,  and  especially  their  own  selves;  and  the  first 
explanation  of  all  events  will  be  the  human  explanation, 
as  though  chairs  and  sticks  and  wooden  horses  were 
actuated  by  the  same  sort  of  personal  will  as  nurses  and 
children  and  kittens".^ 

In  other  types  of  situation  in  which  man, 
under  the  influence  of  strong  emotion,  reacts  to 
objects  in  a  special  way,  Tylor  also  considers  a 
theory  of  animism  to  be  involved.     In  this  con- 

» Ibid.,  p.  285. 


78  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

nection  he  quotes  an  illustration  from  Grote  and 
proceeds  as  follows: 

"Even  among  full-grown  civilized  Europeans,  as  Mr. 
Grote  appositely  remarks,  'The  force  of  momentary 
passion  will  often  suflBce  to  supersede  the  acquired  habit, 
and  even  an  intelligent  man  may  be  impelled  in  a  moment 
of  agonizing  pain  to  kick  or  beat  the  lifeless  object  from 
which  he  has  suffered'.  In  such  matters  the  savage 
mind  well  represents  the  childish  stage.  The  wild  native 
of  Brazil  would  bite  the  stone  he  stumbled  over,  or  the 
arrow  that  had  wounded  him.  Such  a  mental  condition 
may  be  traced  along  the  course  of  history,  not  merely  in 
impulsive  habit,  but  in  formally  enacted  law".^ 

Other  examples  are  chosen  apparently  at 
random  to  illustrate  the  presence  of  animistic 
beliefs.  In  this  manner  are  cited  the  case  of 
Xerxes  flogging  the  Hellespont,  of  legal  pro- 
ceedings instituted  for  the  purpose  of  trying  an 
object, — an  axe,  a  cartwheel,  a  tree  that  has 
killed  a  man, — the  folkloristic  custom  of  '^  telling 
the  bees'*  and  the  domestic  animals  when  the 
master  has  died.  Oftentimes  primitive  man 
talks  seriously  with  animals  as  though  they  were 
men;  an  Indian  argues  with  his  horse  as  though 
he  were  possessed  of  reason;  and  sometimes  he 
greets  animals  reverentially  and  begs  their  par- 
don before  killing  them.  All  of  these  phenomena 
are  described  without  reference  to  their  cultural 
and  historical  settings  so  that  we  are  not  enabled 

•  Ibid.,  p.  286. 


SPIRIT  79 

to  penetrate  understandingly  into  the  penumbrae 
of  thoughts  and  feelings  which  cluster  round 
them. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  citations,  as  well  as 
an  indefinite  number  of  others  scattered  through- 
out Tylor's  work,  it  is  obvious  that,  consonant 
with  the  general  procedure  of  the  comparative 
method,  he  cites  illustrations  from  various  cul- 
tural areas,  different  levels  of  culture,  and  diverse 
mental  processes,  to  prove  that  the  animistic 
theory  is  of  universal  distribution,  and,  by  this 
means  believes  that  he  has  adequately  demon- 
strated that  primitive  man,  at  all  times  and  in 
all  places,  cherishes  a  reflective  theory  that  the 
world  as  such  and  at  large  is  alive,  however 
difficult  it  may  be  for  us  to  make  clear  to  our- 
selves precisely  what  is  implied  by  such  a  state- 
ment, and  however  bizarre  may  be  the  implica- 
tions which  are  involved  in  it.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  animism  in  the  mind  of  Tylor 
connoted  the  literal  aliveness  of  objects  as  well 
as  men,  animals  and  plants,  and  such  has  also 
been  the  common  interpretation  of  his  position. 
Thus  a  commentator,  in  dealing  with  this  view, 
understands  it  in  the  following  way : 

"Animism  therefore  discovers  human  life  in  all  moving 
things.  To  the  savage  and  to  primitive  man  there  is  no 
distinction  between  the  animate  and  the  inanimate. 
Nature  is  all  ahve.    Every  object  is  controlled  by  its 


80  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

own  independent  spirit.  Spirits  are  seen  in  the  rivers, 
the  lakes,  the  fountains,  the  woods,  the  mountains,  the 
trees,  the  animals,  the  flowers,  the  grass,  tne  birds. 
Spiritual  existences,  e.  g.,  elves,  gnomes,  ghosts,  manes, 
demons,  deities — inhabit  almost  everything,  and  con- 
sequently almost  everything  is  an  object  of  worship. 
The  milky  way  is  the  'path  of  the  souls  leading  to  the 
spirit  land';  and  the  Northern  Lights  are  the  dances  of 
the  dead  warriors  and  seers  in  the  realms  above.  The 
Australians  say  that  the  sounds  of  the  wind  in  the  trees 
are  the  voices  of  the  ghosts  of  the  dead  communing  with 
one  another  or  warning  the  living  of  what  is  to  come".' 

Tylor  assumes  that  in  each  of  the  illustrations 
cited  above, — namely,  in  myths,  in  childhood,  in 
momentary  passion,  in  legal  procedure  against 
the  inanimate  object,  etc., — a  detailed  analysis 
will  reveal  a  theory  of  animism  to  be  implied. 
A  dispassionate  examination  of  these  situations, 
however,  without  preconception,  will  show  that 
this  is  far  from  being  literally  true.  In  the  case 
of  mythology,  the  association  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  with  the  elements  of  a  novelistic  plot  and 
their  metamorphosed  appearance  in  the  shape 
of  an  anthropomorphic  or  theriomorphic  hero, 
is  one  of  the  mooted  points  in  ethnology.  It 
would  be  interesting  in  this  connection  to  know 
how  far  the  people,  who  tell  and  believe  in  such 
tales,  actually  consider  the  heavenly  bodies  to 
be  alive,  and  how  far  they  regard  their  animation 

'  DriscoU,  Animism,  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  pp.  527-528. 


SPIRIT  81 

as  bound  up  exclusively  with  the  exigencies  of 
artistic  creation.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  our 
own  literature  affords  many  analogous  cases, 
we  should  be  very  hesitant  in  jumping  to  the 
conclusion  that  they  necessarily  and  inevitably 
cherish  the  former  view.  We  do  not  assume  that 
a  poem  which  embodies  personification  affords 
proof  or  even  indication  that  the  author  believes 
the  objects  in  question  to  be  alive  except  in  so 
far  as  they  enter  into  the  phantasmagoria  of  his 
fancy:  we  recognize  quite  clearly  that  to  create 
and  dally  with  the  figments  of  imagination  is 
quite  different  than  to  ascribe  objective  reality 
to  them. 

In  accordance  with  a  time  honored  tradition, 
as  we  have  seen,  Tylor  draws  an  analogy  between 
the  life  of  primitive  man  and  that  of  the  child, 
considering  the  ontogenetic  development  as  a 
recapitulation  of  the  phylogenetic.  Of  course 
the  comparability  of  the  mental  processes  in- 
volved is  open  to  the  gravest  question.  Quite 
independent  of  this  important  objection,  how- 
ever, we  are  amply  justified  for  other  reasons  in 
asking  whether  or  not  the  child  actually  cherishes 
a  reflective  theory  of  the  outer  world  as  alive. 
The  psychologist's  fallacy  here  comes  into  play, 
— the  confusing  of  the  operations  of  a  mind 
under  observation  with  the  processes  of  its  inter- 
pretation by  the  commentator.  The  personifica- 
7 


82  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

tion  of  ^'chairs,  sticks,  and  wooden  horses" 
arises  within  a  play  situation.  The  objects 
which  perform  human  and  animal  roles  in  sus- 
taining the  projected  drama,  whatever  it  be, 
are  parts  of  a  deliberately  fanciful  and  imagina- 
tive complex  which  may  be  recognized  as  such. 
The  particular  function  which  an  object  sustains 
is  due  to  the  intent  of  the  child  and  its  individual- 
ization or  dramatic  role  to  the  "semblant" 
situation  as  a  whole.  Thus  a  stick  will  serve  as  a 
horse  to-day  when  he  regards  himself  as  Buffalo 
Bill  chasing  the  Indians;  tomorrow,  when  he 
plays  at  war,  as  one  of  a  group  of  soldiers 
advancing  against  an  enemy:  to-day  a  little 
girl's  doll  will  be  regarded  as  a  baby  in  a  cradle; 
to-morrow,  when  she  plays  with  other  children, 
as  a  pupil  in  school.  If,  however,  taken  in 
another  situation  when  he  is  completely  freed 
from  the  dominion  of  play  motives  and  inter- 
rogated as  to  the  character  of  any  of  the  above 
objects,  the  child  would  at  once  recognize  that 
they  are  inanimate  and  stand  upon  a  level  other 
than  that  of  the  human  beings  and  animals  with 
which  he  is  familiar  in  his  daily  experience. 
Oftentimes,  indeed,  the  personification  of  objects 
may  not  bo  seriously  meant  and  the  illusion 
incomplete.  Thus  Aston  points  out  that  the 
child  does  not  attempt  to  eat  his  own  mud  pies, 
the  boy  knows  that  his  father's  walking  stick 


SPIRIT  83 

is  not  a  real  horse  and  the  girl  that  her  doll  is 
not  a  living  being.  A  mother  having  remon- 
strated with  her  daughter  for  her  rough  treat- 
ment of  a  doll,  received  the  reply:  ''Poor  dolly! 
it  is  only  a  bag  of  sawdust."  *  There  is,  there- 
fore, no  inconsistency  or  incompatibility  involved 
in  supposing  that  a  child  may  play  with  a  thing, 
treat  it  as  though  it  were  alive,  talk  to  it  as  such, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  be  well  aware  that  it  is 
really  lifeless.  In  descriptive  analyses  of  such 
phenomena,  indeed,  we  are  bound  to  recognize 
that  whatsoever  type  of  animation  a  thing  ex- 
hibits is  indigenous  only  to  a  particular  situation 
and  should  be  described  solely  in  terms  thereof. 

In  those  cases  in  which,  under  the  influence  of 
momentary  passion,  a  man  kicks  or  abuses  an 
object  which  has  injured  him,  all  that  is  involved, 
psychologically,  is  an  uncritical  emotional  re- 
sponse to  a  stimulus  which  does  not  in  any  sense 
imply  a  philosophic  theory  of  world  animation. 
In  this  connection  Read  states  that  retaliation 
on  a  table,  bramble  or  shirt-stud  (not  unknown 
to  civilized  men)  does  not  imply  a  belief  in  the 
malignity  or  sensitiveness  of  those  objects.^ 

While  the  greatest  diflaculties,  as  we  have 
seen,  are  attendant  upon  the  supposition  that 

8  Aston,  Fetishism,  Hastings  Encyclopedia,  p.  896. 
3  Read,  The  psychology  of  animism,  British  Journal  of 
Psychology,  Oct.,  1915,  p.  3. 


84  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

primitive  man  believes  in  the  universal  animism 
of  all  nature,  it  cannot  be  denied  that,  at  various 
times  and  places,  people  have  believed  in  the 
organic  potentialities  of  inanimate  matter.  One 
of  the  most  curious  of  these  superstitions  is  that 
gems  possess  sex, — a  view,  still  prevalent  in  the 
sixteenth  century,  of  which  Francisci  Ruci  (De 
gemmiss,  f.  4)  gives  the  following  explanatory- 
account: 

"It  has  recently  been  related  to  me  by  a  lady  worthy 
of  credence,  that  a  noblewoman,  descended  from  the 
illustrious  house  of  Luxemburg,  had  in  her  possession  two 
diamonds  which  she  had  inherited,  and  which  produced 
others  in  such  miraculous  wise,  that  whoever  examined 
them  at  stated  intervals  judged  that  they  had  engendered 
progeny  like  themselves.  The  cause  of  this  (if  it  be 
permissible  to  philosophize  regarding  such  a  strange 
matter)  would  seem  to  be  that  the  celestial  energy  in  the 
parent  stones,  quahfied  by  someone  as  'vis  adamantifica' 
first  changes  the  surrounding  air  into  water,  or  some  similar 
substance,  and  then  condenses  and  hardens  this  into  the 
diamond  gem."  ^° 

In  this  instance,  however,  it  is  worthy  of  note 
that  the  learned  commentator,  while  sharing 
fully  the  view  of  the  reproductive  power  of  gems, 
nevertheless  seeks  to  explain  it  by  means  of 
physical  processes  and  changes. 

In  interpreting  funeral  customs,  particularly 
the  burying  of  objects  such  as  bows,  arrows,  and 

"  Kunz,  The  curious  lore  of  precious  stones,  p.  41. 


SPIRIT  85 

personal  possessions  with  the  dead,  burning  of 
wives,  servants,  etc.,  Tylor  ascribes  their  origin 
to  the  belief  that,  in  the  world  to  come,  the  souls 
of  these  things  (both  animate  and  inanimate) 
will  be  of  service  to  the  individual: — in  other 
words,  he  considers  that  these  practices  arise 
secondarily  from  a  more  general  theory  of  the 
world.  Max  Muller,  in  a  criticism  of  this  posi- 
tion, however,  contends  that  the  custom  of 
placing  objects  on  the  funeral  pile  or  on  the 
grave  may  have  sprung  '^from  a  mere  desire  to 
give  up  something  to  those  whom  one  had  loved 
and  served  during  life."  He  argues  furthermore 
that  the  idea  that  these  things  will  prove  useful 
in  another  world  arises  through  a  secondary 
interpretation  of  these  practices  themselves.  He 
speaks  of  the  latter  as  the  result  of  a  mere 
impulse,  an  unreasoning  act  which  only  sub- 
sequently was  endowed  with  a  definite  purpose 
by  reason  of  subsidiary  reflection. ^^ 

Borchert  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  a 
number  of  cases  in  which  animism,  according  to 
Tylorian  principles,  would  seem  to  be  implied, 
it  is  not  really  and  seriously  meant.  A  sailor 
oftentimes  speaks  of  his  ship  as  though  it  were  a 
living  being;  a  vessel  is  launched  and  christened 
with  the  name  of  a  person ;  a  boat  obeys,  runs, 
and  lies  upon  its  side.     We  call  books  our  friends 

"  Muller,  Anthropological  religion,  p.  340. 


86  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

and  sticks  our  true  companions.  The  soldier 
speaks  of  his  weapons  as  though  they  were 
living  objects.  The  poet  Korner  characterizes 
his  sword  at  his  left  side  as  his  bride.  In  all 
of  these  instances  the  consciously  playful  char- 
acter of  the  personification  does  not  lie  open  to 
question.^2 

An  implication  lies  behind  the  several  threads 
of  Tylor's  arguments  which  should  be  made 
explicit.  It  is  tacitly  assumed  that  the  various 
ideas  of  primitive  man  on  this  subject  which 
are  represented  in  mythology,  where  the  heav- 
enly bodies  are  considered  to  be  alive,  in  the 
beliefs  concerning  a  future  world,  in  those  which 
attend  the  practice  of  magic,  etc.,  are  welded 
together  into  a  single,  coherent  and  systematic 
view  of  the  world,  or  what  he  repeatedly  refers 
to  as  a  ''  philosophy  of  nature  ".  All  ethnological 
evidence  tends  to  show,  however,  that  no  such 
universal  systematization  of  experience  has  ever 
taken  place;  on  the  contrary  we  have  abundant 
evidence  to  prove  that  very  heterogeneous  be- 
liefs, arising  from  diverse  sources,  may  exist  side 
by  side  without  ever  coming  into  conflict.^^ 
Sunday  a  man  may  be  a  pious  Christian  who 
goes  faithfully  to  church ;  Monday  a  hard-headed 

^'  Borchert,  Der  Animismus,  Studieii  aus  dem  Collegium 
Sapeintiae  zu  Freiberg  im  Breisgau,  1900,  v.  5,  p.  19. 
"  Boas,  Review  of  Graebner,  Science,  n.s.,  1911,  p.  808. 


SPIRIT  87 

business  man  who  cheats  his  competitors  un- 
scrupulously; Tuesday  a  scientist  interested  in 
the  advance  of  knowledge,  despite  the  fact  that 
it  tends  to  cast  into  disrepute  those  religious 
concepts  with  which  he  has  been  familiar  since 
childhood.  In  a  similar  manner  the  mytho- 
logical beliefs  of  primitive  man ;  those  indigenous 
to,  and  arising  out  of,  his  magical  procedure; 
those  concerning  the  life  in  a  future  world; 
and  those  embodied  in  matter  of  fact  procedure, 
may  never  be  systematized  into  an  architectural 
whole,  the  various  parts  of  which  are  mutually 
consistent,  but  may,  on  the  other  hand,  maintain 
themselves  within  their  several  spheres  in  more 
or  less  exclusion  or  mutual  isolation.!^  Lastly 
a  final  point  deserves  passing  consideration, 
namely,  that  if  we  accept  animism  in  the  literal 
Tylorian  sense,  we  are  compelled  to  assume  that 
primitive  man  is  quite  incapable  of  distinguishing 
between  the  animate  and  inanimate  and,  con- 
sequently, that  his  behavior  toward  objects  and 
living  beings  cannot  be  distinguished, — a  state 
of  affairs  which  of  course  would  involve  a  reductio 
ad  ahsurdum. 

Max  Mtiller  attacks  the  classical  Tylorian 
animism  in  so  far  as  it  involves  the  supposition 

"  Compare  in  this  connection  the  doctrine  of  participa- 
tion set  forth  by  Levy-Bruhl,  Les  fonctions  mentales  dans 
les  soci^t^s  inf^riures. 


88  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

that  primitive  man  regards  the  world  as  such 
and  at  large  to  be  alive  in  the  literal  sense  of  the 
word  and  seeks  to  show  that  he  is  not  necessarily 
committed  ''to  the  startling  assertion  that  the 
sun  and  moon,  the  tree  and  river  are,  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  word,  anthropomorphous  or  man- 
like ".^^  However,  he  recognizes  that  there  are 
many  peculiar  beliefs  and  practices  which  might 
seem  superficially  to  justify  the  attribution  of 
this  view  of  the  world  to  primitive  man  and 
resorts  to  a  very  ingenious  type  of  explanation 
quite  different  from  that  of  Tylor.  He  assumes 
that  the  fundamental  phonetic  elements  (roots) 
express  types  of  action  of  extreme  generality 
and  that  they  constitute  the  elementary,  linguis- 
tic, classificatory  mechanism.  When  man  at- 
tempts to  name  the  inanimate  objects  of  the 
outer  world,  he  has  no  means  of  doing  so  other 
than  by  the  utilization  of  these  roots,  to  which 
he  adds  other  phonetic  elements  which  reveal, 
or  symbolize  more  or  less  clearly,  some  quality 
or  concrete  particularity  of  the  object.  Thus, 
by  reason  of  a  purely  linguistic  exigency  or 
device,  words,  which  apply  to  things,  also  em- 
body types  of  activity.  In  this  manner  language 
spreads  a  veil  over  the  world  and  transforms 
things  into  active,  anthropomorphic  agents. 
The  Siren  voice  of  words,  once  constituted, 
"  Anthropological  religion,  p.  74. 


SPIRIT  89 

exercises  imperial  dominion  over  and  leads  the 
mind  of  man  astray/^  not  only  in  respect  to 
religious  and  mythological  concepts,  but  also  in 
philosophical  and  scientific  controversy:  indeed, 
he  goes  so  far  as  to  interpret  the  whole  history 
of  philosophy  from  Thales  to  Hegel  as  '^a  con- 
stant protest  of  thought  against  language"." 

In  addition  to  this  overwhelming  linguistic 
mfluence,  Miiller  has  also  attempted,  by  means 
of  a  purely  psychological  analysis  of  the  noetical 
relationship  of  man  to  the  outer  world,  to  furnish 
a  parallel  or  subsidiary  explanation  of  the  rise 
of  ideas  of  spirits  and  deities. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  organic  evolution, 
the  sense  of  touch  is  the  most  primitive  and 
least  differentiated.  Scent  and  taste  come  next 
in  order  of  development  and  are  consequently 
more  specialized.  The  three  taken  together  con- 
stitute the  so-called  palaeoteric  senses.  Sight 
and  hearing,  arising  latest  in  the  process  of 
development,  comprise  the  neoteric  senses. 
"The  first  three  give  us  the  greatest  material 
certainty;  the  last  two  admit  of  doubt,  and 
have  frequently  to  be  verified  by  the  former  ".^^ 
In  the  psychic  constitution  of  man,  therefore,  a 
hierarchy  of  reality  is  involved. 

^^  Miiller,  Science  of  language,  Second  series,  p.  545. 
"  Miiller,  Introduction  to  the  science  of  religion,  p.  355. 
18  Miiller,  Origin  and  growth  of  religion,  p.  172. 


90  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

There  are  three  classes  of  things  which  engen- 
der as  many  distinct  types  of  attitude  toward  the 
world.  Tangible  objects,  such  as  stones,  shells, 
bones,  etc.,  are,  to  the  mind  of  man,  the  most 
real  because  they  can  be  touched,  felt  and  man- 
ipulated by  the  hand.^'  When  we  wish  to  con- 
vey an  idea  of  the  irrefragable  reality  of  a  thing 
we  say  that  it  is  manifest  which  means,  ety- 
mologically,  that  it  can  be  struck  with  the 
hands.20  The  most  common  objects  "can  be 
touched,  as  it  were,  all  round"  and  therefore 
seem  to  present  themselves  as  the  most  real.^^ 

Semi-tangible  objects,  such  as  trees,  moun- 
tains, rivers,  the  sea  and  the  earth,  constitute 
the  basis  for  a  less  positive  feehng  of  reality  .^^ 

Lastly,  intangible  objects,  and  the  powers  and 
processes  of  nature,  such  as  the  sky,  stars,  sun, 
dawn,  moon,  hghtning  and  thunder,  engender 
still  less  definite  sense  impressions  and  a  con- 
comitant feeling  of  infinity,  hence  supplying  the 
raw  material  out  of  which  ideas  of  deities  arise.^^ 
Through  the  retroactive  influence  of  language 
on  thought^^  words,  which  were  originally  applied 

"  Miiller,  Origin  and  growth  of  religion,  p.  180. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  173. 

21  Ibid  ,  p.  175. 

22  Ibid.,  p.  180. 

23  Ibid.,  p.  180. 

2*  "Names",  he  says,  "have  a  tendency  to  become 
things,  nomina  grew  into  nmnina,  ideas  into  idols  and  if 


SPIRIT  91 

to  these  vast  things,  came  gradually  to  assume  a 
more  substantial  existence.  Thus  the  Greek, 
Roman,  Indian  and  other  Gods  were  originally 
names  which  secondarily  became  definite  entities 
or  personalities :  Eos  was  originally  a  name  of  the 
dawn,  Tithonos  the  dying  day,  Zeu^,  in  Sanskrit 
Dyaus,  the  bright  heaven,  Luna,  the  moon, 
Pyrrha,  the  red  earth  and  so  on.^^ 

Borchert,  writing  from  the  theological  point 
of  view,  and  contriving  to  derive  consolation 
and  inspiration  from  some  of  the  ingenious  specu- 
lations of  Max  Miiller,  believes  that  the  most 
primitive  religious  concept  is  that  of  a  high  God 
who  is  immanent,  as  it  were,  in  all  religious 
experience  and  furnishes  the  source  from  which 
an  irradiating  series  of  subsidiary  or  lesser  beings 
are  conceived  to  emanate.  Accordingly  he  states 
that  there  is  an  universal  belief,^^  among  both 
primitive  and  civilized  peoples,  that  spirits  are 
creations  of  the  one  and  highest  God  and  act  in 

this  happened  with  the  name  Dyu  no  wonder  that  many 
things  which  were  intended  for  Him  who  is  above  the  sky- 
were  mixed  up  with  sayings  relating  to  the  sky".  Mtiller, 
Science  of  language,  Second  series,  p.  466. 

25  Miiller,  Science  of  language,  First  series,  p.  21. 

^  "  Diese  Allgemeinheit  des  Glaubens  an  einen  hochsten 
Gott  und  Schopfer  werden  die  Animisten  durch  ihre 
Theorie  nie  erklaren."  Borchert,  Der  Animismus,  Studien 
aus  dem  Collegium  Sapientia  zu  Freiberg  im  Breisgau^ 
bd.  5,  p.  157. 


92  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

a  subordinate  capacity  to  him, — oftentimes  as 
his  servants.^' 

Proceeding  after  the  general  fashion  of  the 
comparative  method,  he  cites  illustrations  from 
a  large  number  of  areas  and  historical  periods, 
referring  both  to  primitive  and  civilized  peoples, 
in  which  the  belief  in  the  highest  God  is  present, 
and,  among  the  former,  lays  particular  emphasis 
upon  those  cases  in  which  he  supposes  the  natives 
to  be  free  from  European  influences.^*  He  finds 
a  crucial  illustration  of  the  priority  of  the  belief 
in  God  in  the  oldest  historical  records, — par- 
ticularly the  earliest  collections  of  the  Rig-Veda.^^ 
Among  many  other  cultivated  peoples  the  idea 
of  an  All-Father  has  maintained  itself  for 
thousands  of  years.^° 

Borchert  vigorously  attacks  the  theory  of  the 
priority  of  animism  both  in  the  Tylorian  sense, 
and  in  the  modified  version  of  Spencer  and 
Lippert^^  according  to  which  the  souls  of  dead 
men  constitute  the  origin  of  religion  and  undergo 

"  Ibid.,  p.  16L 

"  Ibid.,  p.  13L 

29  Ibid.,  pp.  31,  52. 

«o  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

5^  "  Es  giebt  kein  Volk,  dessen  Religion  nur  aus  Seelen- 
Ahnen-  und  Geisterkult  besteht,  viel  mehr  glauben  alle 
Volker  an  einen  iiberweltlichen  Gott-Schopfer",  Ibid.,  p. 
236. 


SPIRIT  93 

an  historical  transformation  into  deities.^^  |je 
alleges  that  a  concept  of  divinity  must  be 
immanent  or  primordial  in  order  that  man  may- 
bestow  upon  souls  the  predicates  or  attributes 
of  deity  or  the  supernatural,  and  by  this  means 
elevate  them  to  the  rank  of  gods.^^  Thus  a 
sort  of  implied  religion  is  primary  which  involves 
the  knowledge  and  the  worship  of  God,  and  the 
usual  beliefs  and  practices  attendant  upon  anim- 
ism, particularly  the  cult  of  souls  and  ancestors, 
are  of  secondary  derivation.^^ 

Schmidt  takes  an  iconoclastic  attitude  with 
reference  to  any  classical  or  typical  evolution 
of  spirits  into  gods  or  of  polytheism  into  mono- 
theism. By  reason  of  certain  somatological 
characters,  together  with  a  low  material  and 
industrial  culture,  he  considers  the  pygmies  as 
the  lowest  race  of  man.  Nevertheless,  he  alleges 
that  they  possess  a  pure  monotheism,  involving 
a  lofty  conception  of  God,  which  he  does  not 
believe  to  have  arisen  out  of  animistic  beliefs 
and  practices.^^ 

In  a  quite  different  connection,  basing  his 

32  Ibid.,  p.  130. 
« Ibid.,  p.  134. 
^  Ibid.,  pp.  vii,  236. 

^  Schmidt,  Die  Stellung  der  Pygmaenvolker  in  der 
Entwickelungsgeschichte  des  Menschen,  p.  244. 


94  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

contention  largely  on  psychological  grounds,^® 
Schmidt  also  argues  against  the  mana  theorists, 
— J.  King,  Preuss,  Marett  and  others, — who,  he 
claims,  do  not  treat  animism  at  all  fairly,  and 
he  pleads  for  the  recognition  of  a  fundamental 
instinct  of  personification  which  must  inevitably 
be  considered  duly  in  the  treatment  of  the  early 
religious  life  of  man  but  which  these  writers 
entirely  and  unjustifiably  neglect.*^ 

Andrew  Lang  has  pointed  out  in  some  detail 
the  presence  of  the  '* God-idea"  among  many  of 
the  primitive  Australian  tribes  and  believes  that 
it  has  neither  been  developed  from  animism  or 
the  "Ghost  Theory''  nor  borrowed  from  the 
English.38  He  does  not  seem  to  utilize  this 
evidence,  however,  for  the  support  of  a  theory 
involving  the  priority  of  religion,  but  states  in  a 
guarded  way  that  magic  and  religion  "may  have 
been  concurrent  from  the  first  ".^^ 

In  a  recent  work  Radin  vigorously  attacks  the 
mana  theorists  and  makes  the  strong  statement 
that  "animism  in  the  old  Tylorian  sense  of  the 

^  Schmidt,  L'origine  de  I'id^e  de  Dieu,  Anthropos,  v.  4, 
p.  514. 

"  Ibid.,  V.  5,  p.  245. 

'^  Lang,  The  making  of  religion,  pp.  91-92;  Australian 
gods,  Folklore,  March,  1899.  Spencer  and  Gillen,  The 
native  tribes  of  Central  Australia,  pp.  222,  246. 

'^Lang,  Mr.  Frazer's  theory  of  totemism,  Fortnightly 
Review,  n.s.,  v.  65,  p.  1012, 


SPIRIT  95 

term  is  the  belief  of  the  Indians  ".*°  Although 
his  data  are  confined  to  North  America,  his 
theoretical  interpretations  are  of  universal  ap- 
plication, and  he  leaves  us  with  no  uncertain 
impression  that  he  considers  the  belief  in  spirits 
one  of  the  fundamental  phenomena  in  the 
religious  life  of  man.  According  to  his  opinion, 
the  Indians  are  very  little  interested  in  the 
specific  form  of  spirits,  but  this  fact  must  not 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  their  spiritualistic 
beliefs  are  any  the  less  definite.^^  However  he 
believes  that  the  mana  theorists  have  made 
precisely  this  interpretation, — the  lack  of  defi- 
niteness  in  the  form  of  supernatural  beings 
having  led  them  to  postulate  a  pre-animistic 
magical  power.  Against  this  view  Radin  directs 
the  shafts  of  his  polemic.  He  points  out  that 
spirits,  particularly  those  which  appear  in  the 
shape  of  deities,  have  been  split  by  ethnological 
analysis  into  beings  plus  magical  power,  ^'and 
it  has  then  been  forgotten  that  they  belonged  to- 
gether and  cannot  be  treated  as  though  they 
were  independent  of  each  other ".^  He  regards 
this  separation  as  quite  illegitimate  in  so  far  as 
it  does  not  represent  a  native  distinction. 

*°  Radin,   Religion   of  the   North  American   Indians, 
International  Congress  of  Americanists,  v.  19,  p.  278. 
« Ibid.,  pp.  270-271. 
« Ibid.,  p.  274. 


96  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  mana  theorists,  according  to  Radin,  do 
not  give  us  either  the  facts  or  the  Indian's  inter- 
pretation of  them,  but,  having  approached  their 
problem  from  a  pre-conceived  European  meta- 
physical view-point,  superimpose  it  upon  the 
entire  material  with  which  they  deal.  In  no 
case  is  there  a  clear  presentation  of  data  dis- 
sociated from  a  theory.  In  those  rare  instances 
when  an  attempt  is  made  to  present  the  facts, 
they  are  given  in  the  shape  of  an  appendix  to, 
or  illustrations  of,  an  interpretation. 

In  Radin's  investigations  among  the  Winne- 
bago and  Ojibwa,  he  finds  that  the  terms 
wakanda  and  manito  are  always  referred  by  the 
Indians  to  definite  spirits,  though  not  necessarily 
definite  in  shape.'*^  These  conclusions,  it  is  per- 
haps superfluous  to  state,  are  in  violent  contrast 
to  those  arrived  at  by  other  American  ethnolo- 
gists.^ 

In  a  recent  work  Nieuwenhuis  takes  for 
granted  the  priority  of  animism  in  the  religious 
life  of  man,  undertakes  to  analyze  with  rigor 

« Ibid.,  p.  276. 

**  "We  may  say,  then,  that  from  an  examination  of  the 
data  customarily  relied  upon  as  proof,  and  from  individual 
data  obtained,  there  is  nothing  to  justify  the  postulation 
of  a  belief  in  a  universal  force  in  North  America.  Magical 
power  as  an  'essence'  existing  apart  and  separate  from  a 
definite  spirit,  is,  we  believe,  an  unjustified  assumption, 
an  abstraction  created  by  investigators."    Ibid.,  p.  277. 


SPIRIT  97 

the  logical  and  epistemological  principles  from 
which  it  springs  and,  in  an  extraordinary  fashion, 
attempts  to  show  that  its  fundamental  concepts 
arise  with  the  same  necessity  which  characterize 
the  geometrical  postulates  of  Euclid. 

As  the  basis  of  his  investigations,  the  writer 
examines  the  Bahau  and  Kenja  of  the  Island 
of  Borneo  and  the  Toradja  of  the  Island  of 
Celebes.'*^  He  believes  that  these  tribes  are  the 
most  primitive  in  existence,  that  they  are  isolated 
from  foreign  influences,  particularly  Malay  and 
Islam,  and  manifest,  therefore,  an  ideal  inde- 
pendent development.^^ 

In  Nieuwenhuis'  opinion,  the  proper  object  of 
study  is  religion  in  and  for  itself,  quite  inde- 
pendent, not  only  of  disruptive  foreign  influences, 
but  also  of  other  phases  of  culture,  such  as 
ethical  beliefs  and  practices,  social  organization, 
art,  etc.  He  draws  a  distinction  for  this  reason 
between  "central''  and  "peripheral"  religious 
phenomena,  regarding  the  former  as  animism  or 
a  philosophy  of  nature  very  much  in  the  old 
Tylorian  sense  of  a  systematic  Weltanschauung. 

^  Compare  his  treatment  of  mathematical  and  natural 
scientific  thought  among  these  peoples.  Die  Veranlagung 
der  malaiischen  Volker  des  Ost-Indischen  Archipels  II. 
Internationales  Archiv  fiir  Ethnographie,  bd.  22-23. 

*^  Nieuwenhuis,  Die  Wurzeln  des  Animismus,  Inter- 
nationales Archiv  far  Ethnographie,  Sup.  bd.,  24,  pp.  8-9. 

8 


98  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  ultimate  logical  basis  of  spiritistic  con- 
cepts Nieuwenhuis  takes  to  be  the  Hamiltonian 
principle  of  thought  necessity  according  to  which 
something  cannot  come  out  of  nothing  or  cannot 
return  again  into  nothing.  In  the  process  of 
death,  primitive  man  observes  the  more  or  less 
rapid  loss  of  spiritual  qualities  while  the  body 
remains  intact.  According  to  this  thought  ne- 
cessity, imposed  by  the  Hamiltonian  principle, 
he  concludes  that  something  has  passed  away 
but  has  not  vanished  entirely.  Therefore  he 
conceives  of  a  quasi-material  entity  which  he 
identifies  as  the  spiritual  part  of  man  which 
must  have  gone  somewhere  while  the  corporeal 
part  remains.  Hence  arises  the  concept  of  the 
soul  in  opposition  to  that  of  the  body.  This 
distinction,  however,  is  not  clearly  drawn,  but 
the  soul  is  thought  of  as  a  semi-substantial 
entity  which  can  disappear  from  sight  but  which 
cannot  pass  into  nothing.**^ 

Concomitant  with  his  observation  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  sleep  and  waking,  he  reasons  in  a 
similar  fashion.  During  unconsciousness  some 
of  the  mental  processes  of  the  man  are  suspended, 
but  they  have  not  passed  into  nothing.  Hence 
among  the  Bahau  there  is  the  concept  of  a 
secondary  sleep-soul  which  has  the  capacity  of 

« Ibid.,  p.  59. 


SPIRIT  99 

wandering  away  and  returning  when  the  sleeper 
awakes.^^ 

In  the  observation  of  natural  phenomena  such 
as  lightning,  thunder,  sickness,  etc.,  a  comparable 
method  of  reasoning,  according  to  the  Hamil- 
tonian  principle,  is  pursued.  The  unknown 
causes  are  reified  and  personified  in  a  manner 
similar  to  the  reification  of  the  soul.  Thus,  for 
example,  illness  is  regarded  as  due  to  a  material 
entity  which  can  be  removed  from  the  body.'*^ 

The  primary  object  of  Nieuwenhuis'  investi- 
gations is,  as  we  have  said,  the  logical  basis  of 
animism.  The  method  of  procedure  followed  by 
the  author  involves,  of  course,  the  complete 
extrusion  of  emotional  or  affectivistic  elements 
as  integral  components  of  the  religious  life. 
In  true  Tylorian  fashion  he  considers  the  en- 
semhle  of  these  ratiocinations  as  constituting  a 
systematic  view  of  the  world.  In  this  manner 
he  makes  possible  for  himself  the  correlation  of 
these  logical  processes  with  those  which  lie  be- 
hind the  development  of  the  natural  sciences,  not 
only  in  primitive  but  also  in  more  developed 
cultures, — by  this  peculiar  twist  contriving  to 
reduce  both  to  the  same  logical  level  whose 
ultimate  point  d'appui  is  the  Hamiltonian  prin- 
ciple.^^   If,  in  these  latter  disciplines,  we  attempt 

« Ibid.,  p.  60. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  62. 
eoibid.,  p.  64. 


100  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

to  investigate  that  which  causes  our  sensations, 
we  come  upon  something  unknown :  we  postulate 
a  mysterious  factor  as  the  power  of  nature.^^  In 
gravitation  we  also  deal  with  an  incomprehen- 
sible noumenon.  We  give  a  mathematical  state- 
ment of  the  facts  but  this  does  not  serve  as  a 
satisfactory  explanation.  In  electrical  and  mag- 
netic phenomena  we  glibly  ascribe  a  name, 
''electricity",  for  the  inscrutable  entity.  In  the 
last  analysis,  the  scientist  hypostatizes  the  un- 
known powers  of  nature  as  the  aetiological  bases 
of  phenomena  in  the  same  manner  in  which  the 
animist  reifies  the  soul  which  survives  the  body, 
that  which  wanders  about  during  sleep,  the  sup- 
posed properties  of  matter,  the  causes  of  sickness, 
thunder,  lightning,  etc.  Man's  relationship  to 
the  outer  world  as  revealed  in  science  and  religion 
is  thus  essentially  and  fundamentally  the  same 
and  Nieuwenhuis  characterizes  as  "naturism'' 
the  primordial  or  "central"  religious  phenomena, 
— the  pure  essence,  as  it  were,  uncorrupted  by 
interpenetration  with  other  phases  of  culture. ^- 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  64;  "Fiir  dieses  ganze  weite  Feld  der 
unbekannton  Ursachen  fiihren  wir  die  Naturkrafte  ein. 
So  besitzen  wir  jetzt  Naturkrafte  wie  Elektrizitat,  Schwer- 
kraft,  Magnetismus,  Lcbenskraft  u.s.w.  Auf  alle  diese 
ist  mit  Recht  Schopenhauer's  Auffassung  anzuwenden: 
'&aft  ist  Ursache,  sofern  sie  unbekannt  ist'."  Ibid.,  p. 
65. 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  66,  83,  86. 


CHAPTER  7 
MAGICAL  POWER  AS  THE  PRIMORDIUM 

In  recent  years  a  decided  speculative  reaction 
has  taken  place  in  regard  to  questions  relating 
to  the  existence  and  functions  of  spirits  in  the 
mind  of  primitive  man,  and  a  rival  view,  which, 
in  its  way,  is  equally  extreme,  has  come  to  have 
very  wide  currency :  instead  of  considering  man^s 
most  fundamental  magico-religious  concept  to 
be  that  of  a  soul  or  spirit,  it  ascribes  to  him  the 
vicarious  notion  of  an  impersonal,  unanthropo- 
morphic  power,  thought  to  be  immanent  and  all- 
pervasive  throughout  the  whole  of  nature.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  concomitant  activities, 
instead  of  being  directed  exclusively  toward 
supernatural  beings,  concern  themselves  with 
this  force  and  there  arises  the  attempt  to  control, 
direct  and  wheedle  it  in  the  service  of  human 
needs,  desires,  hopes  and  fears. 

Codrington^s  work  on  the  Melanesians  has 
generally  been  considered  as  the  starting  point  of 
this  type  of  theory.     Referring  to  mana  he  says: 

"It  is  a  power  or  influence,  not  physical,  and  in  a 
way  supernatural;   but  it  shows  itself  in  physical  force, 

101 


102  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

or  in  any  kind  of  power  or  excellence  which  a  man  possesses. 
This  mana  is  not  jBxed  in  any  thing  and  can  be  conveyed 
in  almost  any  thing;  but  spirits,  whether  disembodied 
souls  or  supernatural  beings,  have  and  can  impart  it; 
and  it  essentially  belongs  to  personal  beings  to  originate  it, 
though  it  may  act  through  the  medium  of  water,  or  a 
stone,  or  a  bone.  All  Melanesian  religion  consists  in  fact 
in  getting  this  mana  for  ones  self,  or  getting  it  used  for  ones 
benefit — all  religion,  that  is,  as  far  as  religious  practices  gOj 
prayers  and  sacrifices."  ^ 

In  another  passage  he  states : 

"This  power  (mana),  though  impersonal  is  always 
connected  with  some  person  who  directs  it,  all  spirits  have  it, 
ghosts  generally,  some  men.  If  a  stone  is  found  to  have 
supernatural  power,  it  is  because  a  spirit  has  associated 
itself  with  it ".2 

Without  considering  the  details  of  Codring- 
ton's  work,  it  is  sufficient  to  observe  that  his 
statements  often  reveal  considerable  inconsis- 
tency. Sometimes  he  describes  this  power  as  the 
abstract,  impersonal  capacity  or  virtue  of  a 
stone,  a  bone  or  any  inanimate  object;  at  other 
times  he  speaks  of  it  as  the  peculiar  prerogative 
of  a  living  being,  ghost  or  spirit.  Our  interpreta- 
tion of  Codrington's  position,  therefore,  will 
depend  largely  upon  whether  we  emphasize  one 
or  the  other  type  of  his  statements  on  this  matter. 
It  would  be  perfectly  feasible  to  select  a  group  of 

^  Codrington,  The  Melanesians,  p.  119.     Itahcs  mine. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  119.     Itahcs  mine. 


MAGICAL  POWER  l03 

passages  tending  to  prove  that  mana  is  thought 
of  by  the  people  as  an  abstract  virtue  and  equally 
possible  to  choose  others  showing  that  they 
regard  it  as  an  anthromorphic,  psychic  manifes- 
tation invariably  bound  up  with  a  living  being, 
ghost  or  spirit. 

Whatever  be  the  merits  of  the  case,  it  is  the 
former  interpretation  of  Codrington  which  has 
attained  wide  currency  and  stimulated  other 
investigators  to  look  for  a  similar  concept  in 
other  regions.  In  this  attempt  eminent  success 
has  been  achieved  and  a  mere  compilation  of 
the  results  obtained  would  be  an  exceedingly 
formidable  task.  William  Jones  ascribes  to  the 
Algonkin  ''an  unsystematic  belief  in  a  cosmic, 
mysterious  property,  which  is  believed  to  exist 
everywhere  in  nature''.^  Aston  says,  apropos 
of  the  early  Japanese  religion: 

"Primitive  man  did  not  think  of  the  world  as  pervaded 
by  spiritual  forces.  His  attitude  was  a  piecemeal  con- 
ception of  the  universe  as  alive,  just  as  his  fellow-man  was 
regarded  as  ahve  without  being  analyzed  into  soul  and 
body  ".4 

Love  joy,  who  appears  to  hold  this  view  in  a 
very  literal  way,  is  the  author  of  the  following 
bold  pronouncement. 

5  Jones,  The  Algonkin  manitou,  Journal  of  American 
Folk-Lore,  v.  18,  p.  190. 
*  Aston,  The  Shinto,  p.  26. 


104  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

"Among  many  undeveloped  races  the  one  great  prac- 
tical concern  of  the  indi\4dual,  the  all-important  business 
that  chiefly  engrosses  his  imagination,  controls  his  acti\'i- 
ties  and  accounts  for  by  far  the  greater  part  of  his  so- 
called  rehgious  customs  and  observances,  is  the  endeavour 
to  absorb  into  his  person  as  much  of  this  force,  or  get  into 
his  possession  as  many  objects  charged  with  it,  as  possible, 
while  at  the  same  time  insulating  himself  against  it  at 
those  moments  when  its  excessive  quantity  or  unstable 
equilibrium  makes  it  dangerous.  In  a  word,  the  dominant 
preoccupation,  probably,  of  most  savages,  is,  not  to 
'cultivate  friendly  relations  with  supernatural  beings', 
but  to  get  into  such  well-adjusted,  quasi-mechanical  rela- 
tions loith  the  source  of  supernatural  energy,  that  they  may 
control  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  it  for  the  benefit 
of   themselves,    their   family,    clan,    village    or   tribe"." 

The  writings  of  Hewitt  on  this  subject  reveal 
considerable  obscurity  in  style  and  mode  of 
expression.  While  he  professes  to  be  an  ardent 
advocate  of  the  mana  doctrine,  he  speaks  often- 
times of  plural  orendas  which  contend  against 
one  another  rather  than  of  a  single  universally 
diffused  power. 

"The  possession  of  orenda  ...  is  the  distinctive  char- 
acteristic of  all  the  gods,  and  these  gods  in  earlier  time 
were  all  the  bodies  and  beings  of  nature  in  any  manner 
affecting  the  weal  or  woe  of  man.  So  primitive  man 
interpreted  the  activities  of  nature  to  be  due  to  the  struggle 
of  one  orenda  against  another,  put  forth  by  the  beings  or 
bodies  of  his  environment,  the  former  possessing  orenda 

«*  Primitive  philosophy,  Monist,  v.  16,  p.  361.  Itahcs 
mine. 


MAGICAL  POWER  105 

and  the  latter  life,  mind,  and  orend/i  only  by  virtue  of  his 
own  imputation  of  these  things  to  lifeless  objects".^ 

If  or  en  da  is  to  be  identified  with  the  concept  or 
principle  of  a  magical  power  vaguely  suffused 
throughout  nature,  it  is  not  clear  how  it  can  also, 
at  the  same  time,  be  individualized  in  the  form 
of  many  orendas  struggling  against  one  another: 
but,  if  this  latter  view  be  accepted,  it  would 
seem  that  we  are  dealing  with  amorphous  gods 
or  spirits  which  possess  vague  anthropomorphic 
qualities  such  as  will-power,  and  perhaps  also 
the  psychic  disposition  of  yielding  to  prayers 
entreaties,  and  magical  procedure,  when  properly 
instituted.  In  the  following  passage  he  comes 
perilously  close  to  identifying  outright  plural 
orendas  with  the  gods  themselves. 

"In  the  stress  of  life  coming  into  contact  with  certain 
bodies  of  his  environment  more  frequently  than  with  the 
other  environing  bodies,  and  learning  from  these  con- 
straining relations  to  feel  that  these  bodies,  through  the 
exercise  of  their  orenda,  controlled  the  conditions  of  his 
welfare  and  in  like  manner  shaped  his  ill-fare,  he  came 
gradually  to  regard  these  bodies,  as  the  masters,  the  gods, 
of  his  environment,  whose  aid,  goodwill,  and  even  existence 
were  absolutely  necessary  to  his  well-being  and  his  pre- 
servation of  life  itself .  .  .  .  And  the  story  of  the  operations 
of  orenda  becomes  the  history  of  the  gods".^ 

^  Hewitt,  Orenda,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  American  Ethnology^ 
Bulletin,  v.  30,  pt.  2. 

^  Hewitt,  Orenda  and  a  definition  of  religion,  American 
Anthropologist,  n.s.,  v.  4,  p.  41 


106  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

McDougall  understands  the  doctrine  of  pre- 
animism  to  involve  the  presumption  that  mana 
constituted  the  primary  belief  of  magic  and  that, 
subsequently,  ideas  of  spiritual  beings  have  been 
differentiated  from  it.^  Clodd  characterizes  the 
notion  of  magical  power  as  ''the  germ  of  later 
anthropomorphic  ideas'';^  King  refers  to  it  as 
a  concept  ''of  habit  rather  than  of  the  intellect; 
that  is  to  say,  various  automatic  or  reflex  acts 
have  gradually  been  elaborated  into  a  somewhat 
definite  biological  attitude  toward  the  world ''.^^ 
In  discussing  the  manitou  of  the  Algonkin,  how- 
ever, he  manoeuvres  into  a  difficulty  similar  to 
that  of  Hewitt  and  speaks  of  it  as,  in  some  sense, 
individualized. 

"It  is  important  to  note  that  the  manitou  is  primarily 
a  mysterious  quasi-mechanical  essence,  the  active  element 
in  all  that  is  strange,  excellent,  or  powerful.  It  is  equally 
important  to  note  that  this  quality  comes  by  insensible 
steps  to  be  identified  in  many  cases  with  the  object  or 
person  of  which  it  is  the  vehicle,  so  that  in  the  end  it  may 
be  said  to  he  in  a  measure  personified".^^ 

8  McDougall,  Body  and  mind,  p  4. 

8  Clodd,  Magic  and  religion,  Quarterhj  Review,  1907,  v. 
207,  p.  183. 

1°  King,  The  development  of  rehgion,  p.  149. 

"  Ibid.,  pp.  137-138.  Itahcs  mine.  In  another  con- 
nection King  makes  the  somewhat  astounding  statement: 
"We  should  remember,  however,  that  personal  agencies 
can  scarcely  have  been  postulated  of  nature  by  people 
hardly  conscious  of  any  definite  personality  in  them- 
selves".    Ibid.,  p.  157. 


MAGICAL  POWER  107 

Marett  has  perhaps  done  more  than  any  one 
else  to  popularize  this  dogma.  According  to 
his  interpretation,  Tylor's  view  of  religion  as  a 
''belief  in  spiritual  beings"  is  entirely  too  narrow 
in  so  far  as  a  great  many  phenomena,  which 
might  properly  be  characterized  as  religious,  are 
arbitrarily  extruded  by  the  definition, — various 
practices  and  ideas  not  involving  reference  to 
spirits.  Tylor's  animism,  he  believes,  is  entirely 
too  intellectualistic  and  unduly  neglects  the 
processes  of  feeling  and  will.  ''My  own  view", 
he  says,  "is  that  savage  religion  is  something  not 
so  much  thought  out  as  danced  out;  that,  in 
other  words,  it  develops  under  conditions,  psy- 
chological and  sociological,  which  favor  emo- 
tional and  motor  processes,  whereas  ideation 
remains  relatively  in  abeyance".^ 

In  these  lower  levels  of  the  mind  there  are 
involved  religious  experiences  of  an  affective 
character  which  imply  neither  the  belief  in,  nor 
reasoning  about,  spirits  and  their  capacities, — 
a  group  of  objective  stimuli  simply  engendering 
peculiar  emotions.  Thunderstorms,  eclipses, 
eruptions,  and  the  like,  awaken  the  feeling  of 
awe  or  vague  fear.  In  a  general  way,  those 
processes  of  nature  which  are  terrible,  objects 
such  as  stones  which  have  a  curious  or  unusual 
shape,  odd  and  uncanny  animals,  "white  animals 

"  Marett,  The  threshold  of  religion,  p.  xxxi. 


108  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

(for  example,  white  elephants  or  white  buffaloes), 
birds  of  night  (notably  the  owl),  monkeys,  mice, 
frogs,  crabs,  snakes,  and  lizards,  in  fact  a  host 
of  strange  and  grewsome  beasts,  are  to  the 
savage  of  their  own  right  and  on  the  face  of  them, 
instinct  with  dreadful  divinity  ".^^  Human  re- 
mains and  blood,  particularly  that  of  woman, 
also  tend  to  evoke  these  rudimentary  religious 
feelings  of  man. 

The  subjective  processes  which  are  engendered 
by  these  diverse  groups  of  objective  stimuli  drive 
man  unconsciously  to  seek  rapport  with  these 
mysterious,  unusual  and  catastrophic  events, 
objects  and  processes  of  nature.  At  this  stage 
of  development,  as  has  been  stated,  spirits  are 
not  implied  and  consequently  "something  wider 
than  animism  is  needed  as  a  minimum  definition 
of  religion  ".^^ 

A  high  degree  of  lucidity  cannot  be  said  to 
characterize  the  views  of  the  mana  theorists  upon 
their  favorite  concept.  Considering  his  writings 
as  a  whole,  Marett  appears  to  have  expressed  a 

"  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

"  Marett,  Pre-animistic  religion,  Folklore,  1900,  pp. 
162-182:  Conception  of  mana,  Transactions  of  the  3d 
International  Congress  for  the  History  of  Religions,  v.  2, 
p.  54:  Pre-animistic  stages  in  religion,  Transactions  of  the 
3d  International  Congress  for  the  History  of  Religions,  v.  1, 
p.  33:  The  threshold  of  religion:  Articles,  Magic,  and 
Mana,  Hastings  Encyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics. 


MAGICAL  POWER  109 

bewildering  varieties  of  opinion  on  this  subject 
so  that  we  sympathize  thoroughly  with  Durk- 
heim's  statement  that  his  thought  on  this  point 
of  the  priority  of  pre-animism  remains  ^'h^sitante 
et  tres  reserve '\^^ 

The  views  of  Hubert  and  Mauss  on  this  sub- 
ject exhibit  no  less  elusiveness.  (1)  They  de- 
clare that  mana  is  the  fundamental  notion  from 
which  both  magic  and  religion  are  elaborated  ;^® 
(2)  that  the  relationship  of  logical  subordination 
obtains  between  mana  and  the  sacred,^^  the 
former  being  the  genus  of  which  the  latter  is 
the  species  ;^^  (3)  that  the  usual  chronological 
sequence  between  magic  and  religion  obtains, 
although,  at  the  same  time,  curiously  enough, 
they  are  genetically  related  and  spring  from  a 
common  source;    (4)  they  conceive  of  magical 

15  "Dxirkheim,  Les  formes  616mentaires  de  la  vie  r61igieuse, 
p.  287. 

18  Jevons  understands  Hubert  and  Mauss  to  intimate 
or  imply  that  magic  and  religion  have  sprung  from  the 
concept  of  mana  and  have  only  become  differentiated  from 
one  another  in  the  course  of  their  evolution.  The  defini- 
tion of  magic,  Sociological  Review,  April,  1908,  p.  108. 

17  The  French  school  regard  the  idea  of  the  sacred  as 
the  most  important  of  the  specific  differentiae  of  religion. 
Compare  Durkheim,  Les  formes  ^lementaires  de  la  vie 
r^ligieuse,  and  Levy-Bruhl,  Les  fonctions  mentales  dans 
les  soci^t^s  inf^rieures. 

18  Hubert  and  Mauss,  Th6orie  g6n^rale  de  la  magic, 
L'annee  sociologique,  v.  7,  p.  120. 


110  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

power  as  comparable  to  our  scientific  notion  of 
mechanical  force ;^^  (5)  they  also  point  out  the 
extreme  vagueness  of  the  idea  of  mana  and 
declare  that  it  is  composed  of  a  series  of  unstable 
ideas  which  are  mutually  confounded,  that  it 
may  be  from  time  to  time  and  at  the  same  time, 
quality,  substance  and  activity  i^^'  (6)  not  con- 
tent with  these  characterizations,  they  speak  of 
it  as  functioning  after  the  fashion  of  a  category 
which  furnishes  the  a  priori  basis  of  magical 
ideas  and  rites  in  the  same  fashion  that  the 
postulate  of  Euclid  is  involved  in  our  conception 
of  space.^^ 

Kruijt,  in  a  somewhat  fanciful  way,  attempts 
to  correlate  the  transition  between  magic  and 
religion  with  two  stages  in  the  evolution  of 
primitive  societies.  In  the  first  period  rtiana  is 
believed  to  animate  all  beings  and  objects, — 
to  be  all-pervasive  in  nature;  concomitant  there- 
in Ibid.,  p.  107. 

20  L'id^e  de  mana  se  compose  d'une  s^rie  d'id^es  in- 
stables  qui  se  confondent  les  lines  dans  les  autres.  H  est 
tour  k  tour  et  h,  la  fois  qualitd,  substance  et  activity. — 
En  premier  lieu,  il  est  une  quality.  H  est  quelque  chose 
qu'a  la  chose  mana]  il  n'est  pas  cette  chose  elle-m^me. 
Ibid.,  p.  109. 

21  Elle  fonctionne  h  la  fa^on  d'une  cat6gorie,  elle  rend 
possibles  les  iddes  humaines.  .  .  .  C'est  qu'elle  est  in- 
h<5rente  k  la  magie  comme  le  postulatum  d'Euclide  est 
inh^Tent  k  notre  conception  dc  Tespace.     Ibid.,  p.  119. 


MAGICAL  POWER  111 

with  is  the  feeling  of  the  individual  that  his 
personality  is  vaguely  diffused  throughout  the 
social  group:  in  the  second  period,  however,  he 
comes  to  consciousness  of  himself  as  something 
unique  and  singular,  as  it  were,  and,  in  connec- 
tion with  this  heightened  feeling  of  selfhood, 
there  is  involved  also  the  individualization  of 
spirits, — in  other  words,  the  mana  concept  is 
exchanged  for  that  of  personal,  supernatural 
beings  which  are  believed  to  inhabit  every  living 
form  and  object.^^  Levy-Bruhl  also  appears  to 
follow  this  line  of  thought.^' 

Leuba  holds  that  magic  concerns  itself  with 
a  ^'mechanical,  coercitive  force",  religion,  in 
contradistinction,  with  ''offerings,  prayers,  pen- 
ances,'^ etc.,  having  reference  to  supernatural 
beings.  He  contends  that  there  is  a  profound 
distinction  in  the  direct  psychological  attitudes 
involved  in  the  two  cases  which  is  more  impor- 
tant than  the  objective  differences  existing 
between  the  two  groups  of  concomitant  phe- 
nomena.24 

^^Kruijt,  Het  Animisme  in  den  indischen  Archipel, 
pp.  66-67. 

"  The  basis  of  this  exposition  is  taken  from  Levy- 
Bruhl,  Les  fonctions  mentales  dans  les  soci^t^s  inf^rieures, 
p.  429  and  following. 

2^  Leuba,  How  magic  is  to  be  differentiated  from  religion, 
Journal  of  Religious  Psychology,  19X3,  p.  423. 


112  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

Fossey  holds  that  primitive  man  confuses  the 
laws  of  nature  with  those  of  subjective  connec- 
tion and  that  bound  up  therewith  is  the  feeUng 
of  his  own  omnipotence.^^  He  subscribes  to  the 
conventional  theory  of  the  temporal  sequence  of 
magic  and  religion  and  raises  the  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  can  be  proved  by  direct 
historical  evidence  as  revealed  in  the  Assyrio- 
Babylonian  cuneiform  inscriptions.  Despite  his 
bias  in  favor  of  the  usual  view,  he  frankly  admits 
that  a  study  of  these  ancient  documents  fails  to 
lend  conclusive  proof  of  it:  indeed,  the  net  result 
of  his  investigations  is  to  show  that  magic  and 
religion  were  inextricably  interwoven,  that  mag- 
icians played  an  important  part  in  socio-political 
ceremonies,  Babylonian  kings  emplojdng  them 
officially,  and  that  in  the  library  of  one  of  these 
rulers  incantations  have  been  preserved. ^^ 

Such  complete  absence  of  definite  results  of  a 
concrete  historical  investigation  applied  to  this 
question  is  orecisely  what  we  should  expect  on 
more  general  a  priori  grounds.  This  problem  is 
not  one  which,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  lends 
itself  to  historical  elucidation, — a  fact  which  will 
come  out  more  clearly  in  the  sequel. 

Magic  and  religion,  according  to  Frazer,  are 

^  Fossey,  La  magie  Assyrienne,  Bibliotheque  de  VEcole 
des  hautes  Etudes;  Sciences  Religieuses,  1902,  v.  15,  p.  140. 
»» Ibid.,  pp.  4,  10,  '.36. 


MAGICAL  POWER  113 

not  contemporaneous  phenomena,  as  the  data  of 
ethnology  would  seem  to  suggest,  but  make  their 
appearance  in  temporal  order,  the  former  in- 
variably preceding  the  latter  and  furnishing  the 
motivation  out  of  which  it  subsequently  arises. 
Primitive  man  in  the  pre-historic  period  found 
himself  confronted  by  an  alien  and  hostile  en- 
vironment upon  which  he  forthwith  proceeded 
to  operate  for  the  purpose  of  securing  sundry 
and  varied  benefits,  emoluments  and  advantages 
for  himself.  ''From  the  earliest  times,''  says 
Frazer,  ''man  has  been  engaged  in  a  search  for 
general  rules  whereby  to  turn  the  order  of  natural 
phenomena  to  his  own  advantage,  and  in  the  long 
search  he  has  scraped  together  a  great  hoard  of 
such  maxims,  some  of  them  golden  and  some  of 
them  mere  dross.  The  true  or  golden  rules  con- 
stitute the  body  of  applied  science  which  we 
call  the  arts;  the  false  are  magic."  ^7 

The  fundamental  postulate  upon  which  primi- 
tive man  proceeded  was  that  of  the  uniformity 
of  nature  involving  the  necessary  sequence  of 
events  in  accordance  with  mechanical,  imper- 
sonal determination, — a  presumption  identical, 
indeed,  with  that  of  modern  science.  Ancillary 
axioms  which  he  forthwith  evolved  were  that 
*like  produces  like,'  and  'that  which  has  once 
been  in  contact  with  another  thing  continues, 

27  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  v.  1,  p.  222. 
9 


114  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

after  being  physically  separated  from  it,  to  be 
connected  with  it  in  some  very  real  way/ 

After  having  equipped  himself  with  these  intel- 
lectual tools,  primitive  man  set  to  work  in  an 
earnest  fashion  to  bend  the  recalcitrant  decrees 
of  a  harsh  fate  in  accordance  with  the  impulses 
and  desires  of  his  heart.  The  resultant  of  this  en- 
terprise, in  all  its  infinite  subjective  elaboration 
and  profusion  of  ritualistic  expression,  was  magic. 

At  some  time  and  place,  however,  neither  of 
which  are  specified  by  Frazer,  men  of  unusual 
talents  and  insight  began  to  appreciate  that  the 
current  mass  of  beliefs  together  with  their  con- 
comitant modes  of  procedure  or  rites  were  wrong; 
that  people  had  misinterpreted  the  world,  that 
they  had  ''taken  for  causes  what  were  no  causes,'^ 
and  that  nature  could  not  be  coerced  according 
to  the  traditional  prescriptions.  Out  of  this 
insight  religion  arose.  People  became  humble, 
conciliatory  and  propitiatory,  instead  of  proud, 
arrogant  and  coercitive.  Sacrifice,  prayer  and 
cajolery  took  the  place  of  abortive  attempts  at 
control,  and,  for  the  impersonal  powers  of  nature 
with  which  magic  was  wont  to  concern  itself, 
spirits  and  gods  were  substituted  with  whom 
people  at  once  entered  into  human,  or  anthro- 
popathic,  relations. 

In  expressing  himself  on  the  great  transition 
Frazer  rises  at  times  to  poetic  heights  and  intro- 


MAGICAL  POWER  115 

duces  a  charming  novelistic  narrative  into  the 
bewildering  facts.  ''Man/^  he  says,  ^'is  still 
alone  with  nature,  and  fancies  he  can  sway  it  at 
his  will.  Later  on,  when  he  discovers  his  mis- 
take, he  will  bethink  himself  of  gods  and  beg 
them  to  pull  for  him  the  strings  that  hang  beyond 
his  reach."  ^s 

Andrew  Lang  has  attacked  this  Frazerian 
doctrine  of  transition  in  a  rather  caustic  way, 
contending,  indeed,  that  the  fundamental  propo- 
sition might  with  equal  cogency  be  reversed, 
and  that,  instead  of  arguing  that  religion  has 
arisen  out  of  the  despair  of  magic,  one  might 
say  that  magic  has  arisen  out  of  the  despair  of 
religion,  and  that  men,  having  discovered  that 
the  gods  would  neither  do  their  bidding,  nor 
yield  to  their  entreaties,  invented  magic  for  the 
purpose  of  coercing  them.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
there  is  no  flaw  in  Lang's  facetious  criticism, 
because  so  far  as  the  productivity  of  results  is 
concerned,  both  are,  and  always  have  been, 
equally  sterile  and  inefficacious  in  the  accom- 
plishment of  real  changes  in  the  outer  world  or 
in  the  achievement  of  the  purposes  for  which 
they  are  supposed  to  exist.^^ 

The  large  number  of  writers,  and  particularly 

28Frazer,  The  origin  of  totemism,  Fortnightly  Reveiw, 
n.s.,  V.  65,  p.  648. 

29  Lang,  Magic  and  religion,  ch.  3. 


116  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

JFrazer,  who  believe  ardently  in  the  priority  of 
magic,  have  found  a  group  of  new  champions 
for  their  views  in  the  person  of  Freud  and  the 
psycho-analysts  inspired  by  him.  Reviving 
with  great  energy  the  time  honored  doctrine  of 
the  parallelism  between  ontogenetic  and  phylo- 
genetic  development,  they  have  attempted  to 
give  a  direct,  immediate  and  absolute  account  of 
the  course  of  historical  development  by  means 
of  an  analysis  of  the  atavistic  tendencies  of  the 
individual  which  manifest  themselves  in  certain 
psychopathic  conditions.  According  to  Freud 
the  neurosis  involves  a  retrogression  to  an  infan- 
tile status  which  reproduces  certain  aspects  of  the 
primordial  mental  development  of  the  race. 

We  are  thus  enabled  to  arrange  stratigraph- 
ically  the  order  of  individual  evolution  and  may 
utilize  the  resulting  architectonic  construction 
directly  in  historical  interpretation. 3*^  By  virtue 
of  this  astounding  method  Freud  proceeds  to 

"0  Furtmtiller  calls  attention  to  the  non-comparability 
of  some  of  the  parallelisms  between  ontogenetic  and  phylo- 
genetic  development  cited  by  Freud,  among  which  he 
mentions:  (1)  the  allegation  that  primitive  man  haa 
remained  at  the  stage  of  narcissism;  (2)  the  exogamy  of 
primitive  man  and  the  incest  complex  of  the  neurotic; 
(3)  tabu  and  the  ambivalence  of  feeling.  Review  of 
Freud's,  tJber  einige  Ubereinstinmiungen  in  Seelenleben 
der  Wilden  und  der  Neurotiker,  Zentralblatt  ftir  Psycho- 
analyse und  Psychotherapie,  3.  jahr.,  pp.  548-550. 


MAGICAL  POWER  117 

justify  the  Frazerian  view  of  the  temporal  order 
of  development  of  magic  and  religion  and  the 
psychological  attitudes  invariably  attendant 
upon  the  rites  of  each.^^  Frazer  adopts  the 
traditional  principles  of  associationism, — con- 
tiguity in  space  and  time,  cause  and  effect,  and 
similarity, — and  considers  that  they  constitute 
a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  juxtaposition 
of  psychic  content  involved  in  magic.  The  sup- 
port of  this  position  by  Freud  is  nothing  short  of 
a  curious  anachronism. ^2 

In  the  neuroses,  according  to  this  view,  the 
patient  returns  to  an  earlier  mental  condition. 
He  departs  from  the  adult  world  of  reality  with 
its  multiplicity  of  difficult  adjustments  which  he 
finds  himself  unable  to  encompass,  and  lives 
more  or  less  in  an  atavistic  land  of  phantasy  in 
which  his  wishes  and  thoughts  flow  on  and  attain 
their  satisfaction  within  a  self-contained  subjec- 
tive   system. ^^     Day-dreaming    and    impotent 

31  It  is  of  considerable  incidental  interest  to  note  that 
Freud  goes  further  and  champions  the  Frazerian  explana- 
tion of  magic  in  terms  of  associational  psychology  as  over 
against  the  trenchant  criticism  of  Thomas.  Magic,  Ency- 
chpedia  Britannica,  11th  ed. 

32  Freud,  tJber  einige  Ubereinstimmungen  in  Seelen- 
leben  der  Wilden  und  der  Neurotiker,  Imago,  v.  2,  pp. 
14,  15. 

^  Marett  states  that  primitive  man  does  not  accept 
death  as  a  fact.     "It  is  almost  an  axiom  with  writers  on 


118  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

musings  take  the  place  of  attempts  at  definite 
battles  with  reality  and  come,  in  the  end,  to 
constitute  a  sphere  of  existence  in  and  for  itself. 
Thus  these  mental  processes  do  not  refer  beyond 
themselves,  but  attain  to  vicarious  satisfaction 
in  the  process  of  their  own  unfolding. 

Freud  states  that  he  was  led  to  the  use  of  the 
term  "Allmacht  der  Gedankeii^'  by  means  of  the 
psycho-analysis  of  a  man  who  seemed  to  possess 
it  in  a  striking  way.^-*  He  points  out  that  the 
neurotic,  believing  in  the  almightiness  of  his 
thoughts,  fears  to  give  expression  to  bad  wishes 
lest  they  come  to  immediate  issue  in  the  outer 
world. ^^ 

Frazer  and  many  others  have  held  that  a  con- 
sciousness or  feeling  that  he  is  able  to  control 
the  forces  of  nature  is  an  invariable  mental 
condition  attendant  upon  the  magician's  prac- 
tice. Freud  accepts  this  Frazerian  interpreta- 
tion quite  uncritically,  and  finds  a  parallel  to  it 

this  subject,  that  a  sort  of  Solipsism  or  Berkleianism  (as 
Professor  Sully  terms  it  as  he  finds  it  in  the  child)  operates 
in  the  savage  to  make  him  refuse  to  recognize  death  as 
a  fact."     Pre-animistic  religion,  Folklore,  v.  11,  p.  178. 

'*  Freud,  Bemerkungen  iiber  einen  Fall  von  Zwangs- 
neurose,  Jahrhuch  fiir  psychoanalylische  und  psycho- 
pathologische  Forschungen,  bd.  1,  1909. 

^  This  same  "Alhnacht"  situation  appears  in  daily 
life.  We  are  afraid  to  paint  the  devil  on  the  wall,  or  to 
wish  evil  lest  it  be  realized. 


MAGICAL  POWER  119 

in  the  infantile  attitude  of  omnipotence.  The 
child  and  the  neurotic  believe  that  by  a  mere 
wish  they  can  bring  anything  to  pass,  (Allmacht 
der  Gedanken)  thus  confusing  the  subjective 
flow  of  their  thoughts  with  the  objective  course 
of  events. 

The  magician,  making  a  similar  confusion, 
considers  that  by  mere  wishing  and  thinking, 
accompanied  at  times  by  some  ancillary  rite, 
he  can  determine  and  control  the  order  of  nature. 
With  the  development  of  experience,  however, 
the  infant  learns  by  degrees  that  his  wishes  and 
thoughts  are  not  all-sufficing,  that  he  is  con- 
fronted by  a  hard,  bruising  and  recalcitrant 
reality  which  refuses  to  submit,  and  that  he 
must  adjust  himself  to  it.  This  more  mature 
attitude  toward  the  world  finds  its  parallel  in 
religion.  Primitive  man,  having  learned  gradu- 
ally the  necessary  limitations  of  his  powers, 
gives  up  the  attempt  to  control  the  forces  of 
nature  and  constitutes  spirits  and  gods  to  whom 
he  turns  in  a  submissive,  propitiatory  and  peni- 
tential mood  for  help  in  securing  the  objects  of 
his  desires.  In  the  magical  stage  man  ascribes 
*^ Allmacht -^  to  himself.  In  religion,  however, 
he  abdicates  this  power  in  favor  of  the  gods,  but 
only  in  a  somewhat  imperfect  way  with  a  string 
tied  to  it,  as  it  were,  because  he  still  considers 
himself  able  to  wheedle  or  constrain  them  to 


120  RELlGir   N  AND  CULT. 

encompass  his  ^1  shes  by  mea^^  manifold 
influences.^®  f 

Rivers  has  ri/acently  given  exceedingly 
iconoclastic  criUicism  of  the  ^^^eory,"  par- 
ticularly the  a/.tempt  to  found  i  ^^^  Melane- 
sian  data  to  v^'/hich  attention  w^^^  drawn  by 
the  work  of|^  Bishop  Codring-^  ^^  ^^^^^ 
that  the  f utf  idamental  task  of^^j^g-^^^j  ^^^ 
deavor  is  thj^it  of  cultural  analy^j^-^j^  involves 
the  questior^i  of  the  diffui^^  features  from  one 

36 "  Wahren  ^d  die  magie  nocl^^^^j^^  ^^^  Gedanken 
vorbehalt,  h^^.t  der  AnimismuB^  ^^^  ^.^^^^  ^^^^^^ 
den  Geisterr.1  abgetreten  und  c^^^  ^^.^^  ^^^  g^^^^ 
einer  RehF.ion  emgeschlagen.  ^^^^^^^  ^^^  ^.^^^ 
tlberemstT^mmungen  in  Seelen  ^^^  ^.^^^^  ^^^  ^^^ 
NeurotikAer,  Imago,  v.  2,  pp.  12^ 

"B4din  also  attacks  the  th^^^^^^jy  ^^  ^^^ 
poses^that  we  should  abandon  tb^^  ^^^  ^^^^  univei^al 
force)  and  consider  it  a^    the  unc  ^  ^  -^^  ^^  ^^^ 

rehgfious  emotion  itself.     It  sho^  ^^^^^  .^ 

othe>r  words  as  the  non-individua.  ^^ 

etc.,  which  forms  the  subjective  ^^  ^  „     ^^^ 

reljgion  of  the  North  Amencan^^  International 
Congress  of  Atnencanists,  v.  19,  p  rjr^^  .^^^  j^^^_ 
e^fer,  is  not  adequately  developed,^ ^.^  ^^^  ^^  ^^ 
i;.iothing  further  to  say  as  to  the  f:^^^^^^^^,^^^^  ^f 

this  pure  generalized,  subjective  fe^^  .^^  relationship 

I  to  mdmduahzed  spirits  on  the  one  ^^^  ^^  i^^personal 

/    powers  on  the  other.    Jhe  writer  is, ^^    ^    ^^  ^^^ 

sure  that  he  understands  Radin  s  pos^^  ^^  particular 

point. 

"  Codrington,  The  Melanesians. 


MAGICAL  POWER  121 

area  to  another  and  the  statement,  in  so  far  as 
possible,  of  their  concrete  historical  fates, — 
wie  es  eigentlich  geworden  isL^^  Applying  this 
method  in  the  interpretation  of  Melanesian 
culture,  he  finds  that  it  does  not  provide  "a 
suitable  basis  for  these  [mana]  speculations," 
that  the  word  is  not  indigenous  to  Melanesia 
and  may  have  been  borrowed  from  a  people 
having  an  advanced  animistic  religion. 

"It  is  certain  that  the  word  mana  belongs  to  the 
culture  of  the  immigrants  into  Melanesia  and  not  to  that 
of  the  aborigines.  .  .  .  The  analysis  of  culture,  however, 
indicates  that  it  is  not  legitimate  to  use  the  Melanesian 
evidence  to  support  the  primitiveness  of  the  concept  of 
mana.  This  evidence  certainly  does  not  support  the  view 
that  the  concept  of  inana  is  more  primitive  than  animism, 
for  the  immigrants  were  already  in  a  very  advanced  stage 
of  animistic  reUgion,  a  cult  of  the  dead  being  certainly 
one  of  the  most  definite  of  their  rehgious  institutions."  *° 

We  have  seen  that  Tylor  considered  that  he 
had  proved  the  existence  of  animism  as  a  reflec- 
tive philosophy  of  nature  by  means  of  the  cita- 
tion of  a  heterogeneous  mass  of  diverse  instances 
from  various  cultures  and  different  spheres  or 
aspects  of  experience  in  which  he  alleged  it  to 

*8  Compare  Schmidt,  Die  kulturhistorische  Methode 
in  der  Ethnologic,  Anthropos,  v.  6. 

*°  Rivers,  Ethnological  Analysis  of  Culture,  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  Report,  1911, 
p.  494. 


122  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

exist.  It  would  seem  to  be  implied,  according  to 
this  method,  that  a  summation  of  instances 
serves  to  prove  the  validity  of  the  theory.  We 
saw,  however,  that  at  no  time  or  place,  either  by 
a  group  of  people  or  by  a  single  individual,  were 
these  diverse  phenomena  organized  into  a  single, 
coherent,  systematized  scheme,  if  we  except  the 
architectural  rationalization  of  the  ethnologist 
himself.  The  mana  theorists  appear  to  follow 
a  very  similar  method  of  procedure,  whether  or 
not  they  are  entirely  conscious  of  the  fact. 
They  cite  static  facts  from  diverse  cultures  and 
carefully  selected  linguistic  material,  which  ex- 
trudes evidence  not  favorable  to  their  theory, 
to  prove  the  existence  and  universal  distribution 
of  the  mana  concept  or  the  pre-animistic  stage 
in  the  development  of  religion. 

In  a  manner  similar  to  that  in  which  Tylor 
deduced  all  religious  beliefs  from  the  concept  of 
spirit,  these  theorists  attempt  to  derive  magic 
in  some  way,  not  very  clearly  set  forth,  from  the 
mana  concept  and  assume  that  rites  concern 
themselves  exclusively  in  carrying  on  various 
types  of  transactions  with  this  mysterious,  uni- 
versally diffused  essence.  Oftentimes  it  is  said, 
in  a  seemingly  innocuous  way,  that  mana  is  the 
*' basis  of  magic," — a  type  of  statement  of  which 
the  following  from  Irving  King  may  be  taken  as 
representative:    "We  do  not  question  but  that 


MAGICAL  POWER  123 

this  unformulated  hypothesis  of  the  savage  lies 
at  the  basis  of  his  so-called  magical  practices."  ^^ 
A  great  deal  of  work  has  been  done  on  the 
distribution  of  a  word  for  magical  power  among 
various  peoples.  A  variety  of  native  terms  have 
frequently  been  introduced  into  the  literature 
of  the  subject  such  as  mana,^  manitou,^^  wak- 
onda,^  orenday^^  and  yek.^^  It  has  been  assumed 
in  some  peculiar  way,  which  is  not  made  explicit, 
that  the  presence  of  a  native  term  for  mysterious 
force  is  a  guarantee  of  its  primitive  and  funda- 
mental character.  Despite  the  mass  of  alleged 
linguistic  evidence  which  has  been  piled  up,  no 
conclusive  argument  can  be  based  directly  upon 
it.  Data  of  this  type  which  have  been  collected 
by  the  mana  theorists  show  equivocal  and  un- 
certain results.  The  accounts  given  are  full  of 
inconsistencies,    obscurities,    and    ambiguities. 

^  King,  The  development  of  religion,  p.  156. 

*2  Codrington,  The  Melanesians,  p.  119. 

^  Jones,  The  Algonkin  Manitou,  Journal  of  American 
Folk-Lore,  v.  18. 

^  Miss  Fletcher,  Wakonda,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  American 
Ethnology,  Bulletin,  v.  30,  pt.  2.  Handbook  of  American 
Indians. 

^  Hewitt,  Orenda  and  a  definition  of  rehgion,  American 
Anthropologist,  n.s.,  v.  4. 

46  Swanton,  Social  condition,  beHefs  and  Hnguistic  rela- 
tionships of  the  Thngit  Indians,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  American 
Ethnology,  26th  Annual  Report,  p.  451,  footnote. 


124  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

This  state  of  affairs  is,  of  course,  precisely  what 
we  should  expect,  because  a  theory  of  this  type 
does  not  lend  itself  to  linguistic  proof,  or,  indeed, 
to  historical  demonstration.  The  mana  dogma 
is,  yar  excellence,  a  psychological  one  and  is  to 
be  adequately  tested  only  by  reference  to  the 
psychical  constitution  of  man,  considered  in  the 
widest  sense:  the  question  therefore  arises  as 
to  whether  or  not  it  can  be  brought  into  har- 
monious relationship  with  more  general  prin- 
ciples and  laws.  If  it  be  found  repugnant  in  the 
light  of  these  considerations,  we  are  justified  in 
looking  upon  it  with  profound  distrust. 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  descriptive,  ethno- 
graphic monographs  afford  no  account  of  any 
people  whose  magico-religious  activities  do  not 
concern  themselves,  at  least  in  part,  with  spirits. 
If,  therefore,  a  pre-animistic  stage  in  the  de- 
velopment of  religion  has  existed,  it  must  have 
been  in  a  prehistoric  period  concerning  which 
we  have  no  direct  evidence  whatosever;  con- 
sequently views  with  respect  to  it  have  neces- 
sarily arisen  either  as  the  result  of  an  inference 
or  a  re-interpretation  of  data,  rather  than  by 
virtue  of  an  inductive  study  based  upon  avail- 
able facts.  There  is,  perhaps,  no  fatal  objection 
to  such  an  hypothetical  reconstruction  of  a  past 
era,  provided  there  be  exhaustive  indications 
possessing  a  high  degree  of  evidential  value, 


MAGICAL  POWER  125 

and  that  it  be  capable  of  assisting  to  explain 
or  clarify  the  present  status  of  the  ethnographic 
phenomena.  A  soulless  age,  however,  is  a  purely 
a  priori  construction  which,  rather  than  con- 
tributing to  definite  knowledge  of  the  rise  of 
magic  and  religion  and  the  complex  problems 
involved,  performs  the  role  of  an  obfuscating 
agency  leading  to  a  purely  gratuitous  mystifi- 
cation. 


CHAPTER  8 

THE    ANOMALOUS    POSITION    OF    EMANATION 
AND  THE  SPECIFIC  POWERS  AND  PROPER- 
TIES OF  PHYSICAL  BODIES 

Hobhouse^  does  not  attempt  to  distinguish 
between  magic  and  religion  on  the  usual  con- 
ventional grounds,  but  considers  that  they  are 
closely  interwoven  in  the  life  of  primitive  man 
whose  general  cosmic  outlook  involves  the  belief 
in  invisible  powers  and  agencies,  both  spiritual 
and  otherwise,  which  are  capable  of  being  in- 
fluenced by  him  and  used  for  his  own  purposes. 
The  widely-held  view,  therefore,  which  regards 
spirit  as  of  secondary  derivation  in  the  historical 
series,  is  not  susceptible  of  proof  or  justification.^ 

Marett  holds  that  the  direct  field  observer 
should  not  concern  himself  with  hypothetical 
distinctions,  but  should  classify  his  phenomena 
indifferently  under  the  general  heading  of  the 
magico-religious,  leaving  the  wider  question  of 

*  On  the  whole  Hobhouse  has  treated  this  obscure  and 
difficult  question  with  remarkable,  critical  acumen  and 
insight. 

^  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  evolution,  pt.  2,  p.  23. 
126 


EMANATION  12T 

the  criteria  of  differentiation  open  for  theoretical 
interpretation.^ 

The  great  bulk  of  theoretical  literature,  how- 
ever, is  pervaded  by  either  an  explicit  statement 
or  a  tacit  implication  that  we  are  confronted  by 
the  inevitable  alternative  of  supposing  that  either 
spirit  or  magical  power  is  the  fundamental  factor 
in  magico-religious  experience  and  that  a  tem- 
poral sequence  obtains  between  them.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  in  no  sense  true  that  these  opposed 
alternatives  exhaust  the  theoretical  possibilities 
of  the  situation  and  that  no  other  method  of 
approach  is  feasible.  Among  others,  the  little 
discussed  facts  of  emanation  together  with  the 
specific  powers  and  properties  of  physical  bodies 
militate  directly  against  the  acceptance  of  either 
of  these  views  and  lie,  as  it  were,  in  "no  man's 
land.'' 

Karutz  takes  an  iconoclastic  position  with 
reference  to  the  traditional  distinction  between 
magic  and  religion  and  argues  with  cogency  that 
a  large  number  of  phenomena  are  recalcitrant 
to  both  these  classificatory  rubrics.  He  points 
out  that  the  virtue  presumed  to  abide  in  various 
objects,  particularly  amulets  and  talismans,  is 
to  be  interpreted  as  due  neither  to  the  activity 
of  a  spirit  abiding  permanently  or  maintaining 
a  temporary  habitat  therein  or  working  through 

3  Marett,  Magic,  Hastings  Encyclopedia^  v.  8,  p.  248. 


128  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

the  thing,  nor  to  the  action  of  a  universally 
diffused  mana  which  manifests  itself  in  it,  but 
rather  to  impersonal,  physical  properties  and 
qualities  which  operate,  or  are  conceived  to 
operate,  by  means  of  emanation.^  In  this  con- 
nection he  argues  vigorously  against  the  concept 
of  mana  as  a  universal,  vague,  magical  power 
working  through  things^  and  states  that  the 
primitive  mind  did  not  attain  to  or  achieve  this 
abstraction  from  the  qualities,  properties,  emana- 
tions or  virtues  of  objects,  some  of  which  are 
observed  in  immediate  experience.  Concrete 
activities  and  potentialities  are  believed  to  exist 
in  things  but  not  an  universal  force  over  and 
above  them.  He  considers  that  the  ethno- 
graphical evidence  as  usually  presented,  involves 
a  profound  misunderstanding  of  this  whole  ques- 
tion, and  that,  specifically,  the  African  material 
shows  that  the  people  believe  in  and  deal  with  the 
particularized  qualities  and  virtues  of  things  rather 
than  with  magical  power  as  such  and  at  large.^ 

*Karutz,  Der  Emanismus,  Zdtschrift  fur  EthTiologie, 
1913,  pp.  559-560. 

^ "  Keine  Allegemeine  vage  Zauberkraft  tritt  in  die 
Dinge — das  orenda  der  Indianer  iind  das  mana  der  Melan- 
esier  sind  wohl  so  aufgefasst  vermutlich  mit  Unrecht, — 
Bondern  in  den  Dingen  liegt  spezifische  I^aft,  die  ihnen 
entstromt  und  sich  anderen  iibertriigt."     Ibid.,  p.  555. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  556.  Meier  has  also  stated  that  the  coast 
inhabitants  of  the  Gazelle  peninsula  neither  beheve  in  an 


EMANATION  129 

Kunz  has  recorded  a  large  number  of  phe- 
nomena reflecting  beliefs  in  the  physical  emana- 
tions and  virtues  of  objects  which  are  worthy 
of  being  considered  as  sui  generis. 

"The  electric  or  magnetic  gems,  tourmaline,  amber, 
and  loadstone,  possess  not  only  great  scientific  interest, 
but  demonstrate  the  fact  that  a  certain  energy  really  does 
proceed  from  some  of  these  fair,  ornamental  objects,  an 
energy  that  produces  a  positive  action  from  without 
upon  the  human  body.  This  may  well  serve  to  make  us 
less  resolutely  skeptical  as  to  the  possible  presence  in 
gem-stones  of  some  other  forms  of  emanation  not  as  yet 
susceptible  of  scientific  determination."  ' 

The  belief  in  the  therapeutic  and  prophylactic 
virtues  of  amber  was  widely  prevalent  in  the 
ancient  and  medieval  worlds,  its  electrical  prop- 
erty being  said  to  have  been  first  discovered  by 
Thales  about"  600  B.C.  Buckland  points  out 
its  enormous  significance  in  prehistoric  commerce 
and  states  that  Boyd-Dawkins  has  traced  three 
trade  routes  of  the  Etruscans,  afterwards  fol- 
lowed by  the  Romans,  in  search  of  it.^  An 
interesting  esoteric  account  of  its  efl&cacy  as  due 
to  emanations  is  given  by  King: 

imiversal  force  nor  do  they  have  a  word  for  it.  Meier, 
Die  Zauberei  bei  dem  Kustenbewohnern  der  Gazelle- 
Halbinsel,  Neupommern,  Siidsee,  Anthropos,  v.  8,  p.  8. 

^  Kunz,  The  magic  of  jewels  and  charms,  p.  51. 

8  Buckland,  Necklaces  in  relation  to  prehistoric  com- 
merce, The  Antiquary,  v.  32,  p.  8. 
10 


130  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

"That  the  wearing  of  an  amber  necklace  will  keep  off 
the  attacks  of  erysipelas  in  a  person  subject  to  them  has 
been  proved  by  repeated  experiments  beyond  the  possi- 
bihty  of  doubt.  Its  action  here  cannot  be  explained;  but 
its  eflBcacy  in  defence  of  the  throat  against  chills  is  evi- 
dently due  to  its  extreme  warmth  when  in  contact  with 
the  skin  and  the  circle  of  electricity  so  maintained."  ^ 

Anselmus  De  Boot,  court  physician  to  Ru- 
dolph II.  of  Germany,  in  1609  expressed  an 
opinion  which  was  characteristic  of  his  time. 

"That  gems  or  stones,  when  applied  to  the  body,  exert 
an  action  upon  it,  is  so  well  proven  by  many  persons, 
that  any  one  who  doubts  this  must  be  called  over-bold. 
We  have  proof  of  this  power  in  the  carnelian,  the  hematite, 
and  the  jasper,  all  of  which  when  applied,  check  hemor- 
rhage." " 

Kunz  asserts  that  at  one  time  belief  in  the 
therapeutic  properties  of  precious  stones  was 
universal  among  all  those  to  whom  gems  were 
known.i^  Not  only  were  they  commonly  worn 
or  applied  for  the  purpose  of  securing  their 
benefits,  virtues,  and  protection,  but  were  fre- 
quently ingested.  This  was  accomplished  after 
the  following  fashion.  A  number  of  stones  were 
ground  up,  mixed  with  honey  or  some  other 
sweet  substance,  and  administered  to  the  patient 
in  the  shape  of  an  electuary.     Arnobios'  ''  Tesoro 

» King,  Natural  history  of  precious  stones,  p.  334. 

10  Cited  by  Kunz,  Curious  lore  of  precious  stones,  p.  6. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  369. 


EMANATION  131 

delle  Gioie"  contains  a  recipe  for  "the  most 
noble  electuary  of  jacinth,"  comprising  jacinth, 
emerald,  sapphire,  topaz,  garnet,  pearl,  ruby, 
white  and  red  coral,  amber,  many  animal  and 
mineral  substances,  in  all  thirty-four  ingredi- 
ents.^ 

During  the  final  illness  of  Pope  Clement  VII, 
in  1534,  his  physicians  administered  powders 
composed  of  precious  stones.  In  fourteen  days 
his  Holiness  ingested  forty  thousand  ducats' 
worth  of  these  gems  including  a  diamond, — a 
procedure  which,  according  to  Kunz,  was  suffi- 
cient to  cause  the  transportation  of  the  Pope  to 
another  and  better  world  without  the  ancillary 
intermediation  of  his  disease.^^ 

Nona  Lebour  states  that  among  the  Scottish 
Highlanders  various  cure-stones  are  considered 
as  precious  heirlooms  and  are  kept  carefully 
wrapped  up  in  the  choicest  and  most  expensive 
cloths.  In  the  event  of  illness  in  man  or  cattle, 
the  stone  is  dipped  in  water  which  is  given  to 
the  sufferer  to  drink.^* 

In  medieval  Europe  the  loadstone,  among 
other  stones,  was  widely  famed  for  its  therapeutic 

"  Cited  by  Kunz,  Ibid.,  p.  372. 

13  Ibid.,  p.  379. 

1^  Lebour,  White  quartz  pebbles  and  their  archaeological 
significance,  Dumfriesshire  and  Galloway  Natural  History 
and  Antiquarian  Society,  Transactions  and  Journal  of 
Proceedings,  1913-14,  ser.  3,  v.  2,  p.  131. 


132  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

virtues.  Trotula,  the  first  of  the  female  physi- 
cians of  the  School  of  Salerno,  wrote  a  treatise  on 
female  diseases  in  which  she  recommends  its 
employment  in  child  birth.  She  prescribes  that 
the  woman  hold  the  stone  in  the  right  hand, 
but  adds  that  its  efficacy  is  increased  by  the 
wearing  of  a  coral  necklace.  Francisco  Piemon- 
tese,  a  teacher  in  Naples  about  1340,  also  advises 
the  use  of  the  loadstone  in  these  cases,  but  sug- 
gests, in  addition,  that  it  be  strewn  with  the 
ashes  obtained  by  burning  the  hoof  of  an  ass  or 
a  horse. ^^ 

In  Belgium  during  the  seventeenth  century, 
ruptures  were  treated  as  follows:  a  dose  of  iron 
filings  was  given  to  the  patient,  and  a  plaster, 
made  of  crushed  loadstone,  was  applied  to  the 
affected  part.  By  this  means  a  cure  was  said 
to  be  accomplished  in  the  space  of  eight  days. 
It  is  probable  that  the  plaster  was  believed  to 
draw  the  iron  filings  or  some  emanation  from 
them  through  the  diseased  tissues  toward  the 
surface.  ^^ 

"  Kunz,  The  magic  of  jewels  and  charms,  p.  67. 

"Ibid.,  p.  67.  Kunz  says:  "In  the  ninth  century 
Arabic  treatise,  translated  from  an  earlier  Syriac  text 
and  falsely  attributed  to  Aristotle,  a  number  of  fabulous 
stones  are  noted.  All  of  these  were  said  to  have  attrac- 
tive properties,  and  as  the  loadstone  attracted  iron,  they 
attracted  various  substances,  each  having  its  special 
affinity."    Ibid.,  p.  69. 


EMANATION  133 

Various  stone  implements  found  in  the  shell- 
heaps  of  Brazil  are  called,  in  the  native  languages, 
''lightning-stones,"  "stars  fallen  from  heaven," 
"stones  hurled  by  the  thunder,"  and  "axe- 
stones,"  and  are  believed  to  possess  electrical 
properties.  They  are  highly  prized  by  gold- 
seekers  who  believe  that,  by  attraction,  they 
show  the  presence  of  gold  beneath  the  surface.^^ 

Among  many  peoples,  at  the  present  time, 
stone  implements  are  believed  to  have  fallen 
from  the  sky  and  are  associated  in  their  minds 
with  the  phenomena  of  lightning.  Sven  Nilsson 
states  that,  among  the  primitive  inhabitants  of 
Scandinavia,  arrow-heads  and  stone-axes  are  sup- 
posed to  afford  protection  against  lightning.  In 
certain  eruptive  diseases  of  children,  the  imple- 
ment is  struck  with  a  piece  of  steel  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  sparks  fall  upon  the  child's 
head.^8 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  quartz  pebbles 
when  struck  together  give  out  a  bright  spark.^^ 
The  very  widespread  use  of  these  stones  for 
therapeutic,  and  other  magico-religious,  purposes 

"  Ibid.,  p.  109. 

18  Nilsson,  The  primitive  inhabitants  of  Scandinavia, 
p.  199. 

"  Lebour,  White  quartz  pebbles  and  their  archaeological 
significance,  Dumfriesshire  and  Galloway  Natural  History 
and  Antiquarian  Society,  Transactions  and  Journal  of 
Proceedings,  1913-14,  ser.  3,  v.  2,  p.  121. 


134  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

is,  at  least  in  many  cases,  possibly  bound  up  with 
the  fact  that  they  possess  this  property.  Nona 
Lebour  and  Smith  give  testimony  to  this  effect 
in  their  explorations  of  prehistoric  cairns.  When 
these  chambers  were  excavated  large  numbers  of 
quartz  pebbles  which  had  been  buried  with  the 
dead  were  discovered.  Nona  Lebour  points  out 
that  in  burials  in  Argyleshire  and  elsewhere, 
flintflakes  were  often  found  associated  with 
quartz  pebbles.^^  Mitchell  states  that,  upon 
opening  a  cairn  at  Achnacree,  a  row  of  large 
quartz  pebbles  was  revealed  in  a  dark  chamber 
which  shone  as  though  illuminated.  In  1865 
Canon  Greenwell  excavated  a  large  chambered 
cairn  near  Kilmarten  and  found  a  great  number 
of  broken  quartz  pebbles  and  several  fragments 
of  flint.2^  Facts  of  this  type  would  seem  to 
suggest  that  the  magico-religious  significance  of 
these  objects  may  also  have  been  associated  with 
the  phenomena  of  luminescence. 

Illustrations  of  the  type  previously  cited  might 
be  multiplied  indefinitely.  It  is  sufficient,  how- 
ever, to  call  attention  to  their  very  widespread 
existence  and  importance.  The  phenomena  of 
phosphorescence,  fluorescence,  triboluminescence 

20  Ibid.,  pp.  124,  126. 

"  Mitchell,  On  white  pebbles  in  connection  with  Pagan 
and  Christian  burials,  Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  Antiqui- 
ties of  Scotland,  1883-84,  n.s.,  v.  6,  pp.  286-287. 


EMANATION  135 

and  thermoluminescence,  together  with  the  elec- 
trical, magnetic  and  physical  properties  of  vari- 
ous objects  have  been,  as  we  have  suggested, 
greatly  neglected  in  the  literature  of  magic  and 
religion, — indeed,  the  great  bulk  of  theoretical 
works  have  failed  to  incorporate  them  at  all. 
By  calling  attention  in  the  preceding  citations 
to  these  phenomena  we  do  not  mean  to  imply 
that  they  possess  an  extraordinary  and  distinc- 
tive significance  in  contradistinction  to  spirits 
and  magical  powers,  nor  to  suggest  that  they 
are  peculiarly  fundamental,  primordial  or  neces- 
sary in  the  Hegelian  sense;  however,  it  is  perhaps 
unobjectionable  to  say  that  they  constitute  but 
one  of  the  multiple  sources  from  which  magico- 
religious  concepts  may  be  elaborated. 


CHAPTER  9 

THE    RELATIONS    OF    CAUSALITY    TO    MAGIC, 
RELIGION  AND  OTHER  PHASES  OF  CULTURE 

One  of  the  characteristic  features  of  the 
magico-religious  belief  is  the  presumption  that 
two  or  more  events,  objects,  processes  or  what- 
not, are  connected  together  causally.  It  is  a 
peculiar  fact,  however,  (to  which  sufficient  atten- 
tion has  not  been  given)  that  the  nature  of  the 
articulating  mechanism  may  not  rise  into  the  con- 
sciousness  of  the  person   who   holds   the  belief.^ 

^The  problems  brought  to  light  by  means  of  a  con- 
sideration of  the  articulating  mechanism  have  a  much 
wider  bearing  than  that  which  is  revealed  in  their  relation- 
ship to  the  phenomena  of  magic  and  rehgion.  While  it  is 
not  incumbent  upon  us  to  develop  adequately  these  more 
comprehensive  questions  which  are  involved  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  other  phases  of  culture,  reference  to  a  number 
of  impUcations  is,  nevertheless,  essential.  By  reason  of  the 
inextricably  tangled  web  of  human  aflfairs,  it  is  never  alto- 
gether possible  to  discuss  a  feature  or  segment  of  culture 
as  an  independent,  self-existent  entity;  indeed,  when, 
dominated  by  the  fetish  of  scientific  precision  and  exacti- 
tude, such  an  attempt  is  made,  artificial  results  inevitably 
ensue, — demarcations  and  classifications  of  experience, 
several  steps  removed  from  the  actual  diversity  of  reality, 
maintaining  their  several  outlines  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty. 

136 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTUEE  137 

Hence  an  insidious  difficulty  is  created  for  the 
investigator  either  in  the  field  or  study,  who  is 
constantly  liable  to  commit  the  almost  inevitable 
psychological  fallacy  of  supposing  that  the  be- 
liever is  more  or  less  thoroughly  cognizant  of  the 
nature  of  the  nexus,  and  hence  he  is  prone  to 
refer  to  it  as  a  spirit  or  magical  power,  or  to 
describe  it  frequently  in  terms  which  suggest  a 
conscious  process, — an  awareness  of  its  precise 
modus  operandi.^  Thus  Tylor  repeatedly  refers 
to  spirits  as  personified  causes.  Comte  supposes 
that  in  the  *' theological''  state  primitive  man 
believes  in  spiritual  beings  as  the  aetiological 
bases  of  all  phenomena.^  Nieuwenhuis  asserts 
that  unknown  causes  are  reified  and  personified, 
— illness,  for  example,  being  regarded  as  a  quasi- 

2  Although,  in  the  general  procedure  of  the  Geisteswis- 
senschaften,  hypotheses  are  not  subjected  to  tests  com- 
parable to  those  instituted  in  the  physical  sciences,  but 
depend  largely,  for  whatsoever  measure  of  respectability 
they  may  possess,  upon  purely  internal  evidence  and  an 
inner  consistency  involved  in  the  manner  of  their  own 
statement,  it  may,  however,  in  this  case,  be  possible  and 
desirable,  to  refer  speculations  regarding  spirits  and 
magical  power  to  the  intimate  psychological  attitude  of 
the  esoteric  believer.  The  question  then  arises  as  to  how 
far,  and  in  what  way,  the  mental  activities  of  this  much- 
neglected  individual  assume  the  form  of  a  conscious 
process. 

'  Comte,  The  positive  philosophy,  v.  1,  p.  2  and  follow- 
ing. 


138  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

material  entity  which  can  be  removed  from  the 
body.  Lightning,  thunder,  and  other  natural 
phenomena  in  a  similar  manner  are  considered 
as  entities  or  as  the  result  of  their  activities.^ 
The  great  group  of  pre-animists,  on  the  other 
hand,  supposes  that  mana  fills  in  the  gap  or  con- 
stitutes the  nexus  amid  the  infinite  variety  of 
phenomena. 

Among  a  large  group  of  writers,  a  logical  and 
epistemological  influence  has  dominated  inter- 
pretations of  the  complicated  web  of  relations 
with  which  the  world  is  permeated  as  it  is  swept 
within  the  domain  of  human  experience.  The 
fact  that  one  thing  is  connected  with  another  in 
the  mind  of  man  is  usually  explained  as  having 
been  effected  through  a  process  of  reasoning, 
inference  or  deliberative  observation, — in  other 
words,  the  attribution  of  dynamism  is  a  purely 
noetical  affair.  It  is  quite  impossible  to  trace 
out  with  the  least  hope  of  precision  the  enormous 
ramifications  of  this  mode  of  interpretation. 

Jevons,  for  example,  assumes  that  primitive 
man,  thrust  into  a  confused  environment  which 
presents  a  vast  number  of  potential  causes,  is 
more  or  less  constantly  engaged  in  the  search  for 
them.  In  the  prosecution  of  this  enterprise  he 
very  properly  employs  the  methods  of  the  induc- 

*  Nieuwenhuis,  Die  Wurzeln  des  Animismus,  Irder- 
nalionales  Archivfiir  Ethnographie,  Sup.  to  band  24,  p.  62. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  139 

tive  sciences,  viz.,  agreement,  difference  and  con- 
comitant variation,  but  in  some  manner,  not 
very  clearly  set  forth,  is  prone  to  hit  upon  those 
which  are  fictitious  and  illusory.^  Frazer  con- 
siders that  from  the  outset  primitive  man  is  on 
the  lookout  for  general  principles,  laws  and 
maxims  which  will  be  serviceable  in  bending  the 
decrees  of  nature  to  his  individual  purposes. 
In  this  manner  he  scrapes  up  a  great  hoard  of 
maxims,  some  of  them  golden,  which  form  the 
basis  of  science,  and  some  of  them  mere  dross, 
which  constitute  magic.  Regarding  the  latter 
he  comes  gradually  in  the  process  of  time  to 
recognize  that  he  has  been  fooling  himself,  that 
nature  cannot  be  coerced  according  to  the  tradi- 
tional prescriptions,  that  he  has  "taken  for 
causes  what  were  no  causes"  and  that  his  entire 
procedure  is  a  gigantic  folly .^ 

The  rationalization  and  intellectualization  of 
the  mental  processes  involved  in  causation  is 
by  no  means  confined  to  interpretations  of  the 
magico-religious  experience  of  primitive  peoples, 
but  is  quite  characteristic  of  the  philosophical 
treatment  of  the  subject  at  large.  Here  again 
the  psychological  fallacy  plays  an  exceedingly 
important  role, — a  point  of  view  which  arises 

^Jevons,  An  introduction  to  the  history  of  religion, 
ch.  IV. 

8  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  v.  1. 


140  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

as  the  result  of  abstract,  reflective  thought  fre- 
quently being  read  back  into  living  empirical 
situations  where  it  is  really  not  present  in  any 
sense. 

Closely  allied  to  the  logical  and  epistemo- 
logical  interest  in  causation  is  the  metaphysical, 
which  perhaps  departs  even  further  from  con- 
sideration of  the  direct  psychological  processes 
involved,  and  concerns  itself  largely  with  the 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  predicated  relations 
are  real  and  can  be  objectively  specified.  In  this 
manner  the  problem  presents  itself  to  Aristotle 
and  an  indefinite  number  of  his  successors.  The 
metaphysical  ground  or  the  principle  of  suflicient 
reason  accordingly  becomes  the  basis  upon  which 
their  speculations  repose.  Assuming  a  thing  to 
be,  the  question  arises  as  to  what  determinants 
are  responsible  for  its  present  status,  configura- 
tion, functions,  capacities  or  whatnot.  In  an- 
swer Aristotle  enumerates  the  four  celebrated 
causes, — the  final,  formal,  material  and  efficient.^ 

In  the  history  of  philosophy  the  catchword, 
"causality",  has  been  very  widely  used.  Be- 
wildering ambiguity,  however,  attaches  to  the 
term,  indeed,  so  scandalous  has  its  reckless  em- 
ployment become,  that,  in  recent  years,  an 
heroic  attempt  has  been  made  by  some  writers 
on  the  methodology  of  science  to  get  rid  of  it 

'  Aristotle,  Metaphysics,  Oxford  edition,  bk.  5,  ch.  2. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  141 

entirely.^  Ward,  who  does  not  entirely  sym- 
pathize with  this  purpose,  nevertheless  refers 
to  the  fact  that  for  all  practical  intents  a  certain 
type  of  science  has  eliminated  it  altogether. 

"How  completely  the  theory  of  mechanics  has  divested 
itself  of  the  conceptions  of  substance  and  cause,  in  assuming 
its  present  strictly  mathematical  form,  is  brought  home 
to  us  by  one  striking  fact:  the  fact,  I  mean,  that  mass 
and  force,  in  wh  ch  these  categories  are  supposed  to  be 
impUed,  are  but  dependent  variables  in  certain  general 
equations.  In  7  +  5  =  12  or  tan  45°  =  1,  we  cannot 
say  that  one  side  of  these  equations  is  more  than  the  other 
effect  or  consequent,  that  other  being  the  cause  or  essence 
whence  it  proceeds.  It  would  be  equally  arbitrary  to 
attempt  any  such  distinction  when  we  have  the  equations 
'^y  =  /^  or  7?is  =  ft"^  or  /s  =  my^.  In  these,  the  funda- 
mental equations  of  dynamics,  we  have  four  quantities 
so  connected,  that  if  any  three  are  known  the  fourth  can 
be  found.  In  this  respect  one  term  is  no  more  real  than 
another,  and  the  dependence  is  not  temporal  or  causal 
or  teleological,  but  mathematical  simply.  The  sole  use 
of  such  equations,  it  is  contended,  is  'to  describe  in  the 
exactest  and  simplest  manner  such  motions  as  occur  in 
nature'."  ^ 

Mach  says: 

8  Lewes  refers  to  attempts  to  abandon  the  use  of  the 
term  as  early  as  1864.  He  seems  to  feel  personally, 
however,  that  it  is  desirable  to  retain  it,  providing  its 
fetishistic  elements  be  extruded.     Aristotle,  ch.  4. 

8  Ward,  Naturalism  and  agnosticism,  v.  1.  p.  62.  Ward, 
however,  argues  for  the  usefulness  of  causaUty  on  general 
philosophic  grounds. 


142  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

"There  is  no  cause  nor  effect  in  nature;  nature  has 
but  an  individual  existence;  nature  simply  is".i° 

In  another  passage  he  remarks: 

"It  is  said  description  leaves  the  sense  of  causality 
unsatisfied.  In  fact,  many  imagine  they  understand 
motions  better  when  they  picture  to  themselves  pulling 
forces,  and  yet  the  accelerations,  the  facts,  accomplish 
more,  without  superfluous  additions.  I  hope  that  the 
science  of  the  future  will  discard  the  idea  of  cause  and 
effect,  as  being  formally  obscure;  and  in  my  feeling  that 
these  ideas  contain  a  strong  tincture  of  fetishism,  I  am 
certainly  not  alone  ".^^ 

In  popular  parlance  it  is  sometimes  said  that 
"gravity"  is  the  cause  of  the  movements  of  the 
heavenly  bodies.  This  anthropomorphic  shove, 
however,  is  not  incorporated  in  the  scientific 
statement  in  which,  indeed,  gravitation  appears 
merely  as  the  formulation  of  an  uniformity  or, 
in  mathematical  terms,  a  functionality, — a  con- 
stant relation  which  subsists  among  variables. 

In  a  similar  manner  the  ''law  of  nature"  or  a 
*' force"  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  cause, — a  sort  of 
benevolent  vis  a  tergo  which  contrives  a  specific 
denouement.  From  a  more  critical  standpoint, 
however,  a  constant  relation  is  all  that  is  implied. 
It  is  true,  of  course,  that  a  certain  washed-out, 
anthropomorphic  element  survives  in  imagery, 

*<*  Mach,  Science  of  mechanics,  p.  483. 

"  Mach,  Popular  scientific  lectures,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  253. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  143 

in  feels  of  effort,  and  in  symbolical  and  meta- 
phorical language,  all  of  which  are  involved  in 
thought  processes  concerning  themselves  with 
cause,  gravity,  law,  force,  etc.;  but  these  ele- 
ments of  transient  mental  existence, — these  ad- 
ventitious images, — are  completely  disregarded 
in  the  scientific  formulation. ^^ 

The  most  sweeping  condemnation  of  the  time 
honored  category,  however,  with  which  we  are 
familiar  is  that  of  Russell.  That  something  is 
radically  wrong,  whatever  it  be,  may  be  deduced 

^  Pillsbury,  however,  attempts  to  approach  the  entire 
problem  of  causality  through  the  door  of  introspective 
psychology.  "In  the  writer's  consciousness  the  sign  of 
the  causal  relation  takes  on  a  distinctly  anthropomorphic 
form.  There  is  invariably  a  marked  attribution  of  strain 
sensations  to  the  object,  which  is  represented  as  active, 
and  just  as  distinct  passivity  to  the  object  that  is  con- 
sidered the  effect.  With  the  ascription  of  the  effort  to 
the  causing  event,  there  also  go  actual  contractions  of  the 
muscles  of  the  body  that  would  be  involved  in  accomplish- 
ing some  purpose.  The  feeling  of  effort  is  not  altogether 
a  memory  image,  but  is  an  actual  sensation  from  real 
though  vain  contractions.  ...  (p.  410). 

In  short,  then,  the  anthropomorphic  feeling  of  strain, 
which  constitutes  an  essential  element  of  the  sign  of  causal- 
ity, will  be  called  up  by  the  first  of  two  succeeding  events, 
when  they  have  occurred  together  frequently,  and  when 
all  other  experiences  serve  to  confirm  the  assumption 
that  they  cannot  exist  apart."  ...  (p.  416).  Pills- 
bury,  The  psychological  nature  of  causality,  Philosophical 
Retdew,  1904. 


144  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

from  his  complaint  against  its  use  in  any  sense 
whatsoever.  He  contends,  indeed,  that  the  word 
*' cause"  is  so  inextricably  bound  up  with  mis- 
leading associations  as  to  render  desirable  its 
complete  extrusion  from  the  philosophical  vo- 
cabulary. ''All  philosophers,  of  every  school", 
he  says,  ''imagine  that  caustion  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  axioms  or  postulates  of  science,  yet, 
oddly  enough,  in  advanced  sciences  such  as 
gravitational  astronomy,  the  word  '  cause '  never 
occurs  ".^3  Examining  into  the  method  of  in- 
vestigation pursued  by  the  physical  sciences, 
particularly  in  so  far  as  they  state  their  objects 
in  mathematical  terms,  he  finds  that  the  concept 
is  not  employed  at  all  nor  does  it  find  embodi- 
ment or  asylum  in  the  algebraic  equation.  In 
the  illustration  of  his  opinion,  he  refers  to  the 
modern  scientific  treatment  of  the  phenomena 
of  gravitation,  typical  of  all  the  so-called  "ad- 
vanced sciences".  "In  the  motions  of  mutually 
gravitating  bodies,  there  is  nothing  that  can  be 
called  a  cause,  and  nothing  that  can  be  called  an 
effect;  there  is  merely  a  formula".^'* 

Russell's  quarrel  with  causality  centres  about 
the  fact  that  he  considers  the  essential  heuristic 
principles  of  science  to  be  concerned  with,  or 

^'  Russell,  On  the  notion  of  cause,  Aristotelian  Society, 
Proceedings,  1912-13,  p.  1. 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  13-14. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  145 

tend  toward,  a  mathematical  statement  of  their 
objects.  Tacitly  he  assumes  that  this  form  of 
presentation  constitutes  the  type  of  science  par 
excellence, — any  other  being  a  mere  derogation 
from  the  ideal.  Analysis  of  the  algebraic  equa- 
tion fails  to  reveal  a  cause,  hence  it  has  no  real 
existence.  True  it  stalks  abroad  in  many  places 
as  an  imposter,  but,  at  best,  can  maintain  itself 
only  by  reason  of  the  laxity  of  certain  intellectual 
disciplines  which  have  not  attained  to  the  dignity 
of  true  sciences  because  they  do  not  use  mathe- 
matics as  their  essential  organon.  Appropriate 
precision  and  exactitude,  however,  spell  the  doom 
of  '^  cause '\ 

Russell's  ideal  extrusion  of  this  troublesome 
concept  is  far  from  concrete  enactment  in  the 
world  of  human  affairs.  We  have  not  yet  at- 
tained to  that  stage  of  Olympian  detachment  in 
which  we  can  formulate  an  equation  for  a 
political  change,  an  eccentricity  of  fashion  or  a 
religious  ceremony.  Even  were  such  a  pro- 
cedure achieved,  other  types  of  statement  deal- 
ing with  the  same  subject  matter  would  still 
maintain  themselves  or  unfold  anew  according 
to  traditional  prescriptions. 

We   are  quite   unjustiiaably   wont   to   think 

of  anthropomorphic  elements,  including  those 

bound  up  with  causality,  as  applying  exclusively 

to  the  religion  of   primitive   peoples,   indeed,' 

11 


146  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

attempts  have  been  made  to  show  that  the 
evolution  of  culture,  particularly  so  far  as  it 
manifests  itself  in  the  sciences,  involves  a  gradual 
historical  diminution  of  them.  In  this  spirit 
Fiske  characterized  the  development  of  science 
as  a  progressive  ^'de-anthropomorphization" 
and  Comte  supposed  that  the  evolution  of  so- 
ciety involves  the  continuous  elimination  of 
''fetishistic"  elements. 

Comte  set  forth  his  views  in  the  celebrated 
doctrine  of  three  stages.  In  the  first  or  theo- 
logical state,  man  believes  all  phenomena  to  be 
produced  by  the  action  of  supernatural  beings; 
in  the  second  or  metaphysical,  abstract  forces, 
entities,  or  personified  abstractions  take  the  place 
of  spirits  as  aetiological  bases;  in  the  final  or 
positivistic,  the  mind  directs  itself  to  the  study 
of  laws  which  are  but  generalizations  of  the 
invariable  relations  of  succession  and  resem- 
blance among  phenomena.^^ 

This  view  of  the  final  elimination  of  fetish- 
istic  elements  cannot  be  regarded,  however,  as 
a  satisfactory  generalization  based  upon  his- 
torical facts.  Religious,  theological,  metaphys- 
ical, magical,  superstitious,  playful,  and  poetic 
interpretations,  involving  various  aspects  of 
anthropomorphism,  maintain  themselves  at  the 
present  time  in  our  own  culture  side  by  side  with 

"  CJomte,  The  positive  philosophy,  v.  1,  p.  2. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  147 

those   of  a   purely  rationalistic   or  positivistic 
character.     No    theoretical    argumentation    is 
necessary  to  support  this  statement,  coniBirma- 
tions  of  which  lie  on  every  hand.     While  it  may 
be  admitted  that  causes  no  longer  play  a  part 
in  the  particular  enterprises  carried  on  by  the 
mathematico-physical  sciences,  it  is,  neverthe- 
less, equally  patent  that  they  are  extensively 
used  in  many  diverse  types  of  mental  operations, 
including  those  relating  to  commonplace  prob- 
lems growing  out  of  the  exigencies  of  daily  life: 
indeed,    many   intellectual    undertakings    com- 
monly concern  themselves  with  explanation, — a 
process  which,  in  its  widest  significance,  connotes 
the  setting  forth  of  a  series  of  determining  condi- 
tions out  of  which  a  given  phenomenon  is  con- 
ceived to  have   arisen.     Thus   certain  factors 
antecedent  to,  and  considered  as  relevant  to,  the 
event  or  fact  which  is  the  object  of  interest,  are 
at  the  same  time  held  to  stand  in  the  relation  of 
dynamic  agency  to  it, — in  other  words,  to  pro- 
duce  or   bring   it   into   being.     This   mode   of 
envisagement  is,  indeed,  very  widespread  and  of 
a  rough  and  ready  practical  utility.     We  do 
not  concern  ourselves  with  the  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  specific  causal  relations,  predi- 
cated by  the  mind,  possess  objective  reference  or 
with  the  justifiability  of  the  employment  of  the 
concept  of  causality  as  an  appropriate  tool  in 


148  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

the  process  of  scientific  investigation,  but  rather 
with  the  articulating  mechanism  considered 
purely  in  the  light  of  an  ethnographic  fact. 
In  this  respect  we  shall  consider  its  saturation 
with  human  values, — its  emotional  and  orectic, 
as  well  as  gnostic,  character. 

One  of  the  essential  difiiculties  involved,  which 
is  also  the  pregnant  source  of  great  confusion,  is 
the  fact  that  the  use  of  the  term  ''causality" 
ordinarily  involves  an  implicit  and  thoroughly 
suppressed  use  of  the  comparative  method, — a 
single  term  being  surreptitiously  used  to  desig- 
nate groups  of  phenomena  which  are  essentially 
different  and,  indeed,  profoundly  non-homo- 
geneous. We  have  previously  referred  to  the 
fact  that  this  method  commonly  makes  use  of  a 
single  principle  as  a  basis  of  comparison,  namely, 
the  similarity  of  outer  form.  In  some  detail 
we  have  passed  criticism  upon  the  uncontrolled 
employment  of  this  criterion  and  it  is,  there- 
fore, not  necessary  to  refer  to  these  arguments 
again. 

Despite  the  fact,  however,  that  purely  morpho- 
logical resemblance  cannot  be  regarded  as  the 
fundamentum  comparationis  applicable  at  all 
times,  it  continues,  nevertheless,  to  be  widely 
used  in  this  manner.  The  utilization  of  the 
form  criterion  still  constitutes  the  essential  fea- 
ture of  the  comparative  method  and  its  employ- 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  149 

ment  in  a  surreptitious  and  implicit  manner  in 
other  directions  is  enormously  more  widespread 
than  is  apparent.  A  large  number  of  time 
honored  concepts,  for  example,  continue  to  be 
interpreted  in  this  more  or  less  anachronistic 
manner,  indeed,  it  is  still  widely  assumed  that 
they  are  the  same  everywhere,  comprising,  as  it 
were,  a  sort  of  screen  through  which  the  world 
is  envisaged.  Indeed  the  considerations  here 
set  forth  might  be  regarded  as  an  indictment 
against  many  types  of  philosophic  method  which 
are  wont  to  deal  with  their  objects  as  such  and 
at  large,  free  from  the  exigencies  of  historical 
individuality  and  from  whatsoever  measure  of 
variation  they  may  exhibit  when  set  in  different 
temporal  periods  and  dramatic  stages.  Thus 
the  ideas  of  the  ''sacred ",^^  a  future  life,  mana, 

16  Durkheim  considers  the  idea  of  the  sacred  to  con- 
stitute the  specific  differentia  of  religion.  One  of  the 
essential  diflSculties  involved  here,  however,  is  that  the 
psychological  content  of  the  concept  exhibits  considerable 
variation  when  it  appears  in  different  settings, — ^in  other 
words,  the  mental  phenomena  to  which  the  catchword 
is  appUed,  are  essentially  heterogeneous  and  non-com- 
parable. This  point  is  brought  out  clearly  in  Golden- 
weiser's  critique.  "If  any  religion  is  analyzed  in  its 
concrete  cultural  setting,  one  finds  that  the  domain  of  the 
sacred  does  not  represent  a  psychologically  homogeneous 
phenomenon.  In  Australia,  for  instance,  the  sacredness 
of  the  magical  act  and  of  the  magician  is  not  that  of  the 


150  RELIGION  AND   CULTURE 

causality  and  so  on,  are  frequently  discussed  as 
morphological  constants  which,  appearing  in  dif- 
ferent times  and  places  and  under  varying  cir- 
cumstances, are  nevertheless  homogeneous  and 
analogous. 

So  far  as  we  are  aware,  there  has  been  no  dis- 
cussion of  certain  non-comparable  elements  of 
the  "concept  of  causality"  in  various  areas, 
different  cultural  levels,  and  diverse  mental 
processes.  It  is  perhaps  safe  to  conjecture  that, 
behind  the  bewildering  confusion  which  com- 
monly attends  upon  the  philosophical  and  scien- 
tific treatment  of  the  term,  is  the  vague  thought 
hovering  in  the  background,  that,  however 
elusive  it  be,  there  still  exists  somehow  a  typical 
idea  with  a  more  or  less  definite  structure  or  form. 
This  is  tantamount,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  an 
implicit  leaning  upon  the  comparative  method. 

totem;  nor  the  sacredness  of  the  menstrual  taboos  that 
of  the  unclean  animals,  not  eaten  because  possessed  by 
evil  spirits.  Similarly,  in  our  own  society,  the  sacredness 
of  the  national  flag  is  not  that  of  the  law,  nor  the  sacred- 
ness of  the  family  name  that  of  the  college  pin  or  banner, 
nor  the  sacredness  of  the  Church  to  which  one  belongs 
that  of  one  to  which  he  does  not  belong.  The  sacred, 
then,  is  an  aggregate  as  psychologically  heterogeneous  as  is 
the  profane."  Goldenweiser,  Rehgion  and  society:  a 
critique  of  Emile  Durkheim's  theory  of  the  origin  and 
nature  of  rehgion,  Journal  oj  Philosophy,  Psychology  and 
Scientific  Methods,  1917,  v.  14,  p.  118. 


CAUSALITY  AND  CULTURE  151 

In  philosophy  a  further  smothering  of  the  diverse 
mental  processes  involved  commonly  takes  place 
by  means  of  giving  the  entire  investigation  an 
ontological  twist, — that  is,  raising  the  question 
as  to  whether  or  not  predicated  relations  have 
objective  bases.  This  metaphysical  morass  per- 
forms the  role  of  a  common  denominator,  the 
numerators  comprising  causal  relations  of  all 
types  and,  indeed,  various  complexes  of  elements 
whose  only  title  to  recognition  consists  in  the 
fact  that  they  hang  together  in  clusters. 

The  universality  and  sameness,  usually  be- 
lieved to  attach  to  the  concept  of  cause  applies, 
however,  only  to  a  single  morphological  feature, 
namely,  that  between  two  or  more  elements,  a 
dynamic  relationship  is  predicated.  Reference 
to  this  common  property  involves  disregard  of 
the  historical  processes  which  have  led  to  a 
specific  predication,  the  immediate  psychological 
situation  in  which  the  connection  has,  as  it  were, 
a  temporary  habitat,  and  also  the  more  general 
psychic  setting  or  cultural  milieu. 

Exclusive  interest  in  this  morphological  con- 
stant, which  in  different  stages  is  really  set 
within  a  complex  of  variable  elements,  may  lead 
to  peculiar  results,  among  which  may  be  men- 
tioned particularly  the  attempt  to  draw  an 
analogy  between  science  and  magic,  which  fre- 
quently finds  issue  in  the  statement  that  magic 


152  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

is  a  primitive  science."  Regarded  from  a  struc- 
tural point  of  view,  both  disciplines  involve 
webs  of  causes,  the  elements  comprising  each 
being  ideally  articulated, — in  other  words,  the 
fundamentum  comparationis  is  the  concept  of 
causahty.  Independent  of  this  alleged  simil- 
arity, however,  important  differences  exist, — the 
energetic  genuflections  of  an  Australian  aborigine 
in  the  performance  of  an  Intichiuma  ceremony 
for  the  production  of  plants  and  animals  being 
not  altogether  comparable  to  modern  physical 
experiments, — indeed,  the  comparison  of  science 
with  magic  on  the  basis  previously  indicated,  is 
perhaps  no  more  happy  than  that  of  the  vault  of 
the  heavens  with  a  man's  skull  on  the  basis  of 
the  morphological  feature  of  rotundity. 

1'  See  especially  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  pt.  1,  v.  1, 
p.  220;  The  origin  of  totemism,  Fortnightly  Review,  1899, 
n.s.,  V.  65:  Tylor,  Primitive  culture:  Jevons,  An  intro- 
duction to  the  history  of  reUgion:  Nieuwenhuis,  Die 
Wurzeln  des  Animismus,  1917,  Internationales  Archiv  fur 
Ethnographie,  Sup.  to  hand  24'  Nieuwenhuis,  Die  Veran- 
lagung  der  malaiischen  Volker  des  Ost-Indischen  Archipela 
II,  Internationales  Archiv  filr  Ethnographie,  1915-16,  v. 
22-23. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   APPLICATION   OF   THE   CONCEPT   OF 
CONVERGENCE   IN   THE   INTERPRE- 
TATION OF  CAUSALITY.    UNCON- 
SCIOUS  MENTAL   PROCESSES 

We  may  now  refer  directly  to  the  convergence 
of  mental  processes  which  lead  to  the  attribution 
or  predication  of  a  dynamic  relationship  between 
two  or  more  elements.  We  have  previously 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  large  number 
of  theories  regard  logical  processes  as  furnishing 
the  exclusive  medium  in  which  causal  relations 
are  generated.  The  execution  of  this  type  of 
interpretation  involves  complete  disregard  of  the 
agglutinative  influence  which  emotional  and 
affectivistic  elements  exercise  in  the  architecture 
of  many  types  of  relations,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
tends  almost  inevitably  toward  the  presumption 
that  the  relevant  mental  states  are  more  or  less 
conscious  and  rational.  We  may,  however,  look 
at  this  entire  question  from  a  much  more  elastic 
point  of  view  and  consider  first  unconscious,  and 
then  other  psychological  conditions  which  may 
be  involved. 

153 


154  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

The  supposition  that  people  are  commonly 
wont  to  assume  that  two  events  (objects,  pro- 
cesses or  whatnot),  a  and  6,  are,  or  may  be 
connected  dynamically  and,  at  the  same  time, 
do  not  present  to  themselves  the  mode  and 
manner  of  the  conjunction,  seems  perhaps  some- 
what absurd.  Nevertheless,  that  such  a  state 
of  affairs  can,  and  frequently  does,  exist,  can  be 
demonstrated  beyond  peradventure  in  the  life 
of  both  primitive  and  civilized  man.  A  few 
illustrations  will  perhaps  serve  to  make  this 
matter  clear. 

Dresslar,^  of  the  University  of  California, 
collected  a  considerable  number  of  present  day 
superstitions  from  875  persons  between  the  ages 
of  16  and  28  years  during  the  period  of  their 
professional  training  for  the  work  of  teaching. 
Slips  of  paper  were  passed  out  and  the  student 
requested  to  record  one  superstition  on  each, 
together  with  his  attitude  toward  it  expressed 
in  terms  of  belief,  partial  belief  or  non-belief. 
The  data  were  arranged  in  classified  lists 
which  serve  to  give  a  fairly  accurate  picture  of 
a  typical  modern  attitude  toward  these  matters. 
The  following  type  of  results  appears  in  the 
tables. 

^  Dreselar,  Superstition  and  education,  pp.  9-38. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY 


155 


No 
Belief 

Partial 
Belief 

Full 
Belief 

8 

1 

1 

3 

4 

2 

15 

7 

3 

7 

3 

3 

29 

24 

3 

43 

38 

6 

5 

3 

8 

1 

2 

2 

3 

4 

7 

11 

4 

7 

3 

3 

Totals 


If  you  spill  salt,  you'll  have 
bad  luck 

If  you  spill  salt,  you'U  surely 
have  bad  luck  unless  you 
throw  some  over  your  shoul- 
der   

It  is  a  sign  of  a  quarrel  to  spill 
salt 

To  help  yourseK  to  bread  or 
other  food  when  you  have 
some  on  your  plate  is  a  sign 
that  some  one  is  coming 
hungry 

If  you  see  the  moon  over  your 
left  shoulder  for  the  first 
time,  you  will  have  bad  luck . 

If  you  see  the  new  moon  over 
your  right  shoulder,  it  is 
good  luck 

Potatoes  planted  in  the  dark 
of  the  moon  will  give  a  good 
crop 

If  you  plant  potatoes  in  the 
dark  of  the  moon,  they  will 
all  go  to  tops 

If  you  plant  your  potatoes  in 
the  hght  of  the  moon,  you 
will  have  a  good  crop 

If  a  strange  cat  comes  to  your 
house,  it  will  bring  good  luck 

The  howhng  of  a  dog  is  the 
sign  of  death 


10 

9 
25 

13 

56 
87 
16 


9 
22 
13 


156 


RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 


No 
Belief 

Partial 
Belief 

Full 
Belief 

23 

21 

7 

8 

6 

4 

46 

27 

6 

Totali 


To  find  a  four-leaved  clover 
will  bring  good  luck 

If  a  dog  howls  at  night,  some 
one  is  dying 

If  a  rooster  crows  before  the 
front  door,  you  will  have 
company 


51 
18 

79 


In  analyzing  his  results,  Dresslar  finds,  on  the 
whole,  a  surprisingly  large  percentage  of  beliefs. 

"We  have  7,176  separate  confessions  to  reckon  with. 
Of  these  3,951  are  frank  expressions  of  disbelief,  2,132  of 
partial  behef,  and  1,093  of  full  belief.  Combining  those 
of  partial  belief,  we  have  3,225  confessions  of  belief  as 
against  the  3,951  of  disbelief,  or  55.1  per  cent,  of  dis- 
beUef  to  44.9  per  cent,  of  belief.  It  must  be  steadily 
held  in  mind  that  these  figures  do  not  refer  to  persons, 
but  to  the  combined  confessions  made  on  different  groups 
of  the  whole  of  the  superstitions  listed.  In  other  words, 
the  attitude  of  tliis  very  select  and  uniform  class  of  people 
toward  their  own  superstitions  can  be  very  nearly  repre- 
sented by  saying  that  55.1  per  cent,  of  the  superstitions 
which  they  hold  in  mind  are  not  believed  in,  while  44.9 
per  cent,  are  believed  in.  These  figures  seem  so  extra- 
ordinary that  one  would  be  inclined  to  doubt  their  correct- 
ness were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  every  suggested  precau- 
tion has  been  taken  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  error.  .  .  . 
*If  then,'  one  is  impelled  to  inquire,  'this  amount  of  super- 
stitious faith  exists  amongst  individuals  of  such  a  select 
class,  what  must  be  the  mental  condition  in  this  regard 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         157 

of  those  who  have  not  equal  opportunities  for  developing 
those  reactions  which  tend  toward  arousing  disbehef  in 
the  unreasonable?'  "^ 

In  cases  of  the  type  cited  by  Dresslar,  neither 
the  character  of  the  connecting  link  nor  the 
manner  of  the  achievement  of  the  result  appears 
in  the  tables.  The  state  of  affairs  here  revealed 
is  very  common  but  is  apt  to  be  entirely  neglected 
in  descriptions  of  magical  beliefs.  The  presenta- 
tion of  these  data  in  a  cold  and  formal  manner, 
however,  serves  admirably  to  bring  this  con- 
sideration to  light. 

Among  the  native  races  of  the  Malay  Penin- 
sula there  is  a  peculiar  and  characteristic  associa- 
tion between  various  forms  of  geometrical  art 
and  diseases.  Patterns  are  inscribed  on  the 
combs  worn  by  the  women  and  the  quivers  and 
blow-pipes  carried  by  the  men.  The  designs  are 
highly  elaborated  and  each  of  them  is  associated 
in  the  minds  of  the  people  with  a  certain  disease, 
— the  general  notion  being  that  a  particular 
representation  serves  as  an  efficient  prophylactic 
against  a  specific  ailment.  The  development  of 
this  concept  has  proceeded  to  great  lengths  in 
this  area,  Skeat  and  Blagden  recording  one 
hundred   and   forty   patterns.^      When   two   or 

>  Ibid.,  pp.  146-147. 

'Skeat  and  Blagden,  Pagan  races  of  the  Malay 
Peninsula,  v.  1,  p.  406. 


158  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

more  women  proceed  on  a  journey,  they  carry 
a  number  of  combs  with  them,  the  belief  being 
that  the  entire  party  will  be  protected."* 

Designs  are  also  frequently  utilized  for  the 
accomplishment  of  other  purposes.  A  pattern 
on  a  bamboo  which  had  remained  in  a  family  for 
three  generations  was  regarded  as  capable  of 
driving  away  demons  seeking  shelter  on  cold 
nights;^  another  was  designed  to  facilitate  the 
capture  of  fish  and  protect  the  angler;^  another 
to  protect  the  growing  crops  from  injury  by 
animals;^  the  object  of  a  set  of  quiver  patterns 
was  to  bring  down  various  species  of  monkeys, 
apes,  and  other  small  mammals, — a  particularly 
effective  one  being  described  as  possessing  much 
magical  virtue,  "kom  jasa'',  (slayer  of  many 
victims)  .8 

We  are  not  prepared  to  hazard  generalized 
speculations  as  to  the  interesting  correlation  of 
forms  of  artistic  representation  with  magical  and 
religious  purposes,  and  particularly  the  extra- 
ordinary development  which  it  has  attained  in 
this  area.  It  is,  however,  extremely  probable, 
in   cases   of   this   type,    that   the   articulating 

« Ibid.,  V.  1,  p.  422. 
6  Ibid.,  V.  1,  p.  484. 
6  Ibid.,  V.  1,  p.  489. 
'  Ibid.,  V.  1,  p.  490. 
8  Ibid.,  V.  1,  pp.  417-418. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         159 

mechanism  does  not  rise  into  the  consciousness 
of  the  people.  The  pattern  is  employed  for  the 
purpose  of  achieving  a  definite  result,  but  the 
native  would  probably  be  unable  to  tell  in  what 
manner  it  is  encompassed. 

The  Eskimo  about  Behring  Strait  have  bor- 
rowed the  use  of  masks  as  well  as  a  semi-totemic 
organization  from  their  neighbors  of  the  north- 
west coast.  Nelson  states  that  the  object  of 
these  faces,  utilized  in  their  ceremonies,  is  to 
propitiate  and  honor  animals  or  beings  repre- 
sented by  them,  to  bring  about  plenty  of  game, 
and  to  ward  off  evil  influences.^  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  use  of  masks  is  a  foreignly  intro- 
duced element,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  people 
are  conscious  of  the  manner  in  which  the  repre- 
sentation serves  to  achieve  its  purpose,  or  that 
this  custom  has  arisen  as  the  result  of  a  ration- 
alistic search  for  an  appropriate  means  to  the 
accomplishment  of  desirable  ends. 

The  delimitation  of  magical  possibilities  within 
the  confines  of  restricted  groups  of  individuals  in 
Australia  furnishes  another  striking  case  in  point. 
The  social  organization  has  been  projected  into 
the  cosmos,  and  animals,  plants,  heavenly  bodies, 

9  Nelson,  The  Eskimo  about  Behring  Strait,  U.  S. 
Bureau  of  American  Ethnology,  Annual  Report,  v.  18, 
pt.  1,  pp.  358-359,  394-395. 


160  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

and   inanimate   objects   are   swept   within   its 
peculiar  classifications.     Howitt  says: 

"The  whole  universe,  including  mankind,  was  ap- 
parently divided  between  the  classes.  Therefore  the  list 
of  sub-totems  might  be  extended  indefinitely.  It  appears 
that  a  man  speaks  of  some  being  'nearer  to  him'  than 
others.  I  am  unable  to  ascertain  the  precise  meaning  of 
this  expression.  When  pressed  upon  this  question,  a 
black  would  say,  'Oh,  that  is  what  our  father  told  us'."  ^° 

Frazer  in  interpreting  the  Australian  material, 
considers  that  the  departments  of  nature  are 
regulated  by  the  various  groups  in  the  Intichiuma 
ceremonies,  which  are  considered  to  be  efl&cacious 
in  promoting  the  multiplication  of  the  totemic 
animal,  the  growth  of  plants,  the  supply  of  rain, 
etc.  Whether  or  not  this  constitutes  a  com- 
plete explanation  of  these  extraordinarily  diversi- 
fied ceremonies  need  not  concern  us.  It  is 
sufficient  to  observe  that  the  juxtaposition  of 
elements,  among  which  a  magical  connection  is 
predicated,  is  determined  by  the  socio-cosmical 
classification  or,  in  other  words,  by  the  associa- 
tion or  adhesion  of  the  forms  of  social  organiza- 
tion with  more  general  views  of  nature. 

In  a  profusion  of  cases  of  the  types  previously 
cited  it  is,  indeed,  somewhat  meaningless  to 
entertain  the  supposition  that  the  individual 

"  Howitt,  The  native  tribes  of  South-East  Australia, 
p.  454. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         161 

believes  the  articulating  mechanism  to  be  iden- 
tified with,  or  encompassed  by,  either  a  spirit  or 
an  abstract  magical  power  working  indefinitely 
through  the  universe:  as  a  matter  of  fact,  at 
least  in  many  cases,  he  does  not  know  precisely 
how  these  events,  objects  or  processes  are  con- 
nected,— in  other  words,  the  nexus  does  not  rise 
into  his  consciousness,  however  anomalous  and 
peculiar  such  a  situation  may  seem  when  sub- 
jected to  rigid  analysis. 

One  of  the  deeplj^  underlying  reasons  for  this 
strange  state  of  affairs  is  that  the  individual 
receives  the  juxtaposition  of  events,  etc.,  in  the 
shape  of  a  mosaic,  ready-made,  as  it  were,  from 
his  cultural  milieu,  and  that  whatsoever  measure 
or  type  of  agglutination  is  possessed  by  the 
elements  constituting  the  mass  has  not  been 
applied  by  him.  Some  things  are,  others  may 
be,  stuck  together,  but  how  he  does  not  know. 
Specific  connections  are  the  result  of  a  cumula- 
tive historical  series  developing  in  an  indigenous 
habitat,  together  with  elements  introduced  by 
means  of  transmission  through  cultural  contact, 
and  the  integrating  mechanism  which  has  made 
these  agglomerations  possible  has  been  lost  in  the 
sands  of  time,  in  any  event,  it  is  neither  repro- 
duced nor  in  any  fashion  mirrored  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  individual  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  particular  historical  process  involved 
12 


162  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

may  be  analyzed  out  and  clearly  presented.  The 
statements  of  the  individual  under  the  influence 
of  questioning  by  the  ethnologist  or  during  the 
process  of  rationalistic  reflection  upon  what  he 
thinks,  believes,  and  does,  constitute  what  has 
been  called  secondary  explanation,  which  is, 
indeed,  in  a  literal  sense,  a  fait  nouveau,  not 
related  in  any  direct  way  to  the  actual  processes 
in  which  diverse  elements  have  been  integrated 
into  a  cultural  mosaic. 

The  articulating  mechanism,  indeed,  is  the 
prolific  source  of  a  variety  of  these  secondary 
explanations.  In  this  manner  it  may  assume 
a  vicarious  guise,  become  transformed,  as  it 
were,  and  rise  into  consciousness  in  the  shape  of 
a  spirit,  magic  power,  emanation,  reified  abstrac- 
tion or  quality,  the  concrete  virtue  of  an  object 
or  whatnot. 

It  is  requisite  at  this  point,  however,  to  guard 
carefully  against  a  serious  misunderstanding. 
We  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  spirits,  magic 
powers,  emanations,  etc.  are  created  or  arise 
under  the  exigency  of  the  attempt  to  make  the 
nexus  conscious  by  means  of  a  process  of  secon- 
dary explanation.  All  that  we  mean  to  imply, 
indeed,  is  that  they  constitute  the  garbs  which 
it  may  take  on,  as  it  were,  in  the  process  of 
rising  into  consciousness.  A  spirit  does  this;  an 
emanation  accomplishes  that;  the  concrete  vir- 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         163 

tue  of  a  stone  stops  the  hemorrhage  or  cures  a 
stomach  ache, — such  are  examples  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  this  protean  X  ingratiates  itself 
into  the  tangled  thoughts  of  men. 

According  to  the  point  of  view  suggested  here, 
it  follows  that  one  of  the  fundamental  problems 
involved  in  magico-religious  phenomena  is  that 
which  concerns  itself,  on  the  one  hand,  with  the 
nexus  among  elements,  and,  on  the  other,  con- 
comitant psychological  and  historical  processes. 
In  a  general  way  it  may  be  said  that  the  laws 
governing  the  juxtaposition  of  content  are  not 
known.  Attempts  have  been  made,  it  is  true, 
to  present  them  from  the  point  of  view  of  indi- 
vidual psychology,  following  the  traditional 
Humeian  principles  of  contiguity  in  space  and 
time,  cause  and  effect,  and  similarity.^^  The 
unhappiness  of  this  manner  of  treating  the  sub- 
ject, however,  is  perhaps  so  obvious  as  to  require 
no  special  comment.  At  the  present  time  asso- 
ciational  psychology  is  anachronistic  when  ap- 
plied to  the  mental  processes  of  the  individual, 
but  doubly  inacceptable  when  utilized  in  the 
interpretation  of  cultural  phenomena. 

"  See,  for  example,  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  v.  1. 


CHAPTER    11 

THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  CONCEPT  OF  CON- 
VERGENCE IN  THE   INTERPRETATION   OF 
CAUSALITY  (Continued).    VARIOUS  ADDI- 
TIONAL  MENTAL   PROCESSES 

In  some  respects  diametrically  opposed  to  a 
certain  peculiar  unconsciousness  of  the  articu- 
lating mechanism  involving  an  immediate  accep- 
tance of  the  juxtaposition  of  elements,  which 
we  have  been  discussing,  is  a  highly  conscious 
and  rationalistic  enquiry  in  which  the  mind 
attempts  to  grasp,  by  acts  of  deliberate  appre- 
hension, the  causes  of  an  event  and  then  launches 
out  boldly  upon  a  more  or  less  boundless  path. 
Frequently  the  type  of  investigation  involved  is 
wild  and  uncontrolled, — the  mind  proceeding 
capriciously  from  one  cause  to  another  in  an 
indefinite  series,  contriving,  in  this  manner,  to 
encompass  a  sort  of  intellectual  spree.  Karl 
Pearson  gives  a  good  illustration  in  the  case  of 
the  ash-tree  in  his  garden. 

.  .  .  "The  causes  of  its  growth  might  be  widened  out 
into  a  description  of  the  various  past  stages  of  the  universe. 
One  of  the  causes  of  its  growth  is  the  existence  of  my 
164 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         165 

garden,  which  is  conditioned  by  the  existence  of  the 
metropolis;  another  cause  is  the  nature  of  the  soil,  gravel 
approaching  the  edge  of  the  clay,  which  again  is  con- 
ditioned by  the  geological  structure  and  past  history  of 
the  earth.  The  causes  of  any  individual  thing  thus 
widen  out  into  the  unmanageable  history  of  the  universe. 
The  ash-tree  is  like  Tennyson's  'flower  in  the  crannied 
wall':  to  know  all  its  causes  would  be  to  know  the 
universe.  To  trace  causes  in  this  sense  is  like  tracing 
back  all  the  Hnes  of  ancestry  which  converge  in  one 
individual;  we  soon  reach  a  point  where  we  can  go  no 
further  owing  to  the  bulk  of  the  material."  ^ 

Obviously  the  infinite  regress  does  not  repre- 
sent the  common  or  garden,  the  scientific  or  the 
religious  denouement  of  a  causal  enquiry,  but 
the  mind  is  ordinarily  wont  to  rest  upon,  and  to 
seek  consolation  in,  some  particular  cause  to 
which  it  attributes  responsibility.  In  religious 
mysticism,  for  example,  the  individual  is  prone 
to  fall  back  upon  God.  A  war,  an  earthquake, 
a  calamity,  is  ascribed  to  the  wrath  of  the  Deity; 
the  present  shape  and  constitution  of  things  are 
due  to  His  activities  and  design,  etc.  In  formal 
phrases  and  oratorical  expressions  a  certain  type 
of  mind  finds  consolation  and  a  benign  surcease 
from  vexatious  enquiry.  It  is  curious  to  see, 
for  example,  how  readily  St.  Thomas  Aquinas 
disposes  of  the  infiinite  regress.  *'We  cannot," 
he  says,  ''proceed  to  infinity  in  a  series  of  causes: 

^  Pearson,  Grammar  of  science,  ch.  4,  p.  131. 


166  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

therefore  we  must  posit  something  that  neces- 
sarily is."  2  That  something  for  St.  Thomas  of 
course  is  God.  It  is  obvious  that,  having  arrived 
at  this  point,  no  further  activities  are  implicated: 
a  worshipful  or  reverential  attitude  toward  the 
Author  of  all  being  is  the  logical  outcome. 

Causes  are  sometimes  determined  by  almost 
purely  pragmatic  considerations,  which  are  not 
haunted  either  by  the  influence  of  the  infinite 
regress  or  the  mystical  necessity  of  arbitrarily 
attributing  exclusive  responsibility  to  a  first 
cause  or  deity.  The  first  noteworthy  fact  in  this 
connection  is  that  the  aetiological  role  of  an 
event,  object  or  process,  frequently  appears  to 
depend  upon  the  point  of  view  of  the  observer. 
An  illustration  will  serve  to  make  this  matter 
clear.  Suppose  that,  following  a  murder  in  New 
York,  several  individuals  of  different  mental 
equipment  and  varied  walks  of  life  come  upon 
the  scene  and  undertake  to  set  forth,  each  in  his 
own  way,  the  causes  of  the  event.  The  District 
Attorney  examines  the  body  and,  by  reason  of 
certain  clues  left  by  the  murderer,  announces 
that  a  hardened  and  habitual  criminal,  whom 
he  knows  by  reputation,  is  responsible  for  the 
crime.  His  interest  in  the  history  of  the  act 
stops  here.     Catch  the  man,  try  him,  and  elec- 

2  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Of  God  and  His  creatures, 
bk.  1,  ch.  15. 


CON\TERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         167 

trocute  him,  are  the  sequelae  suggested  by  him 
in  his  professional  capacity.  The  neurologist 
immediately  concerns  himself  with  the  mental 
status  of  the  murderer.  He  finds  that  he  is 
subject  to  periods  of  nervous  depression  involv- 
ing wild  sprees  and  violent  fits  of  temper  with 
homicidal  mania, — that,  in  short,  he  has  a  pro- 
nounced neuropathic  heredity,  his  father  having 
been  a  chronic  alcoholic,  and  his  grandmother 
having  died  in  an  asylum.  During  a  period  of 
mental  instability  he  committed  this  overt  act, 
the  ultimate  responsibility  of  which  is  to  be 
found  in  his  family  history.  The  social  scientist 
sees  in  the  event,  the  desperation  of  the  murderer 
induced  by  poverty.  The  social  scheme  is  illy 
constituted,  he  argues,  and  as  long  as  capitalistic 
plutocrats  exploit  the  working  people  and  make 
slaves  of  them,  an  indefinite  number  of  such 
crimes  are  to  be  expected.  The  statistician  now 
appears  upon  the  scene,  armed  with  columns  of 
figures  and  mathematical  curves.  There  must 
be  so  many  murders  per  100,000  inhabitants  in 
New  York  during  a  given  space  of  time,  he  says, 
and  this  is  one  of  them.  The  explanation  is  to 
be  found  in  statistical  laws. 

The  practical  importance  of  these  interpreta- 
tions is  that  each  of  them  tends  to  suggest  lines 
of  conduct.  The  District  Attorney  would  seek 
to  prosecute  the  man  under  the  laws  of  the  State 


168  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

of  New  York,  the  neurologist  to  cure  him,  the 
social  scientist  to  inaugurate  new  legislation  de- 
signed to  do  away  with  such  unhappy  events, 
and  so  on.  We  are  justified,  on  the  whole,  in 
supposing  that,  as  each  is  called  upon  the  scene, 
he  will  undertake  to  make  use  of  the  concepts 
and  methods  which  have  been  historically  built 
up  in  his  special  vocation  and  will  behave  ap- 
proximately as  indicated.  What  is  implied, 
therefore,  is  that  in  the  development  and  evolu- 
tion of  occupations,  certain  phenomena  have 
been  selected  as  causes  and  that,  on  the  basis  of 
them,  various  methods  of  procedure  have  been 
instituted.  Hence  each  of  these  individuals,  in 
seeking  causes,  is  at  the  same  time  searching  for 
that  which  shall  furnish  the  ground  of  his  pro- 
fessional conduct.  Plural  causes  for  the  same 
event  are  to  be  correlated  with  multiple  oc- 
cupations,— in  other  words,  the  former  have 
meaning  and  value  only  with  reference  to  the 
systems  or  spheres  of  action  to  which  they  are 
related. 

Boas  argues  that  the  causal  interpretation  of  a 
given  phenomenon  projected  by  an  individual, 
does  not  represent  a  complete  logical  process. 
He  associates  a  fact  to  be  explained  with  others, 
the  explanation  of  which  is  regarded  as  satis- 
factory. In  the  process  of  amalgamation  of  the 
new  element  into  the  pre-existing  apperceptive 


(CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY  169 

system,  the  influence  of  traditional  material 
manifests  itself. 

"When  we  recognize  that,  neither  among  civilized 
men,  nor  among  primitive  men,  the  average  individual 
carries  to  completion  the  attempt  at  causal  explanation 
of  phenomena,  but  carries  it  only  so  far  as  to  amalgamate 
it  with  other  previously  known  facts,  we  recognize  that 
the  result  of  the  whole  process  depends  entirely  upon 
the  character  of  the  traditional  material:  herein  hes  the 
immense  importance  of  folk-lore  in  determining  the  mode 
of  thought."^ 

Boas,  however,  does  not  undertake  to  analyse  in 
detail  the  conditions  which  determine  the  selec- 
tion of  the  cause. 

Hume's  classic  treatment  of  the  subject  ap- 
pears to  concern  itself  largely  with  the  influence 
of  habit  and  immediate  perception  in  the  archi- 
tecture of  causal  relations.  He  cites  several 
illustrations,  to  wit,  that  water  will  suffocate  one, 
that  gunpowder  will  explode,  that  iron  is  at- 
tracted by  a  loadstone,  that  striking  billiard  balls 
fly  off  at  a  tangent  rather  than  stop  dead  as  one 
might  be  led  to  conjecture  did  he  reason  about 
the  matter  a  priori,  that  a  crystal  is  the  result  of 
heat,  and  that  ice  is  produced  by  cold.*  Phe- 
nomena of  this  type  represent  the  recurrent  be- 

2  Boas,  Mind  of  primitive  man,  in  Thomas,  Source 
hooky  p.  150. 

*  Hume,  Enquiry  on  the  human  understanding,  p.  32. 


170  RELIGION  AND   CULTURE 

haviour  of  nature.  The  mind,  apprehending 
such  conjunctions  repeatedly,  at  length  comes  to 
believe,  through  the  influence  of  habit  or  custom, 
that,  when  one  of  the  elements  appears,  the  other 
will  necessarily  follow.  Whatever  be  said  either 
in  defence  or  derogation  of  Hume's  brilliant 
analysis  of  the  psychological  mechanism  in- 
volved, it  must  be  admitted  that  his  interpreta- 
tion at  best  can  account  for  only  a  limited 
number  of  causal  relations  with  which  we  are 
familiar. 

Two  more  specific  criticisms  have  been  urged 
against  Hume's  position.  (1)  Customary  con- 
junction does  not  always  lead  to  the  attribution 
of  a  causal  relation, — the  alternation  of  night 
and  day  being  the  most  striking  and  obvious 
case  in  point.  (2)  Frequently  a  causal  relation 
is  attributed  to  two  or  more  events  when  they 
occur  for  the  first  time. 

Perhaps  a  still  more  drastic  objection  is  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  those  connections  which 
involve  the  conjoining  of  events,  objects,  or 
processes  widely  separated  from  one  another  in 
time  and  space,  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of 
habit  and  direct  perceptual  processes.  That  a 
certain  type  of  mosquito  is  the  cause  of  malaria 
or  that  Jevon's  sun  spots  produce  financial  panics 
are  obviously  not  data  of  immediate  experience. 
We  must  raise  additional  questions,  therefore, 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         171 

as  to  the  nature  of  the  diverse  psychic  processes 
which  lead  to  the  bringing  together  of  such 
distant  events  and  non-contiguous  elements. 

There  is  a  considerable  variety  of  rationalistic 
activities  in  which  immense  groups  of  past  experi- 
ences are  systematized  and  organized  in  accord- 
ance with  certain  architectural  principles, — that 
is  to  say,  leading  concepts  which,  constituting  a 
sort  of  glue,  serve  to  stick  together  the  events 
of  the  past  in  an  harmonious  and  emotionally- 
satisfying  whole.  The  writing  of  history  neither 
embodies  an  exact  replica  of  events,  nor  an 
approximation  to  a  photographic  reprint.  On 
the  contrary,  various  elements  of  the  past  are 
selected  out  of  a  limitless  number  and  made  the 
basis  of  a  sort  of  novelistic  narrative.  The  weld- 
ing together  of  facts  in  terms  of  cause  and  effect 
relations,  is  accomplished  by  means  of  the  pre- 
suppositions which  the  writer  imports  into  his 
work.  Certain  obvious  possibilities  which  are, 
in  fact,  frequently  encountered,  suggest  them- 
selves. Historical  events  may  be  represented  as 
having  been  caused  largely  by  the  activities  of 
various  striking  personalities  who  appear  as  lead- 
ing figures  in  the  drama, — the  almost  exclusive 
objects  of  interest  and  the  foundation  upon  which 
the  vast  superstructure  rests.  In  this  fashion 
Carlyle  sets  forth  the  lives  of  such  heroic  figures 
as  Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon.     On  the 


172  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

other  hand,  it  is  possible  to  present  history  as 
the  manifestation  of  quasi-impersonal,  social 
forces  which  lie  beneath  the  surface  and  assert 
themselves  independently  of  specific  historical 
figures,  or,  at  best,  merely  employ  them  as 
more  or  less  unconscious  tools.  It  thus  tran- 
spires that,  in  the  modern  world,  we  hear  a 
great  deal  of  movements, — the  suffrage  move- 
ment, the  social  democratic  movement,  the  im- 
perialistic movement,  etc.  Attempts  have  also 
been  made  to  present  history  from  the  point  of 
view  of  economic  determinism  and  in  terms  of  the 
influence  of  the  geographical  environment. 

Whatever  be  the  leading  concept  which  per- 
meates the  mind  of  the  historian,  it  soon  rises 
from  its  legitimate  position  as  a  directing  agency 
into  an  universal  explanatory  principle,  more 
important  than  all  others, — in  fact  a  sort  of 
beacon  light  which  sheds  a  brilliant  illumination 
over  all  the  elements  of  the  past.  We  are  wont 
to  say  that  such  attempts  at  historical  writing 
are  one-sided,  but  we  are  not  so  prone  to  appre- 
ciate that  they  are  really  the  result  of  the 
artistic  activities  of  the  writer  and  the  product 
of  his  more  or  less  unconscious  weaving  of 
materials  into  a  novelistic  narrative.  Doubtless 
in  many  cases  he  is  quite  sincere  in  fooling  his 
readers  as  well  as  himself.  His  carefully  selected 
facts,  indeed,  have  hidden  powers  and,  when 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         173 

marshalled  in  imposing  array,  develop  an  in- 
trinsic momentum  of  their  own  which  serves  to 
sweep  everything  before  them,  like  an  army 
which  assails  a  city  and  clears  it  of  all  opposing 
forces.  The  inspiring  and  seductive  influence  of 
a  well  organized  story  cannot  be  overestimated. 
We  are  carried  along  unconsciously  with  it  and 
forthwith  lose  our  power  of  self-determination 
and  critical  evaluation  in  the  face  of  its  subtle 
appeal. 

The  influence  of  impulsive,  instinctive  and 
aft'ectivistic  elements  in  contributing  to  the  con- 
stitution of  various  connections,  has  been  greatly 
neglected  in  the  literature  of  the  subject  which, 
as  we  have  suggested,  is  very  largely  dominated 
by  logical  and  epistemological  interests.  From 
a  certain  point  of  view,  however,  it  may  be 
said  that  cause  is  as  much  orectic  as  gnostic, 
peculiar  though  this  statement  may  seem  at 
first  sight. 

Very  frequently  we  can  identify  a  powerful 
orectic  element  in  some  of  the  ordinary  deliver- 
ances of  daily  life  which  involve  either  a  causal 
interpretation  or  a  web  of  specific  relations. 
This  consideration  comes  out,  not  only  in  the 
passion  of  heated  controversy,  but  also  in  argu- 
mentations which,  implying  necessarily  a  shame- 
less selection  of  data,  are  projected  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  prejudices  and  precon- 


174  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

ceptions.  A  man  admits  into  his  apperceptive 
system  only  those  things  which  are  emotionally 
congenial  and  which  serve  to  facilitate  the 
carrying  out  of  his  desires,  either  really  or  ideally 
in  phantasy.  He,  who  is  born  a  democrat,  will, 
for  the  balance  of  his  life,  find  esoteric  virtues 
in  things  democratic:  to  find  an  office-holding 
republican  good  enough  to  reveal  himself  un- 
wittingly as  a  thief,  affords  him  a  certain  degree 
of  genuine  satisfaction  not  entirely  commen- 
surate with  the  heinousness  of  the  erring  one's 
offense.  The  democrat  is  disposed  to  find  the 
ultimate  ground  of  moral,  social,  economic  and 
general  depravity  in  the  republican  administra- 
tion, and  the  republican,  in  his  turn,  is  wont  to 
project  a  no  less  profound  explanation  of  the  ills 
which  surround  him,  when  he  ascribes  them  to 
the  evil  machinations  of  democratic  politicians. 
In  a  very  general  way,  it  is  perhaps  obvious  that 
the  flow  of  mental  processes  involves  both  a 
conscious  and  unconscious  selection  of  data  and 
that  neutral  things  of  the  outer  world  are  swept 
along  with  it  and  thus  acquire  part  of  its  inherent 
dynamism.^ 

•^Lay  says:  "We  see  only  what  is  in  our  minds,  was 
the  old  form  of  expression  but  a  new  one  and  a  better 
one  would  be  to  say  that  we  see,  hear  and  feel  only  what 
is  in  our  hearts,  that  is,  our  desires."  Lay,  Man's  un- 
conscious conflict,  p.  56. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY  175 

We  may  also  say,  with  some  degree  of  un- 
avoidable inaccuracy,  that  frequently  objects 
which  come  within  the  range  of  diverse  mental 
operations  may  acquire,  by  reason  of  this  con- 
tact, some  of  the  qualities  incident  thereto:  for 
example,  they  may  assume  the  forward  moving 
tendency,  volition,  aggressive  desire,  impulse  or 
hope  seeking  satisfaction.  The  lover  kisses  the 
handkerchief  or  the  glove  of  his  absent  mistress 
or,  if  he  has  been  rejected  by  her,  angrily  casts 
it  into  the  fire.  The  man,  enraged  at  his  enemy, 
abuses  a  piece  of  property  belonging  to  him. 
Tylor  cites  the  case  of  Xerxes  flogging  the 
Hellespont  and  that  of  the  wild  native  of  Brazil 
biting  or  kicking  the  object  he  has  stumbled 
over,  together  with  a  number  of  others  of  like 
character.^ 

It  is  not  unlikely  that  many  types  of  exceed- 
ingly common  and  widespread  magical  procedure 
have  developed  from  instinctive  activities  of  this 
kind.  The  attribution  of  causal  agency  to  ob- 
jects or  elements  embedded  in  such  behavior istic 
complexes  is  probably  the  result  of  subsidiary 
reflection, — the  turning  back  of  thought  upon 

^  Tylor  intellectualizes  situations  of  this  type  and 
believes  that  they  indicate  a  reflective  theory  of  world 
animation.  In  contradistinction  to  this  view,  however, 
we  have  contended  that  objects  merely  take  on  a  dramatic 
role  within  the  limitations  of  a  concrete  situation. 


176  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

processes  already  in  existence.  In  many  cases, 
activities  have  been  preceded  by  mental  pro- 
cesses characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  emo- 
tional tension, — the  denouement  which  the  indi- 
vidual or  the  group  faces  being  critical  with 
prospective  weal  or  woe  implicated :  for  example, 
the  desire  to  kill  or  do  injury  to  an  enemy; 
vanquish  a  neighboring  tribe  in  warfare;  produce 
an  increase  of  flocks  or  animals,  particularly  in 
areas  where  the  food  supply  is  precarious;  con- 
trol the  weather  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  the 
production  of  crops;  influence  the  growth  of 
plants  directly;  facilitate  childbirth  for  an 
expectant  mother,  and  so  on.  In  cases  of  this 
type,  and  an  indefinite  number  of  others  com- 
parable to  them,  in  which  emotional  tension  is 
acute,  there  may  arise  the  tendency  or,  indeed, 
the  necessity  for  it  to  drain  off  or  express  itself 
in  overt  behavior.  The  varieties  of  movement 
which  this  psychical  surcharge  initiates,  may 
appear  somewhat  random,  but  there  is  fre- 
quently a  mechanism  at  hand  which  serves  to 
impart  to  them  a  certain  degree  of  cohesion  and 
organization.  This  co-ordinating  agency  con- 
sists in  an  ideal  presentation  of  the  end  or  situa- 
tion which  is  the  result  ardently  sought,  in  other 
words,  an  affective  state  may  be  suflficiently 
intense  to  initiate  a  series  of  adventitious  move- 
ments which  manifests  the  tendency  of  falling 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         177 

under  the  influence  of  a  future  result  vividly 
present  in  the  mind.  Thus,  instead  of  merely 
kicking  a  tree  or  stone  in  impotent  rage  at  his 
enemy,  which  is  an  immediate  dramatized  ex- 
pression of  what  the  primitive  man  would  like 
to  do  to  him,  he  proceeds  to  elaborate  and 
amplify  these  haphazard  acts, — he  constructs  an 
image  and  then  performs  a  more  or  less  extensive 
operation  upon  it.  Frazer  thus  describes  the 
method  frequently  pursued. 

"When  an  Ojibway  Indian  desires  to  work  evil  on 
any  one,  he  makes  a  little  wooden  image  of  his  enemy  and 
runs  a  needle  into  its  head  or  heart,  or  he  shoots  an  arrow 
into  it,  believing  that  wherever  the  needle  pierces  or  the 
arrow  strikes  the  image,  his  foe  will  the  same  instant  be 
seized  with  a  sharp  pain  in  the  corresponding  part  of  his 
body;  but  if  he  intends  to  kill  the  person  outright,  he 
biu-ns  or  buries  the  puppet,  uttering  certain  magic  words 
as  he  does  so.  So  when  a  Cora  Indian  of  Mexico  wishes 
to  kill  a  man,  he  makes  a  figure  of  him  out  of  burnt  clay, 
strips  of  cloth,  and  so  forth,  and  then,  muttering  incanta- 
tions, runs  thorns  through  the  head  or  stomach  of  the 
figure  to  make  his  victim  suffer  accordingly".' 

Other  mimetic  representations  of  an  end  or 
situation  considered  desirable,  are  procedures 
designed  to  multiply  flocks,  produce  rain,  the 
widespread  practice  of  the  couvade,  ceremonial 
dances  representing  warfare  and  the  hunt,  and 
so  on.    These  dramatic  activities  are  contiguous 

'  Frazer,  The  golden  bough,  v.  1,  pp.  55-56. 
13 


178  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

on  the  one  side  to  very  strong  desires  and,  on  the 
other,  to  real  happenings,  many  of  the  latter  of 
which  seem  to  be  the  direct  realization  of  the 
former.  Thus  primitive  man  hopes  vividly  for 
the  death  of  his  enemy,  constructs  and  operates 
upon  an  image  and,  forsooth,  his  enemy  dies; 
he  needs  rain,  institutes  a  dance,  and  a  downpour 
oxJcurs;  he  wishes  a  fine  crop  in  the  spring, 
performs  a  ceremony,  and  unusual  bounty  fol- 
lows; in  short,  many  other  of  his  concrete  de- 
sires are  apparently  realized  in  a  similar 
fashion. 

In  this  manner  the  raw  material  for  the  ideal 
articulation  is  provided.  Reflective  thought  fol- 
lows closely  upon  these  performances  and  their 
happy  sequelae  in  the  events  of  the  outer  world. 
A  causal  series  is  strung  between  various  ele- 
ments of  the  dramatic  complex  and  the  real 
events  of  nature, — the  activities  of  man  seem 
to  be  inextricably  interwoven  with  the  world 
process.  The  mind  of  man  is  so  constituted 
that,  when  a  striking  juxtaposition  of  events  has 
taken  place,  an  undue  importance  is  ascribed  to 
this  circumstance,  one  case  of  apparently  bril- 
liant success  being  sufiicient  to  outweigh  a 
thousand  failures. 

The  unsatisfactory  character  of  life  is  an 
eternal  theme  on  which  poets  and  sages  of  all 
times    and    places    have    dwelt.     Wordsworth 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY  179 

epitomizes  a  mass  of  reflection  on  this  subject 
in  a  single  phrase : 

.  .  .  "The  good  die  young, 
While  those  whose  hearts  are  dry  as  summer  dust 
Burn  to  the  socket."  .  .  . 

The  human  mind  is  so  constituted,  however, 
that,  from  time  to  time,  it  rises  above  the  realm 
of  fact  and  seeks  consolation  in  phantasy.  The 
cause  and  effect  relations,  which  are  involved  in 
the  domains  of  mythology  and  artistic  creation 
in  general,  are  therefore  to  be  correlated,  in  their 
genesis  and  unfolding,  with  certain  affective 
reactions  and  processes  of  imagination  which 
effect  a  reorganization  of  the  real  world  in 
accordance  with  demands  and  exigencies  peculiar 
to  themselves.  Those  numerous  wishes  and 
desires,  which  do  not  find  fulfillment  in  everyday 
life,  attain  to  a  sort  of  vicarious  satisfaction 
through  the  avenues  of  artistic  expression.  In 
a  beautiful  stanza  Barry  Cornwall  expresses  a 
a  lingering  regret  that  the  age  of  story  does  not 
maintain  itself  against  the  sad  disillusionments 
of  science. 

"O  ye  dehcious  fables!  where  the  wave 
And  woods  were  peopled  and  the  air,  with  things 
So  lovely!  why,  ah!  why  has  science  grave 
Scattered  afar  your  sweet  imaginings?  "  ^ 

8  Cornwall.    In  title-page  of  Bullfinch's  Age  of  fable. 


180  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

There  is  also  a  classical  passage  by  Sir  Francis 
Bacon  in  which  the  attempt  to  transcend  the 
limitations  of  the  real  world  is  expressed  in  a 
very  striking  manner. 

"Poesy  is  a  part  of  learning  in  measure  of  words  for 
the  most  part  restrained,  but  in  all  other  points  extremely 
licensed,  and  doth  truly  refer  to  the  imagination;  which, 
being  not  tied  to  the  laws  of  matter,  may  at  pleasure  join 
that  which  nature  hath  severed,  and  sever  that  which 
nature  hath  joined;  and  so  make  unlawful  matches  and 
divorces  of  things;  'Pidoribus  atgue  poetis,'  etc.  .  .  . 

The  use  of  this  feigned  history  hath  been  to  give  some 
shadow  of  satisfaction  to  the  mind  of  man  in  those  points 
wherein  the  nature  of  things  doth  deny  it,  the  world 
being  in  proportion  inferior  to  the  soul;  by  reason  whereof 
there  is,  agreeable  to  the  spirit  of  man,  a  more  ample 
greatness,  a  more  exact  goodness,  and  a  more  absolute 
variety,  than  can  be  found  in  the  nature  of  things."  ^ 

Omar  Khayyam  expresses  a  melancholy  dis- 
content at  the  numberless  vexations  and  vicissi- 
tudes of  life. 

"Ah!  Love,  could  thou  and  I  with  fate  conspire 
To  change  this  sorry  scheme  of  things  entire; 
Would  we  not  shatter  it  to  bits  and  then 
Remold  it  nearer  to  the  heart's  desire?"  ^° 

If  we  accept,  in  an  imaginative  way,  the 
Persian  poet^s  fond  wish  to  refashion  the  world, 

^  Bacon,  Of  the  proficience  and  advancement  of  learn- 
ing, p.  126. 

"  Khayyam,  Omar,  The  Rubaiyat. 


J\,!U)JViMM  KfUM^ 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY  181 

but  proceed  further  into  an  examination  of  the 
architectural  principles  involved  in  the  attempt 
to  piece  together  the  scattered  bits,  we  find  that 
they  persistently  elude  definite  analysis  and  lose 
themselves  in  the  limbo  of  shifting  phantas- 
magoria. Moreover  the  laws,  which  are  con- 
ceived to  govern  the  mythological  world,  are 
more  or  less  capricious,  ill-defined  and  subject 
to  derogation  and  numerous  exceptions,  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  in  which  they  themselves 
involve  a  departure  from,  or  an  abnegation  of, 
the  laws  of  the  real  world. 

It  is  well,  therefore,  that  we  do  not  attempt  to 
push  analysis  of  this  question  too  far,  lest  we 
fall  a  prey  to  the  danger  of  introducing  artificial 
exactness  where  such  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
nature  of  the  case.  Bearing  this  reservation  in 
mind,  however,  we  may  indicate  in  a  loose' way 
some  of  the  fundamental  determinants  which 
enter,  as  architectural  principles,  into  the  con- 
stitution of  the  vicarious  world.  Among  these 
may  be  enumerated,  the  deep  and  instinctive 
hope  of  man  to  see  again  his  loved  ones  who  are 
dead;  to  attain  happiness,  success  and  long  life; 
to  cure  disease;  to  see  the  weary  and  heavy- 
laden  attain  consolation  and  surcease  from  their 
sufferings;  the  tendency  to  regard  things  as 
exactly  opposite  to  what  they  are  in  reality;  etc. 
It  is  entirely  beyond  the  scope  of  our  purposes 


182  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

to  enter  into  a  consideration  of  the  varied  mo- 
tives which  may  lead  to  the  formation  of  myths. 
Interpretations  of  nature,  particularly  those  con- 
cerned with  the  observation  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  aetiological  explanations  of  the  present 
form  of  things,  the  re-statement  of  dreams  and 
nightmares,  purely  artistic  impulses,  etc.,  may 
have  entered  into  their  composition:  the  one 
predominating  here,  the  other  there  in  an  ir- 
regular fashion.  Among  a  number  of  other 
motives,  Kroeber  enumerates  the  following  in 
North  American  mythology,  which  are  some- 
what typical  and  serve  to  express,  in  some  sense, 
the  manner  in  which  the  real  world  undergoes 
transfiguration  under  the  influence  of  mytho- 
logical impulses  and  ideas.  (1)  Final  escape 
from  a  pursuer,  the  means  either  of  flight  or 
pursuit,  or  both,  being  magical,  frequently  called 
"  the  magic  flight."  A  person,  pursued  by  some- 
one, throws  various  objects  behind  him  which 
become  transformed  into  natural  barriers,  such 
as  mountains,  rivers,  etc.,  and  so  bring  about 
his  final  escape.  (2)  The  visit  of  the  dead. 
(3)  The  origin  of  death.  The  fundamental  idea 
is  that  death  might  have  been  averted  but  for 
the  trifling  act  or  wish  of  an  individual.  The 
story  of  the  Garden  of  Eden  is  of  this  type.  Eve 
having  contrived  to  bring  desolation  upon  man- 
kind by  eating  of  the  Tree  of  Knowledge.     (4) 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         183 

The  opposite  of  the  present.  "At  one  time 
things  cannot  have  been  as  they  are  now. 
Rivers  now  flow  down.  Therefore  they  formerly 
flowed  up,  or  part  up  and  part  down.  The 
imagined  condition  is  analogous  to  the  known, 
but  reversed  in  certain  particulars."  It  is  also 
frequently  held  that  at  one  time  there  was  no 
sun.  (5)  Transformation.  (6)  Origin  by  crea- 
tion or  manufacture  "with  or  without  existing 
material  to  operate  on,  but  always  with  the 
accompaniment  of  supernatural  power."  " 

Were  the  vicarious  world  of  mythology,  once 
constituted,  set  off,  held  apart  by  itself  and 
regarded  in  the  light  of  an  artistic  or  fanciful 
creation,  the  causal  relations  which  are  in- 
extricably interwoven  with  its  warp  and  woof 
would  possess  no  great  significance  or  impor- 
tance: our  attitude  toward  it  would  be  compar- 
able to  that  which  we  manifest  in  the  idle 
perusal  of  a  novel  in  which  the  hero,  in  the  last 
chapter,  succeeds  in  surmounting  every  con- 
ceivable obstacle,  marries  the  girl  and  lives 
happily  ever  after.  The  world  of  mythological 
creation,  however,  does  not  in  this  manner  main- 
tain aloofness,  but  comes  into  frequent  and 
organic  relationship  with  the  customs,  ideas  and 
purposes  of  everyday  life:  thus  part  of  the  con^ 

"Kroeber,  Catchwords  in  American  mythology, 
Jmirml  of  American  Folk-Lore,  1908,  v.  21,  pp.  226-227. 


184  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

tent  of  the  former  becomes  more  or  less  perma- 
nently embodied  in  the  latter.  The  mechanisms 
by  means  of  which  this  penetration  is  effected 
are  far  too  complicated  to  be  stated  in  any  brief 
or  dogmatic  way,  nevertheless,  at  least  in  two 
respects,  they  betray  themselves  in  a  somewhat 
obvious  manner.  (1)  Myths  are  very  frequently 
the  prolific  source  of  secondary  beliefs,  the  inci- 
dents cited  in  them  being  thought  to  have  taken 
place  in  reality.  -  (2)  Mythological  incidents  are 
frequently  conceived  of  as  capable  of  being  trans- 
muted into  the  real  world  under  certain  favor- 
able circumstances, — oftentimes,  indeed,  the 
attempt  is  made  to  copy  them,  as  it  were,  and 
to  bring  them  to  pass  under  the  exigencies  of 
practical  desires  and  purposes. 

Referring  to  the  Koryak,  Jochelson  says : 

"  Like  the  heroes  of  the  other  raven  myths,  Big-Raven 
of  the  Korj'ak  appears  merely  as  the  transformer  of  the 
world.  Everything  in  the  world  had  existed  before  he 
appeared.  His  creative  activity  consisted  in  revealing 
things  heretofore  concealed,  and  turning  some  things  into 
others;  and,  since  every  thing  in  nature  is  regarded  by 
the  Koryak  as  animated,  he  only  changed  the  form  of  the 
animated  substance.  Some  things  he  brought  down  ready- 
made  to  our  earth  from  the  Supreme  Being  in  heaven. 
Big-Raven  appears  as  the  first  man,  the  father  and  pro- 
tector of  the  Koryak;  but  at  the  same  time  he  is  a  powerful 
shaman  and  a  supernatural  being.  His  name  figures  in 
all  incantations.  These  are  cither  prayers  addressed  to  him, 
or,  in  ca^es  of  treating  the  sick,  dramatic  representations  of 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         185 

myths  relating  how  Big-Raven  treated  his  own  children,  the 
patient  personifying  one  of  Big-Raven's  children.  His 
presence  is  presupposed  in  pronouncing  the  incantation, 
and  sick  people  are  treated  by  means  of  his  name.  In  the 
same  manner  he  is  supposed  to  be  present  at  every  shamanistic 
ceremony.  When  the  shamans  of  the  Maritime  Koryak 
commence  their  incantations,  they  say,  "There,  Big- 
Raven  is  coming!'  The  Reindeer  Koryak  told  me  that 
during  shamanistic  ceremonies  a  raven  or  a  sea-gull 
comes  flying  into  the  house,  and  that  the  host  will  then 
say,  'Slaughter  a  reindeer,  Big-Raven  is  coming!'  I 
had  no  opportunity  to  witness  personally  any  sacrificial 
offering  to  Big-Raven;  but  the  fawn  festival,  which  is 
now  observed  only  by  the  Reindeer  Koryak  of  the  Palpal 
Mountains,  the  antlers  piled  up  during  the  festival  con- 
stitute a  sacrifice  to  Big-Raven."  ^^ 

Among  many  of  the  tribes  of  the  North- West 
Coast  of  North  America  and  those  of  Western 
Siberia  there  are  great  cycles  of  transformer 
myths,  the  fundamental  notion  being  that  in 
the  fabled  period  Big-Raven  or  some  other  pro- 
genitor appeared  upon  the  scene  and  transformed 
things  in  a  great  variety  of  ways.  Among  the 
Koryak  and  other  Siberian  tribes  this  trans- 
former concept  has  undergone  a  peculiar  secon- 
dary development  in  the  actual  practice  of  magic, 
the  fundamental  ideas  being  that  the  shaman  is 

"  Jochelson,  The  Koryak  religion  and  myths,  Amer- 
ican Museum  of  Natural  History,  Memoir,  Jesup  North 
Pacific  Expedition,  Publication,  v.  6,  pt.  1,  p.  18.  Italics 
mine. 


186  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

most  powerful  when  he  has  transformed  himself 
into  a  woman  and  that  a  great  variety  of 
magical  potentialities  are  contingent  upon  this 
circumstance.     Jochelson  says: 

"It  is  interesting  to  note  that  traces  of  the  change  of 
a  shaman's  sex  into  that  of  a  woman  may  be  found  among 
many  Siberian  tribes.  During  shamanistic  exercises, 
Tungus  and  Yukaghir  shamans  put  on,  not  a  man's, 
but  a  woman's  apron  with  tassels.  In  the  absence  of  a 
ehamanistic  dress,  or  in  case  of  the  so-called  "small" 
shamanism,  the  Yakut  shaman  will  put  on  a  woman's 
jacket  of  foal-skins  and  a  woman's  white  ermine  fur  cap. 
I  myself  was  once  present  at  a  shamanistic  ceremony  of 
this  kind  in  the  Kolyma  district.  Shamans  part  their 
hair  in  the  middle  and  braid  it  hke  women,  but  wear  it 
loose  during  the  shamanistic  performances.  Some  sha- 
mans have  two  iron  circles  representing  breasts  sewed  to 
their  aprons.  The  right  side  of  horse-skin  is  considered 
to  be  tabooed  for  women,  and  shamans  are  not  permitted 
to  lie  on  it.  During  the  first  three  days  after  confinement 
when  Ayisi't,  the  deity  of  fecundity,  is  supposed  to  be 
near  the  lying-in  woman,  access  to  the  house  where  she  is 
confined  is  forbidden  to  men,  but  not  to  shamans.  Trost- 
chansky  thinks  that  among  the  Yakut,  who  have  cate- 
gories of  shamans, — the  'white'  ones  representing  crea- 
tive forces,  and  the  'black'  ones  representing  destructive 
forces,  the  latter  have  a  tendency  to  become  hke  women, 
for  the  reason  that  they  derive  their  origin  from  women 
shamans."^' 

The  Eskimo  about  Behring  Strait  appear  to 
have  come  under  the  influence  of  the  transformer 
"  Ibid.,  p.  53. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         187 

cycle  of  myths  indigenous  to  the  North- West 
Coast  and  to  have  accepted  them  quite  seriously. 
Nelson  states  that  they  attempted  to  prove  one 
of  their  stories  in  an  interesting  manner.  A 
mythical  creature  described  as  being  similar  in 
form  to  the  killer-whale  is  credited  with  the 
power  to  change  at  will  to  a  wolf.  After  roaming 
about  over  land  it  may  return  to  the  sea  and 
become  a  whale.  The  Eskimo  say  they  know 
that  this  change  takes  place  as  they  have  seen 
the  wolf-tracks  leading  to  the  edge  of  the  sea-ice 
and  ending  at  the  water,  or  beginning  at  the 
edge  of  the  water  leading  to  the  shore.^^ 

King  states  that  among  the  Navaho  Indians 
cures  of  diseases  are  effected  in  connection  with 
the  dramatic  rehearsal  of  a  complicated  myth 
regarding  the  migrations  of  a  family,  the  escape 
of  a  son  from  the  hostile  Ute,  his  protection  and 
succor  by  various  gods  and  animals  until  he 
reaches  his  kindred. ^^  Kroeber  says,  referring 
to  the  aborigines  of  California: 

"Women  in  labor  spoke,  or  had  spoken  for  them  a 
myth  regarding  the  culture-hero's  first  causing  women  to 
give  birth.  The  plant  thought  to  have  been  used  on 
this  occasion  by  the  culture-hero  was  eaten  by  Wiyot 

^*  Nelson,  The  Eskimo  about  Behring  Strait,  U.  S. 
Bureau  of  American  Ethnology,  Annual  Report,  1896-97, 
V.  18,  pt.  1,  p.  444. 

15  King,  The  development  of  religion,  p.  128. 


188  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

women   in   order  to  make  the  child  small  and  easy  to 
bear."  i» 

The  penetration  of  mythological  ideas  into 
the  practices  and  beliefs  of  everyday  life  is  by 
no  means  confined  exclusively  to  primitive  cul- 
tures, but  also  manifests  itself  in  an  immense 
variety  of  ways  in  the  higher  civilizations.  A 
recent  religious  sect  of  great  importance  pro- 
vides an  excellent  example.  Christian  Science 
assumes  that  it  is  able  to  copy  miraculous  prac- 
tices which  were  performed  in  the  mythological 
period,  ostensibly  by  Christ.  In  contradistinc- 
tion to  other  types  of  Christianity,  which  attrib- 
ute to  Christ  various  peculiar  powers  which  are 
conceived  of  as  entirely  unique  and  not  capable 
of  being  reproduced.  Christian  Science  assumes 
that,  under  appropriate  conditions,  they  can 
again  be  brought  to  pass.  Furthermore,  how- 
ever, it  is  only  fair  to  say  that  it  arrogates  to 
itself  a  number  of  additional  functions  so  that, 
speaking  at  large,  its  potentialities  may  be  re- 
garded as  indefinitely  extended.  Everything 
from  the  return  of  a  lost  pocket-book  to  success 
in  a  business  venture,  the  cure  of  all  conceivable 
maladies  with  the  possible  exception  of  decapita- 
tion, lie  within  the  proper  province  of  its  meta- 
physical demonstrations. 

"I^oeber,  Notes  on  California  folk-lore,  Journal  of 
Amencan  Folk-Lore,  1908,  v.  21,  p.  38. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         189 

One  of  the  universal  tendencies  of  the  mind  of 
man,  both  primitive  and  civilized,  is  that  which 
consists  in  predicating  activities  within  a  purely 
ideal  totality.  An  examination  of  certain  classi- 
fications of  experience  made  in  different  levels 
of  culture  serves  to  reveal  the  fact  that,  fre- 
quently, specific  groupings  are  not  regarded  as 
purely  static  contents,  arising  through  the  pro- 
cesses of  comparison,  discrimination  and  ab- 
straction, but  rather,  as  the  depositories  of  a 
mystical,  anthropomorphic  dynamism.  The  log- 
ical elements,  as  it  were,  take  legs  and  begin 
to  perform. 

Perhaps  one  of  the  most  striking  examples  of 
this  kind  is  that  of  the  delimitation  of  magical 
possibilities  within  the  confines  of  a  restricted 
social  group  in  Australia.  The  socio-cosmical 
classification,  in  which  men,  animals,  plants  and 
objects  are  brought  under  common  rubrics,  is 
regarded  as  something  more  than  a  convenient 
intellectual  construction, — the  elements  com- 
prising it  are  conjoined  by  mystical  links  and 
are  saturated  with  potential  magical  activities. 
We  have  thus  a  system  of  cause  and  effect  rela- 
tions implied,  whose  genesis  seems  to  us  some- 
what exotic  and  difficult  to  understand  if  we 
bring  to  the  study  only  the  usual  modes  of  inter- 
pretation. By  way  of  illustration  of  this  point 
we  may  adduce  the  following  data. 


190  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

Referring  to  the  natives  of  South-East  Aus- 
tralia Howitt  says: 

'  *I  may  add  that  the  whole  universe,  including  mankind, 
was  apparently  divided  between  the  classes.  Therefore 
the  hst  of  sub-totems  might  be  extended  indefinitely.  It 
appears  that  a  man  speaks  of  some  being  'nearer  to  him' 
than  others.  I  am  unable  to  ascertain  the  precise  meaning 
of  this  expression.  When  pressed  upon  this  question,  a 
black  would  say,  'Oh,  that  s  what  our  fathers  told  us.'  " 

In  the  great  group  of  tribes,  of  which  the  Wakelhura  is 
my  example,  it  was  also  the  practice  to  send  a  message  for 
the  initiation  ceremonies  through  a  totem;  but  in  this 
case  a  message  stick  accompanied  it,  and  this  was  made 
of  the  wood  of  some  tree  which  was  of  the  same  class 
division  as  the  sender,  and  also  of  the  bearer  of  the  mes- 
sage .^^ 

There  were  men  who  professed  to  bring  or  send 
away  rain.  This  was  by  magical  practices,  just  as  the 
same  men  professed  to  destroy  their  enemies  by  magic. 
In  performing  these  functions  the  medicine-man  must 
only  use  things  of  the  same  class  as  himself.  As  I  have 
before  stated,  in  that  tribe  everything  is  thought  to  belong 
to  one  or  the  other  of  the  classes  Malera  and  WutheraP 

Certain  animals  are  the  especial  game  of  each  class. 
Ohu  claims  as  his  game  emu  and  wallaby,  and  if  he  wishes 
to  invite  his  fellows  of  the  same  sub-class,  in  a  neighboring 
tribe,  to  hunt  the  common  game,  he  must  do  this  by 
means  of  a  message-stick,  made  from  the  wood  of  a  tree 
which  is  hke  themselves,  of  the  Ohu  sub-class.    When  a 

"  Howitt,  The  native  tribes  of  South-East  Australia, 
p.  454. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  516. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  399. 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         191 

man  desires  to  perform  some  magical  act,  he  must  use 
for  it  only  objects  which  are  of  the  same  class  as  himself, 
and  when  he  dies  he  is  laid  on  a  stage  made  of  the  branches 
and  covered  with  the  leafy  boughs  of  a  tree  of  his  class. 
Among  aU  the  natural  objects  of  his  class,  there  is  some 
one  which  is  nearer  to  him  than  any  other.  He  bears  its 
name,  and  it  is  his  totem .^o 

Instances  have  been  made  known  to  me  which  show 
that  there  is  a  magical  influence  to  the  persons  of  one  class, 
which  is  injurious  to  those  of  the  other.  But  this  evil 
personal  influence  attaches  not  to  men  alone.  There  is 
the  same  between  men  on  one  side  and  women  on  the 
other.  In  the  Wurunjerri  tribe,  when  it  happened  that 
Bunjil  and  Waang  men  were  camped  at  the  same  fire,  each 
one  had  his  own  stick  to  stir  it,  and  to  cook  his  food  on  it 
with.  A  man  would  not  touch  any  other  man's  stick, 
especially  if  he  were  of  the  other  class  name,  lest  his 
fingers  should  swell.  If  this  happened,  he  had  to  go  to 
the  Wirrarap,  who  would  draw  out  the  piece  of  wood 
from  his  hand."  " 

The  foregoing  discussion  has  served  to  bring 
before  us  the  enormous  range  and  diversity  of 
mental  processes  involved  in  causation.  It  may- 
be justly  said,  therefore,  that  it  is  only  by  virtue 
of  poetic  license  that  we  can  apply  the  term 
'causality^  to  the  phenomena  involved.  The 
mental  processes  implied  can  scarcely  be  classi- 
fied indiscriminately  together  except  in  so  far 
as  they  converge  toward  a  common  end,  namely, 
the  attribution  or  predication  of  a  dynamic  rela- 

20  Ibid.,  p.  113. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  401. 


192  RELIGION  AND  CULTURE 

tionship  between  two  or  more  elements.  There 
is,  however,  no  advantage  to  be  derived  from 
the  classification,  under  a  common  heading,  of 
the  more  or  less  unconscious  acceptance  of  the 
juxtaposition  of  elements  which  are  presented 
to  the  individual  from  his  folkloristic  back- 
ground; the  deliberate,  highly  conscious  and 
rationalistic  search  for  causes;  certain  aspects 
of  magic  and  science;  history;  etc.,  which  we 
have  discussed:  indeed,  positively  misleading 
results  may  frequently  ensue  from  this  enter- 
prise, such  as  the  grossly  improper  comparison  of 
magic  and  science.  We  are  therefore  justified 
in  contending  that  the  use  of  the  concept  of 
causality  as  a  fundamentum  comparationis  be- 
tween different  phases  of  culture  and  diverse 
mental  processes  is  greatly  to  be  deplored.  In 
the  same  way  that  ethnic  entities,  such  as 
totemism,  taboo,  etc.,  are  artificial  units  when 
divorced  from  their  cultural  settings,  so  causality 
at  large,  when  separated  from  its  embodiment 
in  concrete  mental  operations,  is  an  artificial 
unit  which  does  not  assist  us  in  the  understand- 
ing, the  comparison,  or  the  elucidation  of  the 
phenomena  involved. 

A  final  word  of  caution  should  perhaps  be 
appended.  We  do  not  mean  to  attack,  indis- 
criminately and  at  large,  the  processes  of  gener- 
alization and  abstraction  and  to  contend  that 


CONVERGENCE  AND  CAUSALITY         193 

the  proper  study  of  all  cultural  phenomena  con- 
sists in  the  return  to  concrete  particularity  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  involve  nothing  more  than 
descriptive  characterizations  and  a  gossipy  inter- 
est which  finds  emotional  consolation  in  mere 
disjecta  membra,  but  rather  to  suggest  that  these 
logical  processes,  which  lift  facts  out  of  their 
indigenous  habitats  and  deal  with  them  in  their 
universalized  aspects,  should  be  applied  with 
much  more  critical  caution  than  is  customary. 
Ordinarily  we  suffer  from  over-generalization  and 
premature  classification,  and  it  is  this  considera- 
tion primarily,  although  not  exclusively,  which 
has  contributed  so  largely  to  the  bewildering 
ambiguity  in  which  the  entire  problem  of  causal- 
ity has  been,  and  is  still,  enshrouded. 


14 


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The  Press  was  incorporated  June  8, 1898,  to  promote  the 
publication  of  the  results  of  original  research.  It  is  a  pri- 
vate corporation,  related  directly  to  Columbia  University  by 
the  provisions  that  its  Trustees  shall  be  officers  of  the  Uni- 
versity and  that  the  President  of  Columbia  University  shall 
be  President  of  the  Press. 


The  publications  of  the  Columbia  University  Press  in- 
clude works  on  Biography,  History,  Economics,  Education, 
Philosophy,  Linguistics,  and  Literature,  and  the  following 
series : 

Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Anthropology. 

Columbia  University  Biological  Series. 

Columbia  University  Studies  in  Cancer  and  Allied 

Subjects. 
Columbia  University  Studies  in  Classical  Philology. 
Columbia  University  Studies  in  Comparative  Litera- 
ture. 
Columbia  University  Studies  in  English. 
Columbia  University  Geological  Series. 
Columbia  University  Germanic  Studies. 
Columbia  University  Indo-Iranian  Series. 
Columbia  University  Contributions  to  Oriental  History 

and  Philology. 
Columbia  University  Oriental  Studies. 
Columbia  University  Studies  in  Romance  Philology 

and  Literature.  ^  ^^  ^, 

Records  of  Civilization:  Sources  and  Studies. 

Blumenthal  Lectures.  Hewitt  Lectures. 

Carpentier  Lectures.  Jesup  Lectures. 

Julius  Beer  Lectures.  Adams  Lectures. 

Catalogues  will  be  sent  free  on  application 


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Due  end  of  WINTER  Quarter         .    n  79  7 
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